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Christopher Hobbs 
A critical investigation of the role of concepts, skills and 
attitudes within religious education in the secondary school. 
A historical survey of the development of the specification of 
appropriate concepts, skills and attitudes in religious 
education examines the general writings on the subject, agreed 
syllabuses and examination proposals. A critical examination 
of the objectives model of the curriculum, on which the above 
development is based, suggests that this may be the wrong 
approach to education. An examination of the process model of 
the curriculum suggests that this is a model that reflects 
more accurately the nature of education. The rest of the 
thesis is concerned with an attempt to show how religious 
education could be planned within a process model. An 
examination of the nature of religious belief gives an 
indication of what the intention of religious education should 
be. There follows an examination of the contribution that can 
be made to the planning of religious education by an 
understanding of each of the three aspects of learning; 
concepts, skills and attitudes. It is suggested that the 
central concept on which learning should be based in religious 
education is the concept of ultimacy. The intention of the 
learning experience should be that the pupil gains some form 
of realisation. Attitudes are seen as of the essence of 
learning, and are of particular relevance to religious 
education within a process model. The principles upon which 
religious education in a process model would be planned are 
set out and explained, both general principles and principles 
that are particularly appropriate to religious edcuation. 
Finally, some implications of the introduction of religious 
education within a process model into the curriculum of a 
secondary school are considered. 
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Christopher C. Hobbs 
Master of Arts in Education 
1987 
University of Durham 
School of Education 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No 
quotation from it should be published without his prior 
written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
1 
_: · ·.r - _, 
•· ·.·:<.I .J 
1 
2 
3 
4 
CONTENTS 
Introduction 
An Historical Survey 
The general development 
The Agreed Syllabus 
Birmingham 
Avon 
Hampshire 
Berkshire 
Durham 
Manchester 
Examination proposals 
Schools Council N and F proposals 
National Criteria for G.c.s.E. 
Summary 
The Aims/Objectives Model of the Curriculum 
The development of the model 
Educational theory 
Psychology 
Changing society 
A description of the model 
Goals 
Relationship between aims and objectives 
Behavioural objectives 
Experiential objectives 
Criticisms of the model 
The improvement of education 
The production of objectives 
The structure of knowledge 
The nature of edcucation 
Summary 
A Process Model of the Curriculum 
Features of the process model 
The process model in practice 
Content 
Approach 
Criticisms 
Religious Education in a process model 
Summary 
The Nature of Religion 
Educational theorists 
Phenix 
Hirst 
Philosophers and theologians 
Smart 
Ramsey 
Wittgenstein 
Hardy 
Summary 
2 
5 
9 
10 
26 
27 
29 
32 
35 
38 
39 
40 
40 
42 
47 
48 
48 
49 
50 
52 
54 
54 
54 
56 
58 
59 
61 
62 
69 
71 
75 
76 
76 
79 
82 
88 
91 
93 
95 
96 
96 
96 
99 
101 
101 
102 
104 
109 
114 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Concepts in Religious Education 
Definition 
Concepts and the objectives model 
The scope of religious education 
A classification of concepts in religious 
education 
Categories of concepts in religious education 
Concepts in a process model of religious 
education 
Realisation and the non-rational 
Summary 
Skills in Religious Education 
Definition 
Transfer of learning 
Transfer of learning in religious education 
Skills exclusive to religious education 
Religious understanding and the understanding 
of religion 
Skills in the objectives model 
Skills in the understanding of religion 
Skills for the believer 
Skills in the process model of religious 
education 
Summary 
Attitudes in Religious Education 
Definition 
Attitude development and change 
Cognitive dissonance 
Attitudes in an affective taxonomy 
Limitations on the teaching of attitudes 
Attitudes in the objectives model 
Attitudes in a process model of religious 
education 
Summary 
A Framework for Religious Education in a 
Process Model of the Curriculum 
The task 
General principles of procedure 
Principles of procedure for religious 
education 
Summary 
Further Considerations 
Integration 
Realisation and bias 
The content of religious education 
Constraints on implementation 
Assessment 
The role of the teacher 
3 
llS 
llS 
ll8 
120 
126 
134 
138 
143 
147 
148 
148 
148 
151 
153 
159 
162 
163 
169 
172 
176 
177 
177 
181 
183 
186 
189 
196 
201 
204 
205 
205 
207 
213 
221 
222 
222 
224 
226 
228 
229 
230 
Appendix A - Common agreement in learning theories 232 
Appendix B - Raths "criteria for identifying 234 
worthwhile activities" 
Appendix C - Attitudes in religious education 236 
Bibliography 237 
4 
Appendix A - Common agreement in learning theories 232 
Appendix B - Raths "criteria for identifying 234 
worthwhile activities" 
Appendix C - Attitudes in religious education 236 
Bibliography 237 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
It will be helpful to explain at the beginning of this thesis 
why it was written as this will go some way to explaining why 
it has taken the format in which it appears. The original 
reason for starting the thesis was to clarify for myself what 
religious education should be, what was justifiable under the 
title religious education, what the intentions of a teacher of 
religious education should be. The way that these questions 
were to be answered was by an examination of the place of the 
three aspects of learning, i.e. concepts, skills and 
attitudes. A definition of these three aspects, as objectives, 
is currently being used by many people as the basis on which a 
religious education syllabus can be founded. 
During an historical analysis of the development of concepts, 
skills and attitudes it became clear that they did not provide 
a complete picture of what religious education should be. 
Whilst the historical analysis is primarily descriptive I have 
included some of my evaluation of particular items. The 
evaluation is not consistent in that it has not been applied 
to every document or syllabus that has been reviewed. It is 
intended to provide an illustration of the misgivings that I 
felt as the material was reviewed. There are many more 
comments that could be made but that did not seem the way that 
offered the most progress. The way to progress lay, I felt, in 
examination of the curriculum model that gave rise to the 
three aspects of learning in the form that they are used. 
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This required, firstly, a careful description of the 
objectives model and then a critical examination of how it is 
intended to operate. The criticism of the objectives model is 
not original, the comments made in the thesis have been made 
by many other people, no doubt much more clearly and 
convincingly. The criticisms that I have made are a summary of 
many of the criticisms expressed by others, with an emphasis 
on some of those that I considered most relevant. Simply 
criticising the current model is of little help unless changes 
can be put forward that will satisfy the criticisms. This led 
to a consideration of another model of the curriculum, the 
process model. 
The process model reflects a particular view of education 
and, having shown how it would avoid the pitfalls of the 
objectives model it was to replace, it was then necessary to 
show how it could be used to plan a curriculum, and how it 
would affect the planning of a religious education syllabus. A 
method of using the model to plan a curriculum has already 
been set out by other writers and this is reviewed in some 
detail. The problem that nobody seems to have considered is 
how this model could be used to plan a religious education 
syllabus. 
I have tackled this problem in two parts. Firstly I felt it 
was necessary to set out precisely what religious education 
should be about and this meant that an examination of the 
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nature of religion had to be undertaken. This thesis is, of 
course, woefully inadequate to define the nature of religion, 
it has therefore confined itself to a discussion of the 
nature of religious belief. Even this is necessarily brief 
and its conclusions have had to be modified in the light of 
the place that religious education occupies in a state school. 
However, I feel that a working description of religious belief 
has been possible. 
The second part was to show how this working description of 
religious belief could be incorporated into a religious 
education syllabus. This has been done by an examination of 
the three aspects of learning that have already been 
mentioned. This approach was chosen for two reasons, firstly 
that each of the three aspects must be considered in 
the learning of a pupil and it seemed that an examination of 
each of them would be the way to clarify the contribution that 
each of them can make in the new model. Secondly, they 
represent to a large extent the current basis for the planning 
of a syllabus, albeit in a different model. Clearly there has 
been much thought put into the way that they can serve a 
pupil's educational needs and it would be foolish to ignore 
the insights of other writers concerned in the same field. 
The last part of the thesis was then to suggest how religious 
education coud be planned within the new model of the 
curriculum that had been adopted. As a final word, some 
implications of the adoption of this model for education in 
7 
general have been considered. 
I thus believe that my original intention in writing the 
thesis, that of clarification for myself as to what 
constitutes religious education, has been fulfilled. This does 
not, of course, close the matter. A problem now exists which 
is outside the scope of this thesis. That is, how religious 
education can be taught within the new model and according to 
the principles that have been set out in the thesis. Thus the 
next step must be to plan a syllabus for religious education 
within a process model of the curriculum. 
One final note is necessary and that is throughout the thesis 
I have used "he" where "he or she" would be more appropriate. 
This is simply to improve the flow of the text. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 
This chapter will seek to show how the planning of religious 
education has developed from syllabuses based on content to 
syllabuses based on an objectives model, with the objectives 
specified in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes. 
Since the writing of Tyler in 1949 educational thought on 
curriculum development has been heavily influenced by the 
objectives model. This model looks to the end result of the 
process of education as the determining factor as to what 
should take place in the classroom. It is a model that is 
based on aims and objectives. The natural development of this 
model is to state the aims of a course and then to go on to 
specify those aims in terms of objectives. The purpose of the 
objectives is to clarify, and enable the fulfilment of, the 
general statements of the aims. Bloom (1956) produced a 
taxonomy of educational objectives which can be seen as based 
on the work of Tyler, as Tyler had originally proposed the 
aims and objectives model of the curriculum. The taxonomy was 
divided into basically two parts within the cognitive domain, 
knowledge and skills. The second domain was the affective 
domain. If notice is taken of these divisions then it suggests 
that objectives need not be descriptive statements but could 
specify objectives within each of the three areas that can be 
identified as concepts, skills and attitudes. It would then be 
by specification in these three areas that the greatest 
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precision in the elaboration of the aims could be expected. A 
more detailed look at the objectives model will be undertaken 
in the second chapter. It is against this background that the 
historical survey will be conducted. 
The survey will be in three parts. First the general 
development of syllabus planning based on concepts, skills 
and attitudes1 from syllabus planning based on contenswill be 
considered. Secondl~ the way this theme has been developed in 
Agreed Syllabuses will be examine~and finally the influence 
of these developments on assessment as it appears in 
examination proposals will be considered. Within each of these 
parts the maintainance of chronological order will usually be 
observed. 
General development 
The 1944 Education act intended that religious education 
should be a Christian education and implied a syllabus based 
on content. Agreed syllabuses that followed were concerned 
mainly to specify that content and examinations were, for the 
most part, tests of knowledge of the scriptures. Religious 
education was seen in terms of teaching the Christian faith 
and bringing the pupils up to be Christians. 
There appears to have been no significant move away from the 
content based syllabus until the 1960's. Loukes, writing in 
1961 and 1965 does not move completely away from the content 
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based syllabus as he speaks of 
"the "something" that we are asked to teach" 
(Loukes, 1965, 96) 
by which he means content. He also produced a syllabus that 
was based on content in his "problem syllabus". However, he 
takes into account the actual educational practice of what he 
calls "good" schools and this leads him to three fundamental 
demands. First that the ground on which the teaching is based 
is the ground on which the adolescent stands ie. it must be 
identifiable by, and relevant to, the pupil. Secondly that the 
ground must be open, with no preconceived ideas or bias. Third 
is the demand for 
"a line of progress from experience, through analysis, to 
personal choice." (Loukes, 1965, 113) 
The line of progress that he sought was from fact, through 
meaning, to value. This is similar to the progression of 
content, understanding and evaluation that can be found in the 
requirements of assessment that will be examined later. Loukes 
clearly made a move away from the syllabus that is based on 
content alone to a syllabus where relevance to the pupil is 
paramount. It is the consideration of what is relevant to the 
education of the pupil and how to achieve it that is the 
concern of the aims and objectives model. 
Loukes, however, did not adopt an aims and objectives model of 
the curriculum, his emphasis was different. Instead of 
focusing on the end of education he focused on the process. He 
claimed that 
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"Good teaching is a process of dialogue about 
experience. (Loukes, 1965, 99) 
The emphasis on process in education will be considered 
further in chapter three. 
Loukes identified a dilemma in teaching children religious 
concepts that would appear to be too difficult for them to 
grasp and saw the solution in 
"applying to religious education the fundamental concepts 
of all education." (Loukes, 1965, 96) 
He shares this concern with Goldman and his writings of 1964 
and 1965. Goldman applied an educational understanding of 
concept development to the understanding of the Bible and some 
Christian concepts. His proposals were still based on a 
content of Christian education but they also conformed to the 
current educational thought, particularly to the ideas that 
had been proposed by Piaget. 
Smart emphasised, in 1968, the need to teach "how" rather than 
"that", thus expressing his idea that religious education 
should be in the direction of initiation into understanding 
the meaning of religion and into questions about the truth and 
worth of religion. He produces what can be seen as the start 
of a list of objectives in religious education when he says 
"Religious education could be designed to give people the 
capacity to understand religious 
sensitively religious claims, to 
phenomena, to discuss 
see the interrelations 
between religion and society and so forth." (Smart, 1968, 96) 
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All three of the above writers were concerned that children 
should understand what was being taught rather than just 
accept it. This was the general trend of the times and was 
summed up in the Durham Report on Religious Education 
"All major educational reports in recent years have made 
it plain that the principal argument for religious education 
in county schools is that it is a subject with its own 
inherent educational value and must have its place on the 
curriculum for educational reasons. We entirely agree." 
(Durham Report, 1970, 98) 
The report recognises that there are other arguments for 
religious education based on the nature of society and public 
opinion, the cultural, religion and morality, and tradition 
but these it relegates to being of supportive value only. 
Hirst still felt the need to argue in 1976 that educational 
principles are independent of religious belief. He argued that 
a theology of education must not be inconsistent with these 
autonomously justified educational principles but will give 
the teacher 
"an important religious rationale for involvement in 
education but will at the same time preserve him from 
improperly looking to religious resources for his educational 
principles" (Hirst, 1976, 157) 
Once this principle of justification had been accepted then 
religious education as a whole was considered according to the 
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current educational thinking. This meant consideration of 
curriculum development in terms of the aims and objectives 
model because this was the model that was predominant in 
educational thinking at the time. Cox makes the implications 
clear in an article in 1971 in which he identified four aims 
for the teacher of religious education. These were 
"1) To enable pupils to understand what religion has 
contributed to our culture. 
2) To help pupils to understand what people believe and 
how their beliefs influence their lives. 
3) Helping pupils to understand that a rational attitude 
) 
to life includes making up ones own mind on certain 
fundamental or ultimate questions of the nature of life and 
human personality. 
4) Helping the pupils to decide for themselves •..•• their 
own religious stance." (Cox, 1971, 5) 
It was at this time that the influential Working Paper 36 was 
published by the Schools Council. The working paper 
surveyed the current state of thought on religious education 
and attempted to produce a synthesis from its findings. It was 
not the first to attempt this task. J.W.D. Smith had proposed 
a compromise, between the "implicit" approach of Loukes and 
the "explicit" approach of Smart, in 1969. The working paper 
went further in that it not only broke down the aims into the 
kinds of objectives that teachers might have and be able to 
use; it also commented on content and methods that might be 
appropriate, all on an educational basis. The general aims 
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that it broke down into examples of objectives were 
"1) Awareness of religious issues. 
2) Awareness of the contribution of religion to human 
culture. 
3) Capacity to understand beliefs. 
4) Capacity to understand practices. 
5) Awareness of the challenge of religious belief. 
6) Awareness of the practical consequences of religious 
belief." (Schools Council, 1971, 44-45) 
It is possible to criticise these aims as being vague,they are 
open to a wide variety of interpretations and hence do not 
precisely indicate of what religious education is expected to 
consist. Equally they could be phrased in a number of 
different ways and still refer to the same ideas and 
intentions for religious education. It is the purpose of 
objectives that they clarify what is meant by the aims. The 
working paper only gave examples of the objectives that might 
be considered appropriate but even if the objectives had been 
specified exhaustively they were still phrased in a general 
descriptive manner. It is hard to see how objectives thus 
phrased can ever give a precise descr~tion of the aims and 
intentions of the syllabus that is not open to interpretation, 
let alone be definitive of the aims. 
Lupton (1975) takes up this criticism of the objectives model 
and argues that 
"Aims must be subject to considerable elaboration if they 
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are to be of application to the work of the practising 
teacher" (Lupton, 1975, 135) 
He went on to say that this had so far not happened. A fuller 
discussion of the degree of elaboration that might be required 
will take place in chapter two. 
To refer back to the work of Grimmitt in 1973 it is possible 
to see what Lupton means. Grimmitt attempted to combine a 
dimensional approach with an experiential approach and he 
offered what he called a conceptual framework for these two 
approaches. His list of aims in the area of situational themes 
is quite detailed, far more so than in any other area of the 
experiential approach, or in the dimensional approach. He 
states ten aims for situation themes, including such aims as 
"perceive the connection between beliefs, values, 
attitudes and behaviour" (Grimmitt, 1975, 204) 
Whilst this has the generality of an aim it does indicate a 
fairly detailed analysis of the intention of education as 
moral development. This detail might reflect the greater 
amount of work that had been done in the field of moral 
education compared with religious education, for example the 
work of Wilson (1970). Even so, the objectives in the area of 
situational themes still only give a general framework rather 
than precise details of what is to be taught, or learnt. 
Within the dimensional approach, the approach that is more 
concerned with the study of "explicit" religion, the aims and 
objectives are practical examples of what might be included 
rather than a detailed analysis of what is possible or what 
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should be included. Whilst Grimmitt may well say that ·he did 
not intend to produce a syllabus his examples do lack 
precision in their definition of his intentions. His book does 
however offer a useful survey of the developments in religious 
education up to that time. 
In 1975 Naylor surveyed the field of curriculum development 
and offered a suggestion of the way in which religious 
education should move. He looked at a variety of curriculum 
models and outlined his ideas on 
"five phases (objectives, content, learning experiences, 
organisation and integration, and evaluation) with examples 
from R.E." (Naylor, 1975, 123) 
Of particular note is that the objectives come before the 
content. He sees the objectives as being in two parts, aims, 
which are value judgements, and objectives, which are aims 
reduced to specific educational objectives. Naylor's article 
is intended to be of a theoretical nature, the proposal of a 
way of development for religious education that is firmly 
based on the current educational thinking. He concludes with 
the conviction that 
"a means-end approach is central to a planned 
curriculum" (Naylor, 1975, 134) 
Naylor's article was a survey and was hence derivative but it 
does reflect the direction in which religious education was 
moving at the time, 
In 1975 and 1976 Attfield published some detailed work on 
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concepts in religious education which deserves careful 
attention and which will be examined more closely in chapter 
five which deals specifically with concepts. Briefly, Attfield 
proposes a taxonomy of religious concepts and a series of 
steps for the development of the taxonomy as a tool for 
syllabus construction in religious education. 
In 1976 and 1977 the Religious Education Council of England 
and Wales produced two documents that represented the 
consensus of opinion of the members of the council. They 
sought to examine the place of the agreed syllabus within the 
context of contemporary conditions in society and current 
educational thought. They argued for the expansion of 
religious education into the area of life stances although 
they also argued that the religion that had 
"chiefly fashioned the culture in which one lives would be 
dealt with more extensively than fringe belief systems, or 
even other belief systems." (R.E. Council, 1977, 12) 
They do not presume to define content beyond this but 
recommend understandings to be developed, of which they list 
nine that they would expect to see included in any list, as a 
minimum. It is possible to criticise these general statements 
of objectives on the grounds that they would need to be much 
elaborated, and completed, if they were to meet the criterion 
of Lupton that they should be applicable to the work of the 
practising teacher. It should be noted however that these 
documents do not claim to be syllabuses. It was at this time 
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that a new type of agreed syllabus appeared that was no longer 
based on content, and these will be considered in the next 
sect ion. 
Also in 1977 there appeared two new documents from the 
Schools Council. One of these was the handbook for the 
teaching material that 
"Journeys into Religion 
they produced and was entitled 
Handbook A". In the first part of 
the handbook there is the rationale behind the material that 
is produced for use by teachers. The writers suggest that 
there is wide agreement on the aims of religious education and 
that these include 
"a) to promote awareness of religious issues 
b) to develop awareness of the contribution of religion to 
human culture 
c) to promote understanding of religious beliefs and 
practices 
d) to awaken recognition of the challenge and practical 
consequences of religious belief 
e) to give support to pupils in their search for a faith 
by which to live." (Schools Council, 1977a, 17) 
The aims are then divided up into objectives, which they call 
goals. The goals are expressed in terms of concepts, skills 
and attitudes and these are subdivided into three areas. These 
are a) those offered primarily by religious education; b) those 
offered by the humanities; and, in the case of skills and 
attitudes, c) those offered by most subjects. The concepts, 
20 
skills and attitudes are prefixed with the word "key" and are 
only meant as examples. They give a useful description of what 
is meant by the aims they consider are widely accepted but do 
not, nor claim to, go beyond that. 
The second document was called "A Groundplan for the Study of 
Religion" and is of a more theoretical nature. It is not 
intended to be a syllabus but rather seeks to 
"define what sort of knowledge, what sort of experience, 
and what sort of criteria for evaluation of religious material 
need to be included in the religious education curriculum in 
order to enable the pupils to react to whatever religious 
phenomena they may encounter in the reasonable manner of an 
educated person." (Schools Council, 1977b, 12) 
This document will be considered in some detail as it raises 
several important matters. 
Whilst recognising other possible approaches to religion in 
schools the one that the groundplan seems to adopt is Smart's 
phenomenological approach. This is seen as imparting certain 
skills of understanding and it is these skills that the 
groundplan attempts to define. It also contained a list of 
concepts that it claims are central to religion. 
The groundplan clearly states that it does not deal with the 
J 
pupils own search for a falth by which to live and calls its 
area of concern "religious studies" by which it means the 
) 
study of our own and other peoples belief systems (p.13). It 
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seems quite reasonable to talk about the study of religion in 
terms of appreciating certain concepts, developing certain 
skills and approaching the study with certain attitudes. What 
is more difficult to accept is the separation of this study 
) 
from the pupi 1 s own experience. 
The groundplan is divided into three areas; knowledge, 
understanding and evaluation and the interrelated nature of 
these three is shown in diagrammatic form. If just evaluation 
is considered, this means an approach to study from the 
observer's own point of view. The groundplan seems to 
recognise this when it suggests that the evaluation should be 
done with reference to personal relevance. Obviously 
evaluation implies a standard by which to evaluate and 
personal relevance is one of many possible standards and can 
be argued for as worthwhile. The difficulty comes in 
separating evaluation that is by reference to personal 
relevance from the pupil's own search for a faith, necessarily 
personally relevant, by which to live. 
The groundplan seems to be concerned with an objective 
approach to the study of religion but as Bishop Leslie 
Newbigin wrote that 
"If "objectivity" ••.• means "without any presuppositions 
about what counts as evidence and what makes sense", then it 
is impossible". (Newbigin, 1978, 3) 
The groundplan fails to take the progressive development of 
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the pupil's understanding of his own experience and the 
interpretation of such as a necessary part of his development 
of religious understanding. The groundplan does make a 
distinction between "understanding of religion" and "religious 
underst.=lnciing"; the latter it defines as a W::IV 
---J of looking at, 
an approach to, the world which is based on a credal framework 
in which one believes. 
This problem with the groundplan is accentuated by the 
comments made on attitudes. It suggests that any attitudes 
that are developed should start with the willingness of the 
pupil to learn. It is hard to see how the pupil's interest can 
be stimulated in something that does not involve the pupil's 
own experience. The other comments on attitudes are limited to 
a list of the type of attitudes that are thought appropriate 
bearing in mind the obvious pitfalls in developing attitudes 
in religious education and the necessity for the attitudes to 
be educationally justifiable. There are no explicit affective 
objectives in the groundplan, these are left as an approach to 
the subject rather than as targets and so are outside the 
scope of the groundplan. 
Finally, it uses "skills of understanding" to cover concepts, 
skills and attitudes.This does not really clarify matters at 
all but rather introduces a term that is less precise and 
unnecessary. 
The groundplan raises the question of what exactly is meant 
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by religious education and how best it could be taught in the 
school context. Cox (1975), amongst others, has made the point 
that we need to first of all find out how much of the study of 
religion, and the techniques for the study of religion, can we 
expect pupils to understand below, sRy, grAdu8 te level. The 
next question must be to what extent religious education 
should be an objective study, and to what extent should it be 
concerned with the development of the pupil's personal faith. 
Until these questions are answered satisfactorily it is not 
possible to assess the worth of the groundplan for the 
classroom teacher. A discussion of the nature of religious 
belief, the start of an answer to the above questions, is in 
chapter four. 
In 1980 the Christian Education Movement started to publish 
their Professional Papers. In the first of these (Lealman 
1980) Grimmitt contributed an essay in which he divided 
religious education in terms of "pure" and "applied" religion 
and identified abilities and attitudes in each area. His 
"pure" religion seems quite close to what has previously been 
called the "explicit" study of religion, and in this area he 
divides his aims and objectives into four groups. These groups 
are the answers to four questions, 
"1) What is necessary to achieve an understanding of 
religion and its place and significance in everydy life? 
2) What special abilities are necessary to achieve this 
understanding? 
3) Are there any other, more general abilities which the 
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study of religion promotes? 
4) Are there any attitudes which the study of religion 
promotes and which are necesary in order to study religion 
effectively?" (Grimmitt, 1980, 18) 
He gives, in answer to these quest ions; aims and 
objectives phrased as abilities and which consist of concepts 
and skills (question 2), general study skills (question 3) and 
attitudes (question 4). As the concepts and skills are set out 
as abilities they are of the nature of general statements and 
are not an analysis of the aims. 
The second part, that of "applied" religion, is concerned with 
the contribution that the study of religion can make to a 
pupil's personal and social development. This contribution he 
identifies in terms of abilities for each area, personal and 
social. He also identifies some attitudes which are developed. 
In each of these areas of personal and social development the 
abilities that he sees as relevant are, he claims, promoted by 
the study of religion and so they are not necessarily to be 
seen as the aims of the study of religion. The abilities and 
attitudes that he feels are promoted may thus be quite 
acceptable in the general terms that he offers without being 
of any great help to the teacher of religious education. 
The second Professional Paper (1981) continued the development 
of the aims/objectives model without considering concepts, 
skills and attitudes separately. Of interest is some material 
which is provided by Avon L.E.A. to help teachers in schools 
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in making their own syllabuses and which is reproduced in the 
papers. Skills are divided up into the general and the 
particular, the general being study and learning skills that 
would be applicable to most subjects. The particular skills 
;::Jri? not only skills but also include concepts, for example the 
skill "to appreciate the reasons behind religious ritual" 
entails a concept of ritual. It would perhaps have been better 
if they had used the term ability rather than skill. 
Bloom (1954) drew a distinction between skills and abilities. 
He claimed that the term "ability" refers to a competence in a 
situation in which skills and use of knowledge are needed ie. 
specific recall of knowledge allied to mastered skills. Thus 
skills can be seen as theoretically separate from content. The 
attitudes are set out in a useful way and will be considered 
more closely in the chapter on attitudes. Also worthy of note 
is John's analysis of skills (1983) and this will be referred 
to in chapter six. He proposes a list of six skills which he 
claims are particularly relevant to, used and developed in 
religious education. 
These represent the most influential and relevant of the 
writings on the subject in recent years. 
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The Agreed Syllabus 
The agreed syllabus is a legal document which local education 
authorities are required to produce, or adopt from anothec 
authority, under the terms of the 1944 Education act. It must 
be agreed by a committee which is comprised of four groups 
1) the Church of England 
2) such religious denominations as the local authority 
think ought to be represented 
3) representatives of teachers 
4) the authority itself. 
The original intention of the 1944 act was that religious 
education should be Christian education and the committees 
seem to have been involved in doctrinal rivalry in producing 
the early agreed syllabuses. More recently the emphasis has 
been on the educational nature of the document. Early 
syllabuses were content based and it was the precise content 
that was under debate. Recent syllabuses have paid more 
attention to current educational thinking and several major 
developments have taken place. It is reasonable to say that in 
recent years teachers have taken a greater share of the 
writing of the agreed syllabus and it is their interest in 
education that has been reflected in the recent documents. The 
agreed syllabuses that will be looked at have been produced in 
recent years and have been the most influential or have 
introduced stages in the development of the agreed syllabus. 
The development that will be traced is from a content based 
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syllabus to an objectives based syllabus and from objectives 
described by general statements to objectives described in 
terms of concepts, skills and attitudes. 
The Birmingham Agreed Syllabus (107<;\ \.J......JIJ) 
This syllabus was a radical departure from earlier syllabuses 
in its format. The actual syllabus is very short, covering 
only four pages, but it is accompanied by a large, loose leaf 
folder which is intended to be up-dated by supplements. There 
is no formally stated aim but there is an intention stated in 
the introduction 
"The syllabus should thus be used to enlarge and deepen 
the pupil's understanding of religion by studying world 
religions, and by exploring all those elements in human 
experience which raise questions about life's ultimate meaning 
and value" (Birmingham L.E.A., 1975, 4) 
The syllabus acknowledges the presence of significantly large 
minorities of people within the area who are committed to 
religions other than Christianity and so, whilst it was made 
compulsory to study Christianity, it was also made compulsory 
to study some of these other religions. It was also recognised 
that there were people who believed in 
"a stance for living which shares many of the dimensions 
religion whilst not admitting belief in realities 
transcending the natural order." (Birmingham L.E.A., 1975, 10) 
A study of one of these stances for living was made compulsory 
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for pupils in the upper school. This was not an ent .irely new 
idea but it was one that caused a furore when the syllabus 
was first published. 
The syllabus was divided into four sections which were to 
take into account the stages of development of the pupils 
which, it was claimed, were generally recognised. The groups 
were 3-8 years, 8-12 years, 12-16 years and the sixth form. 
This showed up a major weakness, in the educational thinking 
behind the syllabus. Like its predecessors, it was content 
based and thus the differentiation between the age groups was 
in terms of differing content. However, with much of the 
content , it is the way in which it is approached that makes 
it suitable or unsuitable for a particular age group. It is a 
criticism of any syllabus that is presented purely in terms 
of content that it does not say what is to be done with it. 
With the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus there is no direction 
given with regard to intention or approach beyond the passage 
in the introduction. This is inadequate to express clearly the 
committee's intentions. 
The syllabus did more than expand the type of content in an 
agreed syllabus though. Perhaps its most important 
contribution to the development of the agreed syllabus was in 
its recognition of the professional ability of the teaching 
staff i.n the area. The shortness of the syllabus meant that 
the development of courses and the implementation of the 
syllabus were left to teachers. It gave the teacher the 
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opportunity, in fact it required the teacher, to choose 
materials and approaches according to their own strengths and 
professional judgement. Thus the element which will later be 
argued for as the most important in education, the process of 
learning, was much more under the control of the 
professionals, the teachers. 
The Avon Agreed Syllabus (1976) 
This was again a short document and was to be backed up by 
papers issued after it had been published. These papers were 
to be on topics where teachers might need help, such as 
specific issues in religious education, case studies of work 
in school and lists of resources. The second part of the 
syllabus deals with "The provision and arrangements for 
Religious Education in Schools" and this will not be 
considered further as it is not relevant to the present 
survey. It is the first part which is of particular interest. 
It is entitled "Aims and general objectives for Religious 
Education" and is the main body of the syllabus. The principal 
aim of religious education is stated as 
"to enable pupils to understand the nature of religion and 
what it would mean to take a religion seriously." 
(Avon L.E.A., 1976, 4) 
The aim is then split into two parts; 1) understanding of 
explicit religious beliefs and practices and 2) implicit 
questions of meaning and value. 
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The novel part of the syllabus is the way in which it expands 
the aim into general objectives without specifying content 
although there is a considerable amount of content in the 
objectives. The general objectives are separated into three 
stages that are close to those used by Birmingham and are 
similarly justified. The objectives are intended to be 
achieved by the time the pupil reaches the upper age limit of 
each stage. There are between four and six objectives for each 
stage. The objectives are in the form of descriptive 
statements and can be separated into various types. 
1) Content based: general, eg. (age range 9-13) "Have some 
factual knowledge of the historical and contemporary 
expression of Christianity and other major religions". This is 
so general as to provide enough scope on it~ own for an 
entire course. 
2) Content based: specific, eg. (3-9) "Have some knowledge of 
the daily life of children at other times and in other 
countries, including that in first century Palestine". This is 
one of the few specific areas of content and it appears to 
have little to do with the aim of understanding the nature of 
religion. 
3) Skill based, eg. (9-13) "Be able to enter imaginatively 
and with sensitivity into other people's experience and 
attitudes". This illustrates a shortcoming in the syllabus in 
that there is no mention of attitudes such as the desire to 
empathise. Possession of a skill does not imply a wish to use 
it and whilst this is a difficult area some mention could have 
been made of attitudes that might be thought appropriate. 
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4) Concept based, eg. ( 13-16+) "Have gained some understanding 
of the nature of religion •••• ". 
5) Experiential, eg. (13-16+) "Have explored the relationship 
bet ween belief and life". Experiential because only an 
experience is required> there is no specific end or even any 
learning stated. 
There is no explicit description of what is meant by the 
nature of religion in the syllabus. What the syllabus appears 
to be is a desciption of what religious education might aim 
towards that is no better or worse than many others that could 
be suggested because it is no more or less explicit. The 
general objectives do not analyse the aim and only describe it 
in the vaguest of ways. The objectives do not make up a 
coherent whole that pinpoints what religious education should 
be about. Avon later published some guidance for teachers who 
were preparing schemes of work according to the agreed 
syllabus. This guidance contained a list of sixteen skills 
and ten attitudes which differ in format from the general 
objectives in the agreed syllabus. 
The syllabus may not be perfect but it was a development 
away from the content based syllabus. It allows the teachers 
further freedom to develop their own ideas and adapt according 
to the circumstances. 
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The Hampshire Agreed Syllabus (1978) 
This has been one of the most influential of the agreed 
syllabuses, it has been adopted by more authorities than any 
other syllabus. In form it is very much like the Avon agreed 
syllabus in that it is a short document that is supplemented 
by a handbook. Called "Paths to Understanding" (Laxton w. 
(ed.)) the handbook was published two years after the 
syllabus and contains schemes of work prepared by teachers 
working within the guidelines of the agreed syllabus. Many 
teachers would accept that if the schemes are representative 
of the opportunity given to teachers by the syllabus then it 
has added something to the progress of religious education. 
The ~llabus states that 
"The principal aim of religious education in schools 
within the public sector is to enable pupils to understand the 
nature of religious beliefs and practices, and the importance 
and influence of these in the lives of believers." 
(Hampshire Education Authority, 1978, 8) 
The syllabus is set out as objectives within the usual three 
developmental age groups. The general objectives are 
descriptive statements of the aim and there are five to each 
age group. The general objectives are then further described 
by between two and four secondary objectives which are 
examples of what the pupil should be able to do if the general 
objective had been achieved. These secondary Objectives are 
thus all behavioural. Finally, for each of the general 
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objectives there is some content listed which is intended as 
illustrative material only. The general objectives, along with 
their descriptions, give a much fuller analysis of the aims 
than do the objectives in the Avon agreed syllabus but they 
would still seem to fall short of the "considerable 
elaboration" required by Lupton. 
Some relevant points are also made about the basis of the 
syllabus. First, it expects that the content will be drawn 
largely from the Christian tradition as this is the religious 
faith that has had, and still has, the greatest influence on 
our culture. Secondly it claims that religious education is 
concerned with questions of the meaning and purpose of 
existence and should help pupils in their own search for 
meaning, purpose and values. It seems to suggest however that 
this should come by way of studying the answers that other 
people have given rather than by actually engaging in the 
quest based on the pupils own experience. Thirdly it 
recognises the importance of the pupils gaining an insight 
into the experiential dimension of religion and stresses the 
need for encounter with believers and with the practices, 
customs, the art and other ways in which the believers express 
their feelings. 
There is little reference to attitudes in the syllabus. This 
is common to all of the agreed syllabuses up to, and 
including, this one. Whilst there is the expressed desire in 
the aim that the pupils should be able to develop their own 
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faith, undertake their own quest for meaning, there is nothing 
in any of the syllabuses that contributes towards this. 
Studying other people's feelings and insights is not the same 
' as developing ones own insights, that requires an input from 
) . d ones own exper1ence an feelings. Equally, for such a course 
to work in the way that is intended in the agreed syllabus 
some guidance is needed as to the type of approach that is 
considered appropriate. Approach refers both to the way 
that the teacher prepares and conducts the lesson and to the 
way that the pupil approaches the lesson. One way in which 
this can be to some extent specified is by stating attitudes 
that it is considered appropriate to encourage in the pupils. 
This need not be objectionable as long as the attitudes 
specified are those that can be commonly agreed as desirable 
and are not specific to a particular religious standpoint. The 
sort of attitudes that would meet these criteria are those 
that might be thought desirable for the pupil's education in 
other areas of the curriculum. 
If the teacher is to encourage these attitudes in the pupil 
then the approach the teacher must take is also specified to 
some extent. The type of attitudes that are acceptable, by 
their very nature require that they be taught in a certain 
way. For example it is hard to see how respect for others 
could effectively be encouraged in a way that did not show 
respect for the pupils and require them to enter imaginatively 
into the experience of others. 
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The Berkshire Agreed Syllabus (1982) 
Knowledge 
1) Describing 
2) Understanding 
3) Responding 
Religious Heritage 
1) Stories and events 
2) Festival and ceremonies 
3) Moral Teachings 
4) Experience and faith 
5) Culture and Organisation 
6) Beliefs and Concepts 
7) Questions and concerns 
Attitudes Skills 
1) Curiosity 1) Enquiry 
2) Open mindedness 2) Expression 
3) Critical mind 
---------
3) Empathy 
4) Tolerance 4) Interpretation 
5) Self-confidence 5) Reasoning 
6) Consideration 6) Meditation 
7) Appreciation 
8) Commitment 
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The objectives are offered in a diagrammatic form,as above, 
as well as with a fuller explanation. 
The aim of this syllabus is stated thus 
"Religious education aims to help pupils understand 
religious beliefs, practices and insights, in order that they 
may form their own beliefs and judgements, and their own 
allegiances and commitments." 
(Berkshire Education Authority, 1982, 4) 
The syllabus claims that 
"Aims and objectives are roads to travel on, not 
destinations to reach". 
(Berkshire Education Authority, 1982, 18) 
The point that they wish to make is that religious education 
starts before, and goes on after, the pupils are at school. It 
is a generally accepted part of the definition of education 
that it is a lifelong process. However it seems strange to put 
this meaning on the terms aims and objectives as they tend to 
suggest a target rather than a continuing process. 
The knowledge objectives are clearly influenced by Smart's 
six dimensions of religion, with the addition of "questions 
and concerns" as a seventh. Rather than being an extra 
dimension similar to Smart's other dimensions it seems more to 
be expressing the concern of the syllabus that pupils should 
be engaged in their own quest for meaning. It is a point worth 
36 
making but the emphasis is inappropriate here, a pupil's 
personal quest for meaning is not a part of our religious 
heritage. Equally, the way in which knowledge has been divided 
into three sections is unusual. Knowledge is usually thought 
of as static i.n that it is the raw material that is operated 
on by the thought processes. The terms the syllabus uses are 
dynamic namely describing, understanding and responding and 
these would seem to be used as the equivalents of 
knowledge, understanding and evaluation. These are certainly 
different ways in which knowledge can be used, they are 
broadly the uses of knowledge in which pupils may eventually 
be assessed, but they refer to the use to which the knowledge 
is put, not to the knowledge itself. These divisions would 
come more appropriately under the heading of skills. 
The syllabus made a serious attempt at some kind of analysis 
of what is meant by religious education. Despite some unusual 
uses of language it represents a step of progress in the 
development of religious education in that it further 
clarifies what is meant by religious education. The visual 
summary of the syllabus tries to express that the religious 
heritage is the experience that the pupils are to be given and 
that the three separate aspects of the quest to make sense are 
knowledge, attitudes and skills; or knowing, feeling and doing 
as the syllabus calls them. These aspects are to be seen as of 
equal importance and as affecting each other. 
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The Durham Agreed Syllabus (1983). 
This syllabus starts with a discussion of aims but does not 
specify any. The nearest to a specification of an aim is a 
sentence that states 
"Religious education is concerned with helping young 
people to mature in sensitivity to this (spiritual dimension) 
aspect of human experience and to appreciate a religious 
understanding of life and what it means to be religiously 
committed." (Durham Education Authority, 1983, 3) 
The main problem with this is the claim that there is a 
generally recognised spiritual dimension and that anyone 
reading this will understand what is meant. Many people would 
not recognise that there is a spiritual dimension that is 
separate from certain mental and emotional aspects of a person 
and so some definition and justification of this phrase is 
required. 
The objectives are in terms of concepts, skills and attitudes 
but the lists of these are prefaced by a remark that they are 
not definitive or exhaustive but contain only some of those 
that could be listed. It is to be expected that those listed 
were considered to be the most important and it may be that 
the writers felt that the list was complete but wished to be 
cautious. The lists are open to the criticism to which all 
such lists are open and that is that they could be expressed 
in many different ways and still retain a similar character. 
They are certainly better in this respect than general 
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descriptive statements but the criticism is still valid. All 
things considered the syllabus takes another step towards a 
content free syllabus that aims for understanding rather than 
knowledge and in this respect can be seen as a further 
development. 
The Manchester Agreed Syllabus (1985) 
The principal aim of this syllabus is stated as 
"The principal aim of religious education in county and 
voluntary controlled schools is to enable pupils to reflect 
upon and respond to the religious and spiritual beliefs, 
practices, insights and experiences that are expressed in 
human-kind' s search for meaning in life." 
(Manchester Education Authority, 1985) 
It further explains that 
"The term "religion" is used broadly and includes the 
usual meanings given to the words "spiritual" and "ethical"." 
(Manchester Education Authority, 1985) 
It also feels it necessary to state that whilst Christianity 
will feature clearly, other faiths should also be taught. 
The objectives for the secondary stage are set out in four 
groups, the usual concepts, skills and attitudes and also 
experiences. Of these 'experience objectives two' are concerned 
with the broadening of the pupil's experience by developing 
sensitivity and appreciation, they are the type of descriptive 
objectives that appeared in earlier agreed syllabuses. The 
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third is J 
"To help students to broaden their experiences by 
meeting and sharing with people of various faiths or spiritual 
or ethical traditions." (Manchester Education Authority, 1985) 
Apart from the intention that it should broaden the pupil's 
experience this objective has no end in view, it does not 
state specifically what should come out of the meeting and 
sharing. This is a new type of objective in an agreed 
syllabus, it is the first experiential objective that is 
intentionally experiential rather than behavioural. The same 
could not be said for the experiential objectives in the Avon 
syllabus because there the mixture of objectives is such that 
no intention can be assumed. As such it could be seen as a 
further development of religious education. 
Examination Proposals 
The Schools Council 18+ Research Programme N and F Proposals 
(1977) 
These were intended as replacements for the G.C.E. at advanced 
level and were designed to give greater breadth of study, at 
the expense of some depth, to sixth form students. A student 
would study a norm of five subjects, three at normal (N) level 
and two at further (F) level. Within religious studies one 
group, the Basingstoke group, were asked to prepare an 
approach through the listing of objectives. Their brief was to 
convert the aim J 
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"to enable pupils to develop an understanding of religion 
and it'f's place and significance in everyday life." 
......,.-
(Schools Council, 1977c, 2) 
into specific objectives. The objectives that they formulated 
were 
"1) The ability to IDENTIFY religious phenomena. 
2) The ability to UNDERSTAND religious phenomena. 
3) The ability to APPLY religious perspectives. 
4) The ability to ANALYSE and EVALUATE information 
gathered." (Schools Council, 1977c, 2) (their emphasis) 
Whilst they recognise that other objectives could have been 
included they claim that these represent an irreducible 
minimum core. They further explain what they mean by each of 
the objectives and claim that mastery of them by the student 
would produce an educated and skilful student of religion. In 
the next part of the document are schemes that set out how the 
objectives could be applied to selected aspects of Buddhism, 
Christianity and a study of some contemporary religious 
beliefs and practices. These schemes are intended to be 
exemplary and not a syllabus, they do however provide some 
guidance as to how the objectives are intended to be developed 
and attained. At the time the use of objectives presented in 
terms of abilities in religious understanding was a 
significant move forwards for the assessment of pupils in 
religious studies. This is because it related assessment to 
the most recently accepted ideas in curriculum development, in 
this case the means/end model. 
41 
It is worthwhile noting that many current mode 1 syllabuses in 
religious studies are still set out in terms of content only. 
It was also possible until recently to gain acceptance for a 
mode 3 scheme that sets out as objectives only general study 
skills. Often assessment objectives and skills in both modes 
are descriptions of content with words such as "understand" or 
"evaluate" as a prefix. The N and F proposals show much 
clearer thought about the educational objectives needed to 
achieve an 
understanding 
religion. 
aim that is specifically directed at the 
religion rather than simply knowing about 
National Criteria for G.C.S.E. (1985) 
The Schools Council were involved in the preliminary work for 
this examination and Hogbin (1981) provides a useful summary 
of their report. In it four basic principles involved in 
religious study are stated. 
"1) Every pupil should have knowledge of the religious 
traditions within which the culture and institutions of the 
United Kingdom have developed. 
2) Every pupil should have knowledge of his own religious 
tradition where this differs from the mainstream United 
Kingdom tradition. 
3) Every pupil should understand that his own religious 
tradition is one among a number. 
4) Every pupil should gain a knowledge of religion that 
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enables him to achieve greater personal development and social 
competence." (Hogbin, 1981, 15) 
These principles make it clear that the content of any course 
should include Christianity and also other religious 
traditions. 
The paper also expects the National Criteria to be in the 
form of aims and objectives as it is in this form that 
insights and skills most likely to be of lasting value can be 
expressed. It is not expected that the aims and objectives can 
or should be comprehensive but, for the purpose of 
illustration, certain aims are identified. The objectives that 
are given are acknowledged to be limited to those that can be 
assessed. The objectives are in terms of abilities and for the 
most part relate a skill to a particular, though often wide, 
area of content, for exampley 
"Ability to recognise and use religious language." 
(Hogbin, 1981, 20). 
The National Criteria themselves provide the criteria to 
which examination proposals in the future will have to 
conform. They are not intended to prescribe an 11-16 syllabus 
in religious education but are concerned solely with the 
G.C.S.E. examination at 16+. 
The assessment objectives are those upon which the candidate 
may be called to demonstrate his ability and upon that 
demonstration will depend his final grade. They are not a full 
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description of the aims. The aims are intended to be the 
general aims of the course and will not all be assessed. When 
an aim that starts, 
"2.3. to help candidates to identify and explore questions 
about the meaning of life;,;,;" (National Criteria, 1985, 
is considered it is clear that it is not the help that 
students receive that is to be assessed. The two groups; aims, 
which are of an educational nature, and assessment objectives 
illustrate that there is often a difference between what is 
educational and what can be assessed. 
The assessment objectives read as objectives that describe 
the aim of understanding religion and in this they are nearer 
the current thought and practice of teachers than are the 
previous examination syllabuses that were defined by content. 
Given that these criteria are to apply nationally and must 
therefore be general rather than specific thay can be seen as 
a further development in the field of assessment. As the 
exemplary material shows they are wide ranging and adaptable. 
It is possible to criticise the criteria and one criticism 
could be that although a wide variety of combinations of 
content are allowed for there is no mention of any 
consideration of a humanistic approach to life. Also the 
allocation of marks places an emphasis on knowledge that may 
be unwelcome to some teachers who would regard the acquisition 
of skills as of greater importance. Knowledge counts for 
approximately as many marks as understanding, and each of 
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these counts for approximately twice the number of marks as 
evaluation. 
Further criticism of the National Criteria comes in a 
document called "Religious Studies at 16+" by Wood ( 19 84). 
This was concerned with assessment in a multi-cultural society 
and points out the danger that the content of the G.C.S.E. 
course could be entirely Christian or, if following a thematic 
approach, could lack coherence. This criticism is still valid 
now that the National Criteria have been published as it is 
quite possible to follow a course that is entirely Christian 
in content. 
Of interest are Wood's discussion points for the future 
development of assessment. The first three are that:-
1) there should be a common core of skills rather than a 
common core of content 
2) assessment should be resource based ie. that stimulus 
material should be included in examinations 
3) the feasibility of practical tests in religious studies 
should be seriously considered. 
These three pointers to possible future development of 
assessment suggest a different type of course from that which 
has so far been suggested. For pupils to be able to cope with 
assessments based on these principles the course should 
develop the skills required and also provide a familiarity 
with stimulus material and practical work in religious 
studies. The possibilities that are opened up by these changes 
45 
in assessment are wide and some of them will be considered in 
this thesis. 
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Summary 
Religious education has moved from a content based syllabus to 
one based on the objectives model of the curriculum, in line 
with the general trend in education. 
Religious education has developed from a confessional stance 
to one that is largely based on the study and understanding of 
the phenomena of religion. As well as understanding it also 
seems necessary that the pupil's own beliefs, based on the 
pupil's experiences, are developed. 
Since the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus opened up agreed 
syllabuses to the study of a wide variety of beliefs there has 
been no agreed syllabus of influence that has been 
confessional in nature. 
Within the recent agreed syllabuses there is a development in 
the description of the aims of religious education. These have 
been described in terms of general objectives, more specific 
objectives and, currently, in terms of concepts, skills and 
attitudes. 
Assessment seems to be making some progress in the direction 
of assessment of understanding, rather than just knowledge, 
with the introduction of the National Criteria for G.c.s.E .. 
There are suggestions for further development which indicate a 
different emphasis in religious education. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE AIMS/OBJECTIVES MODEL OF THE CURRICULUM 
In the previous chapter, the historical survey of the 
development of concepts, skills and attitudes in religious 
education, it was noted that it was an aims and objectives 
model of the curriculum that was being developed. The use of 
concepts, skills and attitudes as objectives represents the 
latest development of the aims/objectives model in religious 
education. It was also noted in passing that there are some 
apparent weaknesses in that model. This chapter will examine 
the model more closely to assess its value for the planning of 
the pupil's education. It will start with a more thorough 
description of the aims/objectives model and then go on to 
examine some criticisms that have been made of it. 
The development of the aims/objectives model of the 
curriculum. 
It is reasonable to say that three principal factors have 
been influential in the development of the aims/objectives 
model. These three are educational theory, psychology and 
changes in society. Their influence has been inter-related but 
for the moment they will be considered separately. 
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1) Educational Theory 
One of the most influential, and one of the earliest, writers 
to propose an aims/objectives model for the curriculum was 
R.W.Tyler in his book "Basic Principles of Curriculum and 
Instruction" published in 1949. In it he offered a 
systematic approach to the development of the curriculum. By 
systematic is meant an attempt at the rational planning of 
educational thinking about the curriculum. He argued that we 
could set out our objectives in education in three ways. The 
first two are)a) to specify the activities of the teacher and 
b) to specify the content to be covered. Tyler argues that 
neither of these can claim to give us educational ends. In the 
first case it is unreasonable to specify teacher activities 
before stating the changes that are desired in the students. 
In the second case there is no indication of what is to be 
done with the content and thus there is no clear idea of the 
curriculum that may result from this specification. 
Tyler then identifies a third way of stating educational 
objectives, that of expressing them in terms of the behaviour 
to be developed in the student ie. as a behavioural 
objective. Tyler does not mean by behavioural objective a 
statement such as "to develop critical thinking". He requires 
the statement to specify the behaviour more precisely. 
Neither will, "to be able to write a critical essay" satisfy 
him as he also requires that all objectives should be linked 
to content. The type of objective that he requires should 
state clearly the ability to be learnt and the area of content 
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in which this ability can be demonstrated, for example "to 
write clear and well organised social studies reports" 
(Tyler, 1949, 47). An objective should be stated in this way 
to facilitate the selection of learning experiences. It has 
the apparent advantage of making assessment relatively 
straightforward as well, both of the ability of the student 
and the effectiveness of the teacher. Thus Tyler's meaning of 
behavioural objective includes both the intended behaviour of 
the student and relevant area of content, guides the selection 
of learning experiences and indicates the end result of an 
educational process (Tyler, 1949, 62). 
2) Psychology 
The influence of psychology on curriculum development has 
been based on theories of learning and the transfer of 
learning. Taba (1962) describes three theories of learning 
that are relevant to education, and the notions of transfer of 
learning that go with them, in her book "Curriculum 
Development- Theory and Practice". The first theory can be 
called the faculty theory and it sees the mind as already 
containing all mental faculties which just need training and 
practice to bring them to the required standard. This theory 
assumes a complete, or almost complete, transfer of training. 
This degree of transfer was challenged by many psychologists 
including Thorndike and Woodworth, and the theory is now 
outmoded in that it would be dismissed by the vast majority of 
psychologists. 
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The second theory can be called the associationist theory or 
the stimulus/response model. This suggests that learning 
consists of building up a collection of responses, each one to 
a particular stimulus, there being little or no transfer of 
training. 
The third theory, often called the field theory, is the one 
that has gained the widest acceptance and has been stated in a 
wide variety of ways. Basically it suggests that cognitive 
processes are a fundamental characteristic of human responses 
even at its most simple levels and that man perceives and 
creates relationships from his perceptions. This theory 
accepts that there is some transfer of training and suggests 
that new perceptions are interpreted in the li.ght of previous 
learning and are adapted into generalisations that have 
already been made. This is a complex theory and finding 
agreement even between those who hold this theory can be 
difficult. Hilgard has produced a list of fourteen points that 
he feels are fairly commonly agreed. This list has been 
combined with a similar one from Wheeler and the list thus 
produced of sixteen points could be said to be commonly agreed 
upon as reflecting accurately the way in which we learn. This 
list is added as appendix A. 
The list is important for two reasons. Firstly for teachers 
as providing some criteria for selection of suitable learning 
experiences with which to obtain their educational objectives. 
Secondly, and more relevant to the development of the 
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objectives model, is that they indicate a certain kind of 
curriculum and syllabus planning. They require the student to 
be active, involved, motivated and encouraged to make 
connections and generalisations. A model of the curriculum 
that is based on the attainment of behavioural objectives, 
where there is an emphasis on developing the skills and 
understanding of the students, could be considered to satisfy 
these requirements. By using the points of agreement as the 
basis for choosing learning experiences to attain the 
objectives the teacher can then argue that he is planning his 
teaching as effectively as possible according to the current 
agreed understanding of the learning process. 
3) Changes in Society 
Society is a very broad term but there has been an 
increasing call for education in schools to equip students 
for life in society after school. What is meant by society 
in this context can best be shown by illustration, for example 
Taba (1962) claims that Chase (1956) listed five aspects of 
society that set tasks for education. These were:-
"1) A tremendous enlargement of the environment to be 
understood and the culture to be transmitted. 
2) An ever increasing demand for an increasingly skilled and 
literate workforce. 
3) The necessity for the establishment of intercultural 
communication among the diverse cultures of the East and the 
West as a basis for building a world community. 
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4) The difficulties involved in sustaining wide latitudes of 
free individual choice in a world of magnified power and 
shrunken space and time. 
5) A constantly accelerating rate of change which makes 
forecasting hazardous and outspeeds the efforts of education 
to draw abreast of needs." (Taba,l962, 40,41) 
These new conditions in society require a different 
curriculum from one that is based on a fixed content. They 
also indicate the type of person that could be expected to 
come from the process of education. It is clear that a 
curriculum model that is based on aims and objectives could 
provide the framework for the type of education that is being 
called for. 
Apart from the three principal factors, detailed above, it is 
possible to suggest two other factors in society that have 
encouraged the adoption of this particular model. These are 
the reduction in the amount of respect for teachers and the 
education system, and the increasing concern for value for 
money and the demand for accounting for money spent. Whilst 
these two factors are not so well documented as the others 
that have been considered they do seem to have had an 
influence on education. They have resulted in teachers 
justifying their work in terms of what they intend to produce, 
te. in the stating of behavioural objectives. 
Finally there has been a great expansion of the content that 
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could be included in a pupil's education. This can be clearly 
seen in religious education with the introduction of religions 
other than Christianity. It is impossible to cover all 
religions in the same detail that Christianity was once 
covered and therefore decisions were necessary about what 
should be in the syllabus. The result has been an emphasis on 
understanding and on learning how to evaluate experiences. It 
is this type of education for which the aims/objectives model 
has been considered as providing an appropriate model. 
A description of the aims/objectives model. 
Goals 
The term goals can be used to include both aims and 
objectives, and so we need to make some distinction between 
them and establish the relationship between them. Wheeler 
(1967) has divided goals into three types and these are 
a) ultimate the goals for planning the whole curriculum, 
what are usually call aims. 
b) mediate - the behavioural objectives derived from the 
ultimate goals and which are used to plan courses. 
c) proximate - the objectives that are used for the planning 
of specific lessons. 
The relationship between aims and objectives, 
The aim of education is the educated man and this is usually 
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considered to be by definition a desirable state. Those that 
complain that education is poor or restrictive will usually go 
on to say what education should be like, thus demonstrating 
that they do believe that education is a desirable state. The 
aims of education are value judgements that prescribe 
desirable states that go to make up what would be considered 
;5 
the desirable state thatAcalled educated. 
Objectives are descriptive of the intended outcome of 
teaching. Harris suggests that there are two ways in which 
objectives may be related to aims:-
a) as pre-conditions for the fulfilment of aims 
b) as objectives, the achievement of which constitutes the 
achievement of the aim. (Harris, 1972, 116) 
In many areas it appears to be impossible fully to describe 
that which is by nature prescriptive. For example, where a 
value judgement is made and some form of art is prescibed as 
beautiful it is not possible to describe exactly what it is 
that makes it beautiful. Similarly it is not possible fully 
to describe aims that are prescriptive of desirable states. 
~~ 
Even in training it is difficult to see~any useful activity 
can fully be described that is not learnt purely by rote. For 
example there may be a requirement that a student should be 
able to use a chisel and it may be possible to describe an 
action that is appropriate to the use of a chisel. However, as 
soon as a value judgement is introduced into the use of the 
chisel, say to use the chisel in a manner that is both safe 
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and efficient, the nature of the problem changes. With the 
vast range of ways in which a chisel may be used, particularly 
bearing in mind the uniqueness of each wood grain, description 
of the actions required must give way to the learning of 
principles. Thus objectives of type b seem logically 
unacceptable for educational aims. 
The only way in which type b objectives can be used in 
education is if they are tautologous of the aim. For example, 
"appreciating Hamlet" can only be a type b objective if the 
aim was "to appreciate Hamlet". 
It is reasonable to suggest that there can be two types of 
objectives and that these are:-
a) pre-conditions for the fulfillment of aims 
b) objectives liable to promote the fulfillment of aims. 
The second group of objectives include not only behavioural 
objectives but also what have been called experiential 
objectives. Consideration will now be given to these two types 
of objectives, ie. behavioural and experiential. 
Behavioural Objectives. 
White (1971) suggests that there are two types of behavioural 
objectives :-
"1) objectives which themselves consist in the pupils behaving 
in a certain way. 
2) objectives whose attainment is tested by pupils behaving in 
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a certain way. (White, 1971, 109). 
This distinction can be shown by considering three examples. 
a) In an elocution lesson the objective "to speak in a correct 
way" is clearly 8 behavioural objective of both It is 
the same behaviour that satisfies both criteria. 
b) In a course on clear thinking one objective might be that 
a student will "test the validity of arguments". The activity 
of testing arguments is a behavioural objective in sense (1) 
but only by questioning the student can it be said that it is 
a behavioural objective in sense (2). The questioning of the 
student to see if they do test arguments is not the same as 
the actual testing of arguments. However, the objective is 
still behavioural in both senses. 
c) In a course on aesthetic appreciation an objective might 
be "to appreciate the beauty of a particular painting". The 
appreciation can be tested by questioning and so this is a 
behavioural objective in sense (2). However, behaviour is 
active and intention guided whilst appreciation is a state. 
Appreciation may be accompanied by actions but it is in 
essence passive. It is therefore not possible to say that this 
is a behavioural objective in sense (1). 
Pratt (1976) notes this by suggesting that behavioural 
objectives are characteristically stated in such terms as 
"perform, demonstrate, write down" ie. by performance 
criteria. Where there are objectives characterised by such 
terms as "know, understand, be able to" then states are being 
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defined rather than actual behaviour. These states are passive 
and so would be behavioural objectives only in White's sense 
(2) and not sense (1). 
MacDonald Ross claims that there are four characteristics of 
an adequate behavioural objective and that these are 
"1) The objective relates (somehow) to the general educational 
aims. 
2) The objective states what the student will be able to do 
after the learning experience (that he could not do before). 
3) The objective is brought to the appropriate level of detail 
by specifying the conditions relevant to the performance. 
4) A standard of performance is indicated". 
(MacDonald Ross, 1975, 151) 
Experiential Objectives. 
An experiential objective does not have a particular end in 
view nor is it a means to a long lasting state. The objective 
is to present the student with an educational encounter, with 
an experience from which they may learn or bring to bear what 
they have learned previously. The experiential objective 
describes the encounter and not the end result. Eisner calls 
these objectives expressive and describes them thus ·-
"The expressive objective is intended to serve as a theme 
around which skills and understandings learned earlier can be 
brought to bear, 
understandings can 
but 
be 
through which those skills and 
expanded, elaborated and made 
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idiosyncratic.'' (Eisner, 1969, 15). 
The learning from the experience is not predetermined. The 
experience could be such as solving a problem, tackling a 
task; more specifically such as interpreting a poem or making 
an object from wire and clay. The student should use those 
of his previous learning experiences that he considers 
appropriate and develop in his own direction. The intention of 
the objective is that the student has an opportunity to 
develop his own personality along the lines that he chooses. 
Whilst experiential objectives do not seem to be part of the 
orthodoxy of the objectives model they do represent a 
development of the model which offers a signpost to a 
different model, one that will be considered further in 
chapter three. Experiential objectives can be seen as an 
attempt to answer some of the criticisms c·l: the objectives 
model and J!- behavioural objectives in particular. It is these 
criticisms that will now be considered. 
Criticisms of the Objectives Model. 
There have been many criticisms made of behavioural objectives 
and of the objectives model. MacDonald Ross (1975) lists 
sixteen criticisms of behavioural objectives 
"1) No consistent view exists as to the origin of objectives. 
2) In the educational domain no well-defined prescriptions are 
available for deriving objectives. 
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3) Defining objectives before the event conflicts with voyages 
of exploration. 
4) Advocates do not show how teachers can use objectives to 
guide unpredicted classroom events. 
5) There is an extremely large number of paths through any 
body of knowledge, thus reducing 
objectives in design. 
the effectiveness of 
6) In some disciplines criteria can only be applied after the 
event. 
7) Objectives do not prescribe the validity of test items. 
8) Objectives are inherently ambiguous. 
9) The level of specificity problem has never been solved. 
10) Objectives do not communicate intent unambiguously, 
especially to students. 
11) Trivial objectives are the easiest to operationalise, and 
this is a problem. 
12) The relevance of goal-referenced models of education can 
be questioned. 
13) Weak prescriptions lead to cycling. This can be costly. 
14) Lists of behaviours do not adequately represent the 
structure of knowledge. 
15) The use of behavioural objectives implies a poverty-
stricken model of student-teacher interaction. 
16) The behavioural objectives scheme suffers from many of the 
weaknesses of any operationalist dogma." 
(MacDonald Ross, 1975, 178,179) 
He suggests that the most important of these are 1,2,7,9, and 
13 to 16. He also claims that many of the more detailed 
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objections can be traced back to 14,15 and 16, which he 
regards as fundamental. Of the difficulty in writing 
objectives; he suggests that the cause is some combination 
from the above list. Space and time do not permit an 
exhaustive study of the objections but some ~+' those ... -ri 1 1 J...~ V.L W..L...L.J... uc: 
considered that seem to be the most important. These refer to 
whether the model is the best way to improve education, if the 
model can be considered workable, the model's interpretation 
of the structure of knowledge, and finally whether it 
correctly reflects the nature of education. 
The improvement of education. 
One of the arguments for the objectives model of the 
curriculum has been that it provides a basis for the 
improvement of the practice of the teacher and hence an 
improvement in the education of the pupil. However, Stenhouse 
(1975, 83) suggests that seeing the objectives model as being 
the way of improving teacher practice rests on a fundamental 
mistake. He argues that practice is not improved by by setting 
higher and higher standards but by giving people the 
opportunity constructively to criticise their performance. It 
is consideration of the process that leads to changes and 
improvement in practice and not whether a certain standard has 
or has not been achieved. The objectives model fails in this 
respect in that it only indicates success or failure and not 
the reasons for the outcome of the educational process. Some 
assessment of actual performance could be incorporated into 
61 
the way that the model is taught but such assessment is not an 
intrinsic part of the model. 
The production of objectives. 
If the objectives model is to be workable it must be possible 
to generate a clear and comprehensive list of objectives from 
the aims of the course. Some of the problems of deriving 
objectives that fully describe aims, from the aims that are 
themselves prescriptive, have already been considered. 
The problem of writing objectives became obvious during the 
consideration of aims and objectives within religious 
education. Frequently the objectives were expressed as 
descriptive statements that were as vague as the aims that 
they were supposed to be describing. When the objectives were 
not vague they were often interpretations of the aim in a very 
narrow sense. For example, where the aim was "understanding of 
Christianity", the objectives could be the broad and vague 
"knowledge of the life of Christ"; or the narrow "knowledge of 
St. Mark's gospel as it shows the teaching of Jesus" where 
there is little reference to other interpretations or aspects 
of the life of Jesus. Clearly there is no agreed level for the 
mediate goals that these objectives represent. Mediate goals 
are intended to expand the aims such that the course can be 
planned, such that it will reflect the aims accurately. To do 
this they must not only expand parts of the aims but must also 
include all aspects of the aims that are to be included in the 
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course. There will be a great deal of room for interpretation 
between mediate goals and proximate goals, which give the 
objectives for each lesson, and only by looking at the 
proximate goals can a clear idea of the substance of the 
course be gained. However, it is fair to say that the first 
example of a mediate objective was too vague and the second, 
whilst having the 
' s 
neclesary detail, 
1\ 
requires many other 
objectives alongside it to cover all aspects of the aim. 
Neither of the examples of objectives given above was 
behavioural in that they indicate passive states. Nor are they 
experiential because they do not describe an educational 
encounter but rather an end state. There are several other 
examples of objectives within the field of religious education 
where the descriptive statements of objectives are more 
appropriate to an earlier time in education when the 
curriculum was stated in terms of content. For example, the 
objective from the Avon Agreed Syllabus that requires that 
pupils "have some knowledge of the daily life of children at 
other times and in other countries, including that in first 
century Palestine" has already been noted. 
When it was found that concepts, skills and attitudes were 
listed to describe the aims of religious education it was 
found that there was often a qualification to the list that 
these were among those expected to be the objectives of the 
course. There was never a claim that the list was exhaustive 
and that, when mastered, constituted the achievement of the 
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aims of the course. Thus even when mediate goals are 
considered in their most analytic form, that of concepts, 
skills and attitudes, they still fall short of providing a 
definition of the prescriptive statements of the aims. They 
constitute an incomplete de script ion of the aims, Whilst aims 
are prescriptive and can only be assessed on a subjective 
basis, objectives are intended to relate to behaviour that can 
be assessed objectively and they themselves are open to 
assessment. It should also be noted that of concepts, skills 
and attitudes, only skills could be considered as behavioural 
objectives in White's sense (1). Even these may be rare as it 
is difficult to formulate an objective that requires the pupil 
to behave in a certain way that would not be thought 
objectionable by some group of people. For example, "that the 
pupil can pray according to a particular faith" would be 
objectionable to people of other faiths. 
Many skills objectives, and all attitude objectives, will 
only be behavioural in White's sense (2). For example, 
statements that require pupils to "appreciate" or "understand" 
such things as religious language are skills in this sense. It 
is important to note that these do not state the outcome of 
the pupil's appreciation and are hence not objectionable in 
the same way as the example of a behavioural objective in 
White's sense (1). 
Concepts per se must be considered as content although they 
are often written as understandings. For example, "understand 
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the meaning of commitment to a believer" can be expressed as 
having a concept of religious belief as entailing commitment. 
MacDonald Ross suggested that an adequate objective has four 
~hAracteristtcs and an example of deriving a proximate on::>1 b ................. 
from an objective may illustrate some of the problems 
involved. An aim of a course in physical education could be 
that the students become physically fit. This would include 
some commitment on the part of the students as well as 
learning. Mediate goals would include the understanding of the 
importance of such things as diet, rest and hygiene. In order 
to assess the commitment of the students some 
objectives relating to standards of performance would need to 
be included. An example of a proximate objective of this 
aspect of the course may be that the student should "be able 
to run 2,000 metres in under six minutes". This states what 
the student will be able to do after the learning experience, 
although he may have been able to do it before. It also 
indicates a standard of performance. Another characteristic of 
objectives, according to MacDonald Ross, is that the 
conditions relevant to the performance must be specified. 
Certain qualifications to the objective must be added such as 
wind speed, altitude, type of track, weather conditions, slope 
of track, and any others that may affect the performance. 
However, fitness is a relative term, relating to the 
individual. The asthma sufferer may never be able to make such 
a sustained effort and others may find it either hard or easy, 
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much depends upon for which group of students this objective 
is thought to be suitable, particularly for which age group. 
If each student is to be treated as an individual, and each 
student is to be assessed at the same level of fitness 
relative to his own abilities, then the objective must be 
written for each student on an individual basis. This may well 
be considered as impractical if we are to bear in mind the 
number of objectives and the number of students who are the 
responsibility of a single teacher. 
This example from physical education highlights two of the 
major problems of writing objectives. The first is the problem 
of writing objectives that define the prescriptive aim. The 
second problem comes from the first and is the difficulty of 
stating adequate qualifiers to the objective to make it 
precise and unequivocal. 
The example of fitness was used because few would doubt the 
desirability of fitness, although some may question its place 
on a school curriculum. It is difficult to find an objective 
in religious education that would not be questioned as to its 
value and desirability by some group. For example, in a 
religious education syllabus a mediate goal may be that "the 
pupils have an understanding of Christianity". The range of 
possible meanings of this objective are vast. It could be used 
as an objective in an Infant School or in a Theological 
College. Within the secondary sector of education the range 
of meaning could extend from that of a Church School to that 
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put on the objective by a school in a multi-faith community. 
This is to disregard for a moment those who would argue that 
an understanding of Christianity has little or no value, and 
no place on the school curriculum. 
Fitness is only one aspect of physical education and an 
ability to run is only one aspect of fitness. So understanding 
of Christianity is only one aspect of religious education and 
''understanding the doctrine of God" is only one aspect of 
understanding Christianity. To ask the question of whose 
doctrine of God illustrates some of the problems that have to 
be faced in the formulation of proximate objectives, and thus 
in the writing of qualifiers for the objectives within 
religious education. To further require that each pupil 
reaches an understanding of the doctrine of God that is 
compatible with his ability, and comparative to the abilities 
of other pupils; and that this achievement is assessed for 
each pupil, seems to take the specification of objectives into 
the realms of impossibility. 
The fourth characteristic of an objective to be considered 
is that the objective relates properly to the aim. In this 
example the objective test is not the same as the educational 
ie. 
intention of the aim. A student who can achjrl've that objective 
may be fit but ach~ving the objective is not the same as 
being fit, it is not the same as achieving the aim. It is an 
indicator objective in that it is an indicator of the 
intention but is not the same as the intention itself. If the 
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aim is to be fulfilled then a series of objectives must be 
written which can be tested objectively. Even then the 
question of whether the aim has been achieved could still be 
open to debate. Fitness is not a precise description but 
rAther a value judgement, it depends upon the individual point 
of view whether a person is considered fit or not. There may 
be a large degree of public agreement about what constitutes 
fitness but there will always remain some scope for 
disagreement. This is the problem that has been mentioned 
before, that descriptive objectives cannot fully define 
prescriptive aims. 
Two problems have been examined in this section, the 
i 
diffculties in writing objectives, both proximate and mediate 
o\ 
with regard to the detail and complexity necfes~ry, and the 
difficulty in making a list of objectives complete such that 
the achievement of all of the objectives constitutes the 
achievement of the aim. As was noted when White's distinction 
between types of behavioural objectives was considered, some 
behavioural objectives can only be tested indirectly and this 
introduces further problems into the writing and assessment of 
objectives, for then assessments must be devised and it must 
be demonstrated that success in the assessment constitutes 
achievement of the objective. When Harris was considered it 
seemed that a full description of aims in terms of objectives 
was impossible in many areas due to the prescriptive nature of 
aims. After the above criticisms of the objectives model it 
would seem that it is the responsibility of the supporters of 
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the objectives model to show that it can work, that a complete 
list of precise objectives is possible and realistic. There 
appears to be no such demonstration, particularly in the fteld 
of religious education. 
This is a fundamental problem in that no educational 
justification of the objectives model can be valid unless it 
can also be shown that the model is practical, that it can 
work as the basis for curriculum planning in schools. Neither 
is it an answer to say that teachers must be trained, and put 
in more effort to make it work. The problems that have been 
outlined appear to show that the working of the objectives 
model is unrealistic. 
The structure of knowledge. 
By structure of knowledge is meant the way that discrete data 
~~ 
~ inter related. Structure of knowledge refers to the way in 
which man integrates knowledge to give a coherent pattern to 
his experiences. Bruner (1960) further explains this and 
emphasises the importance of the structure of knowledge when 
he makes four basic claims for the teaching of the fundamental 
structure of a subject. These were that 
1) Understanding the fundamental structure makes the subject 
more comprehensible. 
2) Human memory can better retain structural patterns rather 
than random details. 
3) Understanding of fundamental principles and ideas appears 
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to be the the main road to adequate transfer of training. 
4) The gap between elementary and advanced knowledge of a 
subject is reduced by emphasis on structure. 
MacDonald Ross, in his list of criticisms of the objectives 
model; lists as number 14 
"Lists of behaviours do not adequately represent the 
structure of knowledge." (MacDonald Ross, 1975, 179) 
By this he means that lists of behaviours do not reflect the 
coherence of the ideas contained in the lists. 
Stenhouse (1975) suggests that education should enhance the 
freedom of man in that it should induct him into the knowledge 
of his culture as a thinking system. In other words that 
education should be such that the educated man is free to 
think because he has learnt the modes of thought. This again 
outlines the importance of structure, the educated man has 
been introduced to the structure of a subject and can now 
develop his own thoughts in a coherent manner. Stenhouse goes 
on to claim that 
"Education as induction into knowledge is successful to 
the extent that it makes the behavioural outcomes of the 
students unpredictable." (Stenhouse, 1975, 82) 
The idea of education as producing a man freely thinking, and 
reacting to his thoughts, is contradictory to the idea of 
education as being stated in terms of behavioural outcomes. 
70 
The nature of education. 
Stenhouse's comments raise the question of what is meant by 
education, what is the nature of education? This p1'"ovides the 
final criticism that will be made of the objectives model. It 
is the least substantiated of the criticisms but it may be 
the most important in that it opens up an alternative line 
of enquiry to follow, an idea to replace the model that has just 
been criticised. There is no real agreement as to what 
education should be, that is, there is no well defined 
prescription of the educated state that is the intention of 
education. There are, however, a great many writers that have 
concerned themselves with the nature of education. They have 
not prescribed what it is to be educated but have indicated 
the form that the prescript ion should take. Peters suggested 
that education 
"implied the transmission of what is worthwhile to those 
who become commit ted to it . " (Peters, 1966, 45) 
He further describes education as taking part in worthwhile 
activities, which he described as 
"activities that have standards in them rather than 
requiring justifiation in terms of what they lead on to." 
(Peters, 1966, 155) 
This echoes a point that Bertrand Russell made when he wrote 
that 
"the essence of what is useful is that it ministers to 
some result which is not merely useful." (Russell, 1926, 15) 
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When applied to education there is the possibility of two 
conclusions. Firstly that education is useful in that it 
results in the educated state, which is not merely useful. 
This takes a utilitarian view of education but in an unusual 
way. Education should produce an educated state, a tautology, 
but this state must be more than useful, it cannot be training 
or lead to any particular outcome that might be described as 
useful. Certainly objectives fit in to this pattern of 
education so far but the problem is with the aims of 
education. These must be justified not in terms of usefulness 
but in other terms, that of leading to an educated state that 
is of value in its own right, but if it has intrinsic value 
then it needs no justification. Therefore the aims of 
education can be stated according to personal preference, they 
are value judgements requiring no justification. Little 
agreement as to the aims of education can be expected and to 
ask where the value lies in a set of aims is the same as 
asking what use they have, hence implying that their value is 
not inherent but extrinsic. 
The second conclusion is that the process of education itself 
is of a value that is not merely useful. This is the view 
taken by Blenkin and Kelly when they wrote that if educational 
provision 
"must be justified in utilitarian or instrumental terms, 
we will be denying pupils access to something of vital 
importance - an appreciation and understanding of the concept 
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that some things can be valuable for their own sakes." 
(Blenkin, 1983, 313) 
They believe that one thing that is valuable for its own sake 
is education, consisting as it does, or should do, of 
worthwhile activities. 
It is this concept of the nature of education as of intrinsic 
worth, whose worthwhileness lies in its activities, its 
process rather than in its end. that contradicts the notion of 
I 
curriculum planning through pre-specified objectives. It will 
not be argued that behavioural objectives, and the objectives 
model in general, are worthless but that there are inherent 
deficiencies in the model. In looking for a different model on 
which to base curriculum planning lt ls not reasonable to go 
back to the earlier model based on content, for exactly the 
reasons that led to the introduction of the objectives model 
in the first place and which are still relevant now. The model 
that will be considered in the next chapter is based not on 
the end of education but on the process of education. 
There has alre~y been some suggestion that this might be 
(\ 
an 
appropriate direction in which to proceed. Loukes emphasised 
the process of education in his description of good teaching. 
Also, the objectives model itself has spawned experiential 
objectives which are concerned with providing an experience 
for the pupils with no pre conceived ends to the experience. 
v 
Thus the emphasis is on the process and not the end. It would 
seem a logical progression to inquire as to whether it is 
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possible to formulate a model of the curriculum based on the 
process of education. 
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Summary 
There have been three principal factors in the development and 
adoption of the aims/objectives model of the curriculum. These 
are educational theory, psychology and the changing nature of 
society. Other factors can also be suggested. 
In the objectives model the objectives are intended to specify 
what is meant by the aims. Objectives can be categorised in a 
variety of ways, amongst these is the distinction between 
behavioural and experiential objectives. 
There are many arguments against the aims/objectives model of 
the curricnlum, among the more important are a) the model does 
not provide the best way to improve education, b) the 
production of comprehensive objectives is not possible, c) the 
model does not reflect the structure of knowledge, d) the 
model mistakes the nature of education. 
These arguments against the model do not seem to be answered 
adequately. This means that the objectives model may be an 
unsafe model to adopt as the basis of the curriculum. 
A study of the nature of education and the notion of 
experiential objectives may provide some suggestion of another 
model that could be developed and adopted. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A PROCESS MODEL OF THE CURRICULUM. 
A view of education was presented at the end of the last 
chapter that is not consistent with the objectives model of 
the curriculum. It suggested that planning of the curriculum 
be based on the process of education not the end of the 
process, the educated state. Before looking at the planning of 
a curriculum based on a process model of the curriculum some 
further consideration of the features of the model may be 
useful. 
Features of the process model. 
Kelly (1983) suggests that the process model represents a 
tradition that has developed from a range of sources, each of 
which has been operating on similar principles. The most 
fundamental principle of the model 
"is its insistence that education must be planned and 
assessed in terms of its own intrinsic values and merits 
rather than as instrumental to the achievement of goals or the 
creation of products that are extrinsic to it." 
(Kelly, 1983, 11) 
This is the argument that was presented in the previous 
chapter and it constitutes a definition of education about 
which there can be disagreement. It does, however, represent a 
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view of education that is justifiable, as has been shown, and 
it is the view of education that will be considered further. 
It is the only model available that offers a realistic 
alternative to the objectives model that has already been 
examined and found wanting. 
Another feature is that education be thought of 
"in terms of activity and experience rather than of 
knowledge to be acquired and facts to be stored." 
(Hadow, 1931, 75) 
This represents the desire that the curriculum be designed 
with the intention of the development of the pupils according 
to their needs rather than according to the demands of bodies 
of knowledge that may be thought to be useful. This again 
emphasises the process of education rather than an end result, 
and also the central importance of the pupil in the process. 
This view is endorsed by the current understanding of learning 
as represented in the list as appendix A. 
A third feature is that there is no division made between 
basic skills and other, apparently more sophisticated, forms 
of learning. This division is difficult, if not impossible, to 
make and as there is no agreed definition of what is a "basic 
skill" can have little meaning. As an example of what is 
meant by this division, pupils are often put off reading by an 
emphasis on mechanical ability rather than reading for 
enjoyment and appreciation of the literature. This manifests 
itself in a constant progression to harder and harder books 
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rather than allowing the pupil a choice of books based on 
interest. The result is often that reading is seen as a task 
and there is no development of the "higher skills" of 
appreciation, comprehension is considered all important. 
This problem of differentiation of skills is also shown in 
Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives. This offers one 
interpretation of the complex structure of learning and the 
problem can best be shown by example. The statement "Harold 
Wilson was Prime Minister" can be seen as a simple piece of 
knowledge. However, to understand the full implications of the 
statement requires much more advanced concepts such as 
government and democracy. Gribble (1970) makes a further point 
that has been refe{ed to before, and that is that the 
objectives are not educational as they stand, they can only be 
deemed educational when applied to some suitable content. A 
value judgement as to what is educational needs to be made, a 
prescription of what is education is necessary. 
A final comment on this feature of the process model can be 
seen in Bruner's declaration, based on his claims for the 
structure of knowledge, that 
"Any subject can be taught effectively in some 
intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of 
development." (Bruner, 1960, 33) 
Whilst this statement does not necessarily apply exclusively 
to the process model it is certainly within the capacity of 
the model to fulfil the requirements of the statement. 
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A final feature of the process model that is noted by Kelly 
is 
"the idea that knowledge should be seen as largely 
undifferentiated, that subject boundaries, far from being 
sacrosanct, are arbitrary and ephemeral". (Kelly, 1983, 12) 
He qualifies this by saying that the only time that the 
demands of a subject should impinge upon a pupil's education 
is when it is necessary for the organisation of the pupil's 
experience. Kelly was writing for the primary school, the 
situation is different in secondary schools where the current 
practice is for the timetable to be based on subjects. That is 
not to say that the point can be dismissed and it is one that 
will be returned to later on in another chapter. The 
next step is consideration of how a process model can be used 
in the planning of the curriculum. 
The process model in practice. 
"Education should be rational and meaningful. 
Rationality and meaning entail intention. 
Therefore education should be intentional." 
(Pratt, 1976, 19) 
There can surely be no question that education should be 
intentional, the problem is how to put these intentions into 
practice. The way that these intentions are put into practice 
to some extent reveals what the intentions are. With the 
objectives model the intentions are stated in the form of 
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aims, the intentions of the process model must be realised in 
some other way. 
Dearden (1976) suggests that these intentions will not be 
prescriptive of the content but rather along the lines of what 
he calls relational aims. He describes relational aims as 
those concerned with a pupil's positive attitude to learning. 
He goes on to claim that 
"These relational aims can be conveniently grouped under 
three main headings: 1) intrinsic interest (eagerness, 
curiosity, 
expression 
learning to learn, absorption 
(expressing one's individuality, 
etc.); 
being 
2) self 
oneself, 
etc.); 3) autonomy (making independent judgements, choosing 
with confidence, self direction, learning by discovery etc.)." 
(Dearden, 1976, 54) 
He then goes on to suggest that whilst these relational aims 
are important it is also necessary to give guidance on the 
substance of these educational activities. He suggests that 
teachers formulate aims based on initiating pupils into 
"the main forms of knowledge or understanding which have 
been historically developed". (Dearden, 1976, 55) 
He also claims that direction to educational activities should 
come by ensuring that content and skills will have 
"future usefulness, whether for the later stages of 
education itself or by way of "preparation for life"." 
(Dearden, 1976, 55) 
By placing such value on the end product of education, by 
making it a main focus of education, Dearden is not using the 
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notion of education as process in the way currently under 
consideration. The criticism could also be made that by 
formulating aims based on the initiation of the pupils into 
forms of knowledge, however specified, he is to some extent 
prescribing the intentions of education. This is related to 
the problem of how to select content that was raised by Kelly 
in his comments on the artificial boundaries between subjects. 
Stenhouse (1975, 5) is concerned that the intention of the 
curriculum should be open to critical scrutiny. If the 
intentions of the process model are to be open to critical 
scrutiny then the principles upon which the curriculum are 
planned must be carefully set out. Unlike the objectives model 
it is not possible to describe the end result, rather the 
intentions of the course should become clear by the way in 
which the task of teaching the pupils is approached. Peters 
suggestions as to the nature of education have already been 
considered. 
The process model will now be considered in relation to two 
aspects; transmission or approach, and content. Whilst in 
practice these two are to a large extent inseparable they will 
be considered separately. In each case some method of defining 
the method of selection of the learning will be sought that 
will leave the intentions of the course open to critical 
scrutiny. Content will be considered first; it has already 
been mentioned in relation to some problems and these have a 
bearing upon the definition of the approach. 
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Content 
When Stenhouse (1975) proposed a process model of the 
curriculum he based it on Hirst's forms of knowledge. That 
is, he reasoned that the forms of knowledge provided the 
basis on which the content could be selected. He argued that 
the curriculum should cover all forms of knowledge and that 
the forms of knowledge directed what needed to be taught. 
Barrow (1976) does make the point that even if the 
different forms are valid it still does not follow that they 
can be the basis of a curriculum in that it would not 
necessarily be said that each form needs to be mastered for 
the student to be considered educated. Indeed, it is hard 
to say what might be meant by "mastery" of a form. It could 
be argued, however, that an education that did not include 
each of the forms of knowledge and its basic thought 
structures was not a comprehensive education in that it did 
not allow a man to be completely free in his thought. He 
would be restricted by not having experience of one form of 
thought, its structure would not be known to him. 
There are several theories of knowledge that propose a 
similar scheme to the forms of knowledge. Hirst's has been 
the most influential in this country and so it is 
the one on which attention will be concentrated. Phenix' 
realms of meaning have been criticised due to the arbitrary 
nature of his choice of the characteristics of true 
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propositions upon which our realms of meaning are based. 
Equally relevant is the criticism that a realm of meaning is 
not the same as a realm of truth, there can be meaning 
without truth. Although the realms are different from 
Hirst's forms they are also open to the main criticism 
that will be considered in relation to the forms. 
Hirst's forms have been challenged by many writers and some 
of the challenges do not appear to have been answered 
satisfactorily. Brent (1978) and Smith (1981) raise points 
that are not only valid but also are of concern in other 
areas and so it is these two that will now be considered 
further. 
Both Brent and Smith criticise Hirst on the point of the 
objectivity of the forms of knowledge. For Hirst the forms 
are objective in that they deal with concepts that are 
expressed linguistically and are recognised by more than one 
person. They constitute shared knowledge rather than purely 
personal awareness ie. their objectivity lies in their 
linguistic intersubjectivity. Brent disagrees with Hirst in 
that he suggests that they cannot be considered properly 
objective if they are not transcendent of culture ie. that 
they are not applicable only to a particular culture or 
cultures. He also argues that if they are not transcendent 
of culture then they are not a suitable basis of an 
educational curriculum. In that case education would have to 
be seen as reinforcing the pattern of society by limiting 
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, 
the students thought to a particular, culturally determined, 
pattern rather than developing the individuality and 
creativity of the pupil as a person. 
Brent argues that the forms are transcendental. He bases his 
argument on Toulmin's (1949) notion of "limiting" questions 
ie. that our reaction to a situation determines the question 
that we will ask and the answer that is appropriate. That 
there are a limited number of reactions, and hence a limited 
number of forms of knowledge, leads Brent to claim that 
"It is these reactions that constitute the primitive 
differentiation of consciousness which has developed into 
the . • • • • schema as we have it today." 
(Brent, 1978, 201) 
Smith (1981) also criticises the forms of knowledge from the 
standpoint of objectivity and Hirst's use of the term 
"criterion" and his criticism seems more fundamental. 
Smith's argument is quite technical and to fully explain it 
would take up more space than is available. Therefore, a 
much shortened form of the argument is given here. 
Smith points out that the word criterion has a general sense 
of a 
"standard by which anything is judged or estimated" 
(Q.E.D.) 
but it also has a technical sense in which the word 
"points not to the grounds for applying a concept in 
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particular cases, but to the normal circumstances in which 
the concept has application". 
(Smith, 1981, 20) 
He then argues that the linguistic intersubjectivity that is 
Hirst's grounds for the forms of knowledge is in fact not 
the criterion for truth but the criterion for objectivity, 
meaning that it is this 
"underlying level of agreement that makes possible our 
concept of objectivity." 
(Smith, 1981, 20) 
Thus in the technical sense of the word criterion, which is 
the one that Smith believes Hirst is using, the result is 
not forms of knowledge but forms of objectivity. These forms 
can be described as forms in which individuals can 
communicate experience to others. They are equally the 
underlying conditions that give us our notions of falsity as 
of truth, nonsense as of meaning. Brent is equally open to 
this criticism. There may be a limited number of reactions 
communicable as Toulmin suggests and these form the bases of 
communication but these give meaning to objectivity and not 
to truth. This argument will be referred to again in chapter 
four. 
Barrow (1976) claims that the crucial test for the 
different forms of knowledge is the third of Hirst's 
criteria ie. that each form has a distinctive method of 
testing for the truth. From this Barrow does not accept 
any form other than mathematics and science because he is 
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unable to show that any of the other forms is able to satify 
this criterion. 
The question must now be asked as to whether the use of the 
Hirst's forms of knowledge as the basis of the curriculum 
can be considered as valid. If they are, as Smith claims, 
forms of objectivity, forms in which we communicate our 
experience, rather than forms of knowledge then they may 
still be of some value to us. They cannot, however, be 
used as Stenhouse uses them, that is to dictate the areas of 
the curriculum that are to be studied. They are, rather, a 
guide along the lines of the comment of Stenhouse, that has 
already been noted, to the effect that education should free 
the thought of the students. The forms would thus represent 
the ways in which the students can think and communicate 
their thoughts. It is important therefore that students 
should understand how to use these ways of thinking and to 
understand other peoples use of them. 
Equally, Barrow's criticism that according to Hirst's 
criteria only two forms are clearly identifiable raises a 
further question. If Hirst's criteria can produce only two 
forms and that even these are not of the same nature as put 
forward by Hirst then the whole validity of the basis of the 
forms is called into question. There seems no reason to 
consider them as an adequate basis of the curriculum in the 
way that Stenhouse does. 
86 
Barrow (1976) made an interesting point when he suggested 
that there are two basic interpretative attitudes, religious 
and scientific. He defined the men that hold these positions 
as 
someone to whom the mystery of life is ultimately 
only explicable in some religious terms, and someone to whom 
this kind of explanation is unnecessary and meaningless." 
(Barrow, 1976, 57) 
Upon this differentiation he makes a case for the inclusion 
of religious studies in the curriculum in order to counter 
any tendency to indoctrination of the pupils into the 
scientific attitude. This may at first seem a poor 
justification for religious education, and would not 
necessarily appeal either to the scientist who is a believer 
or the atheist. However, the argument does have some weight. 
It acknowledges that no view of the world can be ignored and 
that a view of the world that has such wide support as that 
of the religious view, in all it•s many forms, deserves some 
-
consideration as part of a person's education. This is 
particularly relevant if education is seen in terms of 
initiation into forms of thought that consequently allows 
freedom of thought. Secondly, it strikes a chord with those 
who would argue that there is a spiritual dimension to life 
and that introduction to this dimension is an essential 
element in a person's education. 
The approach of the process model will now be considered 
before returning to the question of content. 
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Approach 
Whereas in the objectives model the teaching strategies and 
approach would be considered after what the pupils should 
learn has been established, in a process model the approach 
forms the basis of the syllabus. 
Peters has put forward the notion that instead of having aims 
to direct the teaching it should proceed according to certain 
principles. These he calls principles of procedure. They apply 
not to what the pupil should learn but to the way in which the 
teacher initiates the learning process. Even the word 
"initiates" suggests some particular approach to teaching, 
different from, for example, the word "instructs" and so must 
be treated carefully. 
Peters (1959, 89,90) develops what he means by principles of 
procedure by drawing a parallel between two men in politics. 
One of them, in pursuit of equality, wishes to introduce 
measures that would lead to all people being equal, for 
example, introducing some system where no man has more money 
than another, disbanding any institutions, such as the army, 
where one man is placed in authority over another. The second 
man merely insists that any changes that are made treat all 
men as equal unless there is a good reason why they should not 
be treated as equal. For example, it would be foolish to force 
all men to go to university as not all men would benefit from 
that kind of education. It is from the second man, the man who 
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had certain principles as to how he should act, that Peters 
takes the idea of principles of procedure. Peters goes on to 
suggest that most disputes in education are not about aims but 
are arguments about principles of procedure. He gives as 
examples, the use of authority, teaching by example and the 
validity of conditioning. 
Principles of procedure offer a way in which the intentions 
of the course can be open to scrutiny and yet not be 
prescriptive of an end. However, the process model encourages 
the pupil to be active, to take part in enquiry. If this is to 
be done honestly then no artificial restrictions can be placed 
upon the enquiry such as subject divisions. This tends to 
suggest a fully integrated curriculum but this would not be 
widely accepted as viable for a secondary school as it runs 
contrary to current practice, as has been noted before. Phenix 
claims that 
"while attention to the structure of the disciplines is 
surely not a sufficient condition for maximum learning, it is 
a necessary condition for such learning." (Phenix, 1964a, 47) 
The emphasis put on structure by Bruner has already been 
noted. Phenix claims that these disciplines are to be found in 
"the various specialised communities of men who follow 
certain common rules and procedure governing the scope and 
methods of the inquiry." (Phenix, 1964a, 47) 
From this it is possible to argue that the pupils need 
content to be structured in some way and that the structure 
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needs to be understood by the teacher. The areas of content 
that already have a structure to them are the disciplines. 
This does not mean that all teaching should fall within 
particular disciplines. This would be wrong for two reasons, 
primarily because the disciplines are culturally based and 
only offer one pattern of knowledge which varies with time and 
culture. For example, astrology is no longer considered by 
most people to be a valid academic discipline. Secondly, and 
related to the first, it is necessary for the pupils to 
understand the inter-related nature of knowledge. This is so 
that, for example, if they are introduced to astrology they 
can compare it to other areas of their knowledge and make an 
appropriate judgement about it. A process model seems to 
require, by its very nature, that enquiries are allowed to go 
beyond subject areas but that does not mean that they should 
not be planned around the structure of a subject area. 
Principles of procedure would come from at least three 
sources. Firstly from an analysis of the way that children 
learn, that is that the principles would reflect the current 
understanding of the psychology of learning. To this end there 
is the list of commonly agreed statements about how pupils 
learn in appendix A. Secondly, they should reflect the 
understanding of the nature of education that has been 
adopted, they should reflect the principles of the process 
model of education. As an example of what might represent this 
category of principles there is Rath's "criteria for 
identifying activities that seem to have some inherent worth" 
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(Raths, 1971, 716). These are included as appendix B. Thirdly 
they should come from the area of the curriculum around which 
the learning is to take place. Bruner (1969) points out that 
subjects are based on certain attitudes, for example, physics 
is based on 
"attitudes about the ultimate orderliness of nature and a 
conviction that order can be discovered" (Bruner, 1969, 20) 
If principles of procedure are also to reflect the subject 
then a close look at the nature of the subject must be taken. 
Criticisms 
In the chapter on the objectives model of the curriculum the 
criticism of the model was primarily concerned with four main 
points. It seems reasonable and fair to see if these 
criticisms could also be applied to the process model. This 
exercise in no way should be taken to indicate that these are 
the only criticisms that the process model must answer because 
the model may be open to completely different criticisms which 
do not apply to the objectives model. 
The argument for the process model was based on an 
interpretation of the nature of education. There are certainly 
other interpretations of the nature of education and the 
supporters of these other interpretations may well claim that 
the process model does not accurately reflect their view of 
education. However, this thesis has adopted a particular view 
of education and the process model, coming as it does from 
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this view, is consistent with that view of education. 
With regard to the stucture of knowledge, the process model 
requires pupils to engage in inquiry that is not unduly 
restricted. This means that pupils have an opportunity to 
build up their own structure of knowledge. The previous 
section requires that the educational experiences of the pupil 
are planned with regard to the structure of the subject. The 
question of integration will be considered later. It seems 
fair to say that the process model is not open to this 
criticism. 
When Stenhouse suggested that the objectives model was not the 
best way to improve the practise of education his reason was 
that it did not require the teacher to examine their methods, 
only their results. The process model does require the teacher 
to examine his methods and may therefore be a model which will 
improve practise because of the model rather than in spite of 
it. 
Finally there is the question of whether the model is workable 
and that, to a large extent, is the subject of the rest of the 
thesis, how can the model be put into operation with regard to 
religious education. 
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Religious education in a process model. 
The above argument has attempted to show that a process model 
that is based upon subject disciplines is rational and viable. 
No consideration has been given to the basis on which the 
curriculum would be planned to make sure that pupils received 
a broad educational experience. That lies outside the scope of 
the thesis. Neither has any proper discussion of integration 
taken place,although that will be considered at a later stage. 
This thesis will attempt to investigate and illustrate two 
sets of criteria with regard to religious education being 
planned within the framework of a process model of education. 
These two sets of criteria are the structure of the subject 
and the principles of procedure that are appropriate to the 
subject. These would form the basis of the planning of a 
religious education course according to a process model. 
The basis for this investigation will be twofold. Firstly a 
consideration of the nature of religion and the implications 
that this would have for the study of religion. From this it 
should be possible to indicate the nature of the subject of 
religious education. Secondly a consideration of the concepts, 
skills and attitudes that have been offered as appropriate 
to, and as a definition of, religious education. These 
represent the most recent thought and analysis of religious 
education that is taken from the point of view of the planning 
and preparation of a course to be taught as 0 religius 
~ 
education. They also represent the three aspects of learning 
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that have been identified. As such they can provide guidelines 
for the investigation. It is also necessary to demonstrate how 
these three aspects of learning fit in to the process model of 
education. They will therefore each be considered in two ways, 
for what each of them reveals of the nature of religious 
education, and for the place that each of them has within a 
process model of the curriculum. 
94 
Summary 
The process model of the curriculum is based on a view of 
education as of intrinsic value. Thus, the curriculum should 
be based on the process of education. 
The intentions of the curriculum should be open to scrutiny, 
therefore the principles on which the curriculum are based 
must be stated clearly. 
Hirst's forms of knowledge may be criticised to such an extent 
that they cannot be taken as the basis of curriculum planning. 
Barrow's notion of two interpretative attitudes suggest that 
religious education has a part to play in education, as a way 
of thinking that is different from others. 
Peter's notion of principles of procedure offer a way in which 
the process model can planned and in which the basis of 
planning is open to scrutiny. 
It is possible to argue that content needs to be structured in 
some way but that there should not be rigid divisions between 
disciplines. 
95 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NATURE OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. 
The nature of religion and its implications for religious 
education will be examined from two points of view. Firstly 
that of the educational theorists who have examined religion 
and religious education with regard to its place in the 
curriculum. These have regarded religion as a way of knowing. 
Secondl~ that of some philosophers and theologians who are 
concerned with the nature of religion with regard to the 
believer. These distinctions are not exact but serve to give 
some shape to the inquiry. 
Education theorists. 
Phenix 
Phenix argues that there are six realms of meaning and 
religion comes within two of these realms. Each of these 
realms is described in two ways, according to quality and 
quantity that, it is argued, are the two logical aspects of 
meaning. That there are three of each logical aspect and that 
they each inter-relate gives nine generic classes. Religion 
belongs, first of all, to the realm called synoptics and has 
the generic classes of comprehensive and norm. The generic 
classes reflect that religion is concerned with a totality of 
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knowledge and the meaning refers to what ought to be. It also 
belongs to the realm of synnoetics and the generic classes of 
singular and fact. The meanings in this group 
"arise out of concrete existence in direct personal 
encounter." (Phenix> 1964b, 26) 
They involve meaning of one thing in actual existence, and 
this is the group in which religion as experience is placed. 
Religion as a synoptic is · seen as comprehensive and the 
element in religion that integrates all of the realms is, 
according to Phenix, ultimacy. He describes it thus 
"The term "ultimacy" is a general designation for such 
ideas as infinitude, absoluteness, the unlimited, 
transcendence, perfection, completeness, all-inclusiveness, 
the supreme, and many others." (Phenix, 1964b, 244) 
As it is comprehensive it should include all of the other 
realms in its scope and Phenix describes how each of the 
realms can be related to and interpreted by this concept of 
ultimacy. He claims that, with regard to content, that 
anything can be the content of religion as long as it is 
looked at from the standpoint of ultimacy. As to the method of 
inquiry, in this realm Phenix points to such means as prayer, 
meditation, ritual, and active commitment. 
Smart (1975) also makes a similar point, he suggests that 
questions of ultimate meaning are questions about deep values 
and it is this depth of values that is called religious. He 
does point out, though, that all questions of value have depth 
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but only the deeper ones are called religious. Ultimacy is 
perhaps the wrong word as it is a matter of degree of depth 
and so Smart describes religious questions as those at or near 
the limit of ultimacy. 
Phenix emphasises the need to go beyond the finite to the 
infinite for understanding in this realm. This does not mean a 
another realm beyond the finite but a totally different type 
of experience. For this reason understanding re~res a basis 
of faith rather than the characteristic forms of understanding 
of the other, finite, realms. Phenix states his understanding 
of religion as 
"Religion means nothing apart from a relation of natural 
and supernatural, finite and infinite, the latter being 
another order of reality from the former." 
(Phenix, 1964b, 246) 
To those who are committed to the transcendent there is some 
new and essential perspective that can only be gained by going 
beyond the finite to this new realm of meaning. In going 
beyond the finite there is a new illumination of the Whole, an 
illumination that is often referred to as revelation. In this 
part of Phenix' theory there is a clear similarity to some 
modern theologians, such as Tillich, who would claim that 
"the name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and 
ground of all being is God" (Tillich, 1949, 63) 
There is also a similarity to Ramsey's disclosure situations 
that will be considered later. 
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Religion in its experiential aspect belongs, according to 
Phenix, to the realm of synoetics, the realm of personal 
knowledge. He claims that this personal knowledge is the same 
as the I-Thou relationship of Buber. He thus seems to 
separate the synoptic religion of the theologian from the 
synoetic experience of the believer. 
Hirst 
Hirst (1976) included religion as one of his forms of 
knowledge. As a form of knowledge religion should have 
categorial concepts. These are concepts which all knowledge in 
that form presupposes and which are characteristic of the 
form. Brent (1978) suggested that in the religious form the 
categorial concepts are God, sin and the transcendent. Other 
concepts are substantive and this includes such concepts as 
prayer, ritual and sacrifice. Brent demonstrates the way in 
which the categorial concepts define what is meant by religion 
by comparing two accounts of creation. The first account is 
one involving creation by God, one that would be accepted by 
many people as true. The second account is science fiction and 
starts 
"Our universe was created by a black cloud" 
(Brent, 1978, 105) 
He then goes on to describe, in scientific terms, how the 
black cloud created and sustains the universe and how it has 
many of the attributes of God, such as omnipresence. However, 
the account of the black cloud would not be seen as a 
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religious account according to Brent. The reason for this is 
that the black cloud does not command the use of the word God, 
it is not transcendent and it could not be sinned against. 
Similarly, substantive concepts would not be used in relation 
to it. For example, it would not be the object of prayer 
because prayer presupposes transcendence. Barrow's notion 
of interpretative attitudes has already been noted. Further to 
this he offers aSa definition of religion 
"religion as any set of beliefs involving a supernatural 
being who has influence over our lives and a code of conduct." 
(Barrow, 1981, 142) 
This seems to me to be similar in form to the definition 
offered by Brent. Smart (1975), however, argues that there is 
no satisfactory definition of religion based on content and 
there certainly seems to be no definition that includes all 
that might be considered religion whilst excluding all that is 
not considered religion. 
There are two notions from the above analysis of religion that 
are useful and will be referred to later and these are that 
religion is concerned with ultimacy and the importance of 
categorial concepts. 
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Philosophers and theologians. 
Smart 
Smart (1975) produces a definition of religion by looking for 
common, formal characteristics of religions. He claimed that 
there are six dimensions of religion that can be identified; 
myth, doctrine, ritual, social, ethical and experiential. To 
these he has now added a seventh, the symbolic. Smart places 
emphasis on the experiential dimension, explaining that it 
would be hard to account for the other dimensions without the 
experiential. Smart also emphasises that the experiential 
element involves hope of, or realisation of, experience in an 
other world, an invisible world. It is the lack of any concept 
of this invisible world that leads him to reject Marxism and 
Humanism as religions. The concept of an invisible world is 
linked to revelation, the experience of the invisible world is 
revelation, and the concept of an invisible world is so broad 
as to allow all of those beliefs that are normally called 
religious to be included. 
Sealey (1982) comments that the dimensions are not 
specifically religious, they are only religious when they are 
related to an appropriate categorial concept. A more serious 
criticism along the same lines comes from Surin (1980) to the 
effect that the experiential is not an autonomous dimension 
but is an integral part of all of the dimensions of religion. 
He presents a two stage argument 
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1) ordinary experience is the starting point of religion 
and reflection on religion 
2) intellectually valid reflection on religion requires 
the adoption of the approach of the phenomenologist. 
That is that religious concepts grow out of elements of 
finitude in human existence. 
Hardy (1979) notes difficulties in Smart's approach for the 
study of religion. The study of religion as "what men do", 
that is in terms of phenomena, has two problems 
1) the dimensional matrix affirms similarities in 
religions. It is not "aids to seeing" what is there but rather 
"what is there", a phenomenological construction becomes an 
ontological statement. 
2) If what occurs in one tradition is true then all other 
similarities in other traditions are dissimilar because they 
do not have the element of truth. 
Hardy also notes that the idea of studying the truth claims of 
a religion is a prejudgement, to the believer they are not 
truth claims but the truth. A religion must be presented as 
true to the believer and not as a matter of truth claims that 
disinherit the believer. 
Ramsey 
Ramsey (1976) claims that there are two elements to religious 
belief and that these are discernment and commitment. This 
discernment comes from disclosure situations which can be 
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described as situations which are given a new depth by some 
discernment that goes beyond the apparent situation, by some 
insight. He lists six types of disclosure situation of which 
the last, cosmic disclosure, is the one that he equates with 
religious disclosure proper. These cosmic disclosures are 
mediated through the other five types of disclosure ie. 
linguistic, perceptual, theoretic, moral and personal. These 
disclosures give rise to commitment, as Gill says 
"disclosures give rise to attitudinal and behavioural 
commitments which are commensurate with that which is 
disclosed therein" (Gill, 1976, 61) 
There are two points to note about this commitment when it 
comes to cosmic disclosure ie. religious commitment, a) it 
comes from outside rational decision and b) to give up the 
commitment would mean a great upheaval. 
With regard to education Ramsey makes two points that need to 
be kept in mind. 
"No religious apologetic, nor religious teaching, 
will be worthwhile if it does not a) evoke the appropriate 
kind of situation and b) recommend language of a suitably odd 
nature" 
(Ramsey 1967 P.5) 
Ramsey speaks particularly about religious belief within a 
Christian framework, in some way connected to a deity. In fact 
Ramsey suggests that we may be able to use the word "God" as a 
class term for all cosmic disclosure. 
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Wittgenstein 
Wittgenstein seems to take a wider view of religious belief. 
Wittgenstein saw religious belief as a form of life, a 
distinctive language game in which the objects are radically 
different from the objects in other language games. To 
understand religious belief, or any other language game, any 
utterance must be placed in the language 
belongs and there must be awareness 
component. Wittgenstein's interest was 
system to which it 
of its functional 
in the meaning of 
religious belief, and what it is to be a believer, rather than 
in the object of belief. 
His concern for the object of religious belief, for which I 
will use the term God for convenience, comes into his thinking 
mainly when he is concerned to show that religious belief is 
only intelligible and justified in the fact that the language 
is used in such a way that religious terms cannot be replaced 
by non-religious terms without loss of meaning. That is that 
God is nothing other than God. In the same way he argues that 
any statement that can be empirically tested cannot be a 
religious statement and if used in a religious way is 
superstition. 
Wittgenstein was also concerned to show that religious belief 
is logically distinct and he clearly demonstrates, with regard 
to what would be considered as evidence for a belief, that 
religion and science are logically distinct. There is accepted 
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as evidence for belief such things that would be laughed at if 
they were used as evidence in a scientific statement, things 
such as dreams and feelings. For example, St. Paul's 
conversion was on the basis of a vision, in no way would this 
be accepted as scientific evidence but it was enough for St. 
Paul to change his life. Science requires that each experiment 
can be reproduced, with the same results, an endless number of 
times. Religious belief can be the result of a single 
experience, and the interpretation of that experience by the 
believer. 
Wittgenstein said that, when evidence for a belief is 
considered, that religious belief is not a matter of evidence. 
The strength of a religious belief cannot be judged by the 
strength of the evidence for it, as would be the case in 
science, but on the amount that a man will risk for that 
belief. Ramsey (1967) suggested a similar thing when he 
reflected on Butler's idea that with religious belief the 
smallest piece of evidence on one side can be enough to tip 
the balance in favour of one answer, but then the commitment 
to the answer is great and out of all proportion to the 
balance of evidence. 
Wittgenstein explains his main idea about religious belief as 
the believer "using a picture". This is a grammatical and not 
a derogatory remark and is intended to show the way in which 
the believer sees reality. This point needs to be stressed, 
that from the point of view of the believer he is not using a 
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picture, what he sees is reality. When a believer makes a 
statement such as "God's eye sees everything" he is making a 
statement based on his picture. The way to understand his 
picture is to ask what he means by his statement, what 
consequences does he draw from this statement. In this example 
such questions as "Does the believer think about the length of 
God's eyebrows?" would need to be asked. The answer gives a 
clue to the way that the believer uses the term "God's eye" 
and a clue to the way he uses his picture. The "techniques of 
usage" of the picture need to be learnt in order to understand 
what it is that the believer believes. 
Before a term such as "God's eye can be understood a 
knowledge of what an eye is in ordinary language is 
necessary. Then it is possible to judge what particular 
qualifications the believer puts on the words and thus the 
consequences that he draws from the statement. Religious 
language is thus qualified ordinary language. It is these 
qualifications that give religious language its 
distinctiveness, they are the way in which religious belief is 
expressed as a distinct form of life. It is here that there is 
a reminder of Ramsey and his language of a suitably odd 
currency. 
This brings up a particular problem for religious education. 
If each man is using a picture and all the pictures are to 
some extent individual, then to what degree, if any, can 
there be any teaching about religious belief. That is to say, 
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if each man uses a different picture, has a different view of 
the world, then how is it possible to communicate a picture 
to any other person. 
Wittgenstein further explai.ns the problem when he refers to a 
discussion between a believer and an unbeliever. When the 
believer is questioned about his belief he will eventually 
reach a point when rational argument is exhausted and he is 
left with a final statement "that is what I believe", Ramsey 
noted this statement in ordinary life, for example when a 
fisherman tries to explain his enjoyment of fishing he will 
end up with "That is what I like, the type of person I 
am". Equally, in a discussion between a believer and an 
unbeliever, what the unbeliever does not believe is not the 
same as what the believer does believe. They are not really 
arguing about the same thing because they are using different 
pictures, they are starting from different positions. Only 
someone who uses the same picture as the believer can 
understand what it is that he believes. Augustine of Hippo 
noted a similar point when he wrote 
"Understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore 
do not seek to understand in order that you may believe, but 
make the act of faith in order that you may understand; for 
unless you make an act of faith you will not understand". 
Understanding will only come to someone who believes, who 
uses the same picture. 
An answer to this problem for religious education lies in 
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Smith's interpretation of Hirst's forms of knowledge. The 
basis of the forms is their linguistic intersubjectivity and 
this gives criterion for objectivity, that is that the forms 
are 
"forms in which a non-solipsistic consciousness 
will articulate its experience". 
(Smith 1981 P.20) 
The linguistic intersubjectivity that is the basis of the 
forms, and the criterion that permit us to use such terms as 
truth and meaning are 
"the regularity of the world and the consistency 
and agreement of people's response to the world •••••• This 
underlying level of agreement makes possible our having the 
concept of objectivitiy and all its aspects: knowledge, 
meaning, truth and so on. 
(Smith 1981 P.20) 
Men have a shared experience, on the grounds of which 
communication is possible, and this communication allows the 
sharing of individual experience with others. The extent to 
which it is possible to communicate personal experience to 
other people is another matter but communication is possible. 
It may be that ultimately it is not possible really to 
communicate because different pictures are used and proper 
communication is only possible with those that use the same 
picture, that already agree with the particular point of view. 
It is possible however to communicate with other people so 
that thay can appreciate a point of view and a person's 
feelings and it is on this level that religious education in 
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schools can work. Perhaps when Smith describes the forms as 
"forms in which a non-solipsistic 
articulate its experience" it shoul')be 
be comprehensible". 
consciousness will 
added "and expects to 
Finally, Hudson (1975) suggests that Wittgenstein offers a 
threefold answer to the question of what is a religious 
believer, and that is that a believer 
a) makes use of certain pictures as explanatory of life 
set in the dimension of God 
b) uses these pictures in a commissive way in that 
he takes risks for them 
c) uses these pictures in an affective way in that pity, 
terror, awe are part of the substance of his belief. 
Har-dy 
Hardy is concerned to remove the idea of religions as "eggs 
in a basket" ie. as separate, enclosed systems. He 
acknowledges that each of at least the major religions offer a 
coherent explanation of life and according to Wittgenstein 
these would be separated from each other by their use of 
different pictures. However, Hardy argues that these systems 
are not, like eggs, closed to the environment, rather 
"In place of seeing religious tradition as closed 
systems, they need to be seen as open systems of a high order 
which have been successively re-structured and elaborated in 
response to a progressive interchange with their environment 
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in and beyond the world." 
(Hardy 1976 P.61) 
If these religious traditions are reactions to the same 
environment then they have at least that element in common, 
there is something on which to base a dialogue between the 
religions. 
Hardy also points out that many people do not subscribe to a 
major religion but rather have a folk religion. By this he 
mean that they have beliefs which are not really those of any 
particular religion but are a reflection of many different 
beliefs. This folk religion will not usually be coherent or 
even conscious but does motivate the persons opinions and 
actions. It is in this area that there might be found the 
religion of the Millwall Football Club supporter. 
Hardy also reflects Wittgenstein's point about religious 
doctrine not being truth propositions for the believer, to him 
they are the truth. Thus it is impossible ever to fully 
appreciate a religion except as an insider, as a believer. If 
a man does not use the picture he cannot fully understand it, 
and this is particularly true of the affective element of the 
picture. 
Hardy sees religious education 
"as a struggle to enable an open communication 
between religious traditions and between these and 
non-religious traditions in classroom situations." 
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(Hardy 1979 P.107) 
Wilson thinks that education is about attitudes and he claims 
that· 
"any concept of religion as a sui generis activity 
ought to rest primarily upon a central emotion of awe; and 
upon a central activity, the activity of worship." 
(Wilson 1971 P.33) 
It should be noted how closely the awe and worship of Wilson 
matches the discernment and commitment of Ramsey, worship 
implying commitment to the object of which we are in awe. 
Conclusions 
If Wittgenstein's analysis of religious belief is accepted 
as correct then the next stage must be to draw out the 
consequences for religious education. 
These are that first of all the pupils must learn the rules 
of the language game, they must be able to make the proper 
connections, draw the correct consequences, understand the 
qualifications of religious statements. Only once they have 
learned the language will they be able to engage in a full 
dialogue with people who use different pictures, both in terms 
of understanding others and expressing themselves clearly. 
Secondly, there are two elements to consider in religious 
education and these are the development of the pupil's 
understanding of his own experience and the dialogue with 
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people who put a different interpretation upon their 
experience of life. In Wittgenstein's terms, learning about 
their own picture and learning about other people's pictures. 
Hardy suggested that the centre of religious tradition is not 
in the ideas or concepts that are used. He suggests that the 
believer does not start with concepts but with experience and 
this would involve the other two elements in Wittgenstein's 
threefold description of a believer, the commissive and the 
affective. It is an old maxim of education that you start with 
the child's own experience and work out from there. It is 
particularly important that religious education follows this 
order. Religious belief is to a large extent non-rational and 
unless the pupil understands that his own actions and emotions 
come from his use of a picture, his way of interpreting the 
world, then he can hardly be expected to make sense of 
another persons reactions to their own picture. 
From the above may come a definition of what religious 
education should be something on the lines of:-
Religious education involves the pupil in a 
questioning of the way in which he sees the world and of his 
actions and emotions that are involved in that interpretation; 
a dialogue with other people about the way in which they see 
the world; and involved in, and necessary to the above, is 
the learning of how to play the language game that is 
religious belief, how to make the appropriate connections to 
the statements of belief. 
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The above definition of religious education is of a kind that 
is acceptable for a process model of the curriculum, it 
envisages no particular end save the learning of the languge 
game and this can be seen as necessary to further inquiry into 
what is considered a worthwhile area of learning. 
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Summary 
Phenix offers a view of religion that is based upon the 
notion of ultimacy. 
Hirst suggests that forms of knowledge each have categorial 
concepts by which they can be recognised. Whilst the theory of 
the forms of knowledge may be unsatisfactory, the notion of 
categorial concepts could be useful. 
Religion must be presented as true to the believer. 
Ramsey claims that there are two elements to religious belief, 
discernment and commitment. Discernment arises out of 
disclosure situations. 
To Wittgenstein religious belief is both a form of life and a 
language game. It is a form of life as the believer makes "use 
of certain pictures set in the dimension of God". It is a 
language game to the extent that to understand a believer the 
right connections must be made to the words the he uses. 
Religious 
elements. 
belief also entails affective and commissive 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCEPTS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
This chapter will first seek to clarify what is meant by a 
concept by looking at the definition of a concept. It will 
then go on to look at how concepts have been used in religious 
education in an objectives model and how the scope of 
religious education is determined by the selection of the 
concepts involved. An investigation of the classification and 
categorisation of concepts will be followed by a consideration 
of the place of concepts in a process model of religious 
education. 
Definition 
There appear to be two ways in which concepts are operated, 
abstraction and generalisation. In generalisation an 
hypothesis is formed which is tested by further examples 
whilst in abstraction there is abstracted from a variety of 
examples a common element. In practice it is difficult to 
distinguish between the two in relation to the formation of 
concepts but there is a difference in relation to the 
definition of concepts. As an example, the concept of religion 
can be defined in either way. A generalised statement of the 
concept of religion is very difficult to compose if it is to 
include all that is regarded as religion whilst excluding all 
that is not regarded as religion; the result is usually 
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unsatisfactory. By abstraction a precise definition is not 
produced but there can be a useful clarification of thought, 
such as in Smart's six dimensions of religion. Smart does not 
seek to produce a definition of religion but does identify and 
describe what he sees as the essential elements of a religion. 
A generalised approach to the definition of the term "concept" 
may give a statement such as "a concept is basically a system 
of learned responses, the purpose of which is to organise and 
interpret the data provided by sense-perception". Whilst this 
may be a reasonable definition more can be learnt about 
concepts by the process of abstraction. 
Professor W.E.Vinacke (1952, chapter 7) suggests the following 
criteria for defining concepts 
1) "Concepts are not themselves sensory data but systems which 
are the products of our past responses to characteristic 
situations stimulus." Concepts have no existence of their own 
but are entirely dependent upon the individual and his 
experience. 
2) "Using concepts is simply applying past learning to a 
present situation." There are two ways in which the new 
experience will operate upon concepts, assimilation and 
accommodation. With assimilation the new experience is 
absorbed and integrated into previously organised concepts, it 
involves reinforcement rather than new learning. With 
accommodation the new experience will modify previously held 
concepts or will require the building up of a new concept. It 
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is in this process that most learning takes place. 
3) "Concepts relate discrete sensory data." There are two 
types of relationship between the discrete data. In identity 
classes a variety of different stimuli are recognised as being 
of the same event or object, for example photographs of a 
baby, a young man and an old man may be recognised as being of 
the same person, a noise and a sight may be identified as 
having the same source. In equivalence classes different items 
are treated as in some way the same, for example chairs, 
benches and stools are all seats. 
4) "In human beings words or other symbols are the means of 
linking di sere te items of experience." 
5) "Concepts have two ways of functioning; the extensional use 
and the intensional use." The extensional use of a concept is 
very similar for all people and can only be defined ostensibly 
ie. by an actual instance of what the concept refers to. Once 
established this function of a concept is not likely to vary 
greatly during a lifetime, assuming a large enough sample of 
those instances to which the concept relates were experienced 
in the learning of the concept. It is the common extensional 
aspect of a concept which allows communication between people. 
The intensional use varies from person to person and is the 
affective attitude to a concept. For example, if the concept 
of a dog is considered, the extensional use will not vary 
greatly between people, 
sufficient experience of 
assuming that the people have 
dogs. People can identify as dogs 
even dogs of breeds that they have not seen before and can 
agree on the identification. To teach someone else the concept 
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of a dog it would be necessary to show them examples of dogs. 
Intensionally however the concept of a dog may vary widely, 
one person may feel warmth and affection to dogs whilst 
another person may feel fear. It is the intensional use of a 
concept that may change greatly and rapidly even in a concept 
that has been held for a long period of time, for example in a 
religious conversion such as that of Saint Paul. 
6) "Not all concepts are rational or even meaningful." There 
is no great harm in irrational or meaningless concepts as long 
as they are recognised as such. 
7) "Concepts need not be consciously formulated." This may be 
particularly true of concepts in their intensional use. The 
recognition of this by the pupil, and the bringing of concepts 
to the conscious mind of the pupil, may be an important part 
of the teacher's activities. For example a concept of religion 
as mere superstition and hence meaningless may result from 
childhood experiences and may need to be consciously 
confronted before respect for other people's beliefs is 
possible. 
Concepts and the objectives model 
The various aims offered for religious education appear to 
have certain themes in common. There seem to be three themes 
that are readily identifiable and these are that the pupil 
1) will be able to understand religious language, 
symbols and those elements by which believers express their 
belief. 
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2) will appreciate the meaning of belief to the believer. 
3) will be able to question and develop his or her 
own beliefs. 
Of these three the first relates to religious concepts, 
concepts of things that would usually be considered as 
specifically religious. For example, the concept of God and 
the particular ways in which language is used to describe the 
concept of God. The second relates to concepts such as belief, 
faith, commitment and devotion, and it relates to an 
understanding of the intensional use of the specifically 
religious concepts of the first aim. These concepts are not 
specifically religious themselves as they have functions 
outside of the religious, for example, the concept of devotion 
applies to duty. The third aim relates to the intensional use 
of the concepts made by the pupil himself. 
The lists of objectives that are offered in support of the 
aims include concepts that are of a general religious nature. 
This is what is to be expected of a list of mediate goals. 
Only when proximate goals are listed could specific religious 
concepts reasonably be expected. For example, as a mediate 
goal "an understanding of the concept of religious 
symbol" is acceptable, the proximate goals may offer such 
concepts as that of bread and wine as appropriate. Whilst it 
is desirable that pupils understand the general religious 
concepts, in the interests of transfer of learning, these can 
only be learnt through specific examples. Understanding the 
general concept is important as it is only through this 
119 
general understanding that pupils could be expected easily to 
recognise other specific concepts of a similar nature. It is 
also possible that the pupil may then forget the precise 
meaning of the specific concepts that have been learnt and yet 
still retain the general concept, for example, the pupil may 
be able to recognise a religious symbol and appreciate that it 
has meaning for the believer without being able to recall 
other religious symbols or their specific meanings. This point 
may be minor but it does illustrate a difference between 
knowledge and understanding and the importance for the pupil 
of understanding rather than just knowledge, a point 
emphasised in the current thinking on how pupils learn. 
The scope of religious education 
Of the three aspects of learning that make up objectives; 
concepts, skills and attitudes, it is concepts that define the 
subject area. Only if there are 
religious understanding could 
skills that are specific to 
these claim a place in the 
definition of the subject area, otherwise they are only 
subject specific when linked to content ie. to concepts. The 
existence of specific skills will be considered in the next 
chapter. Any consideration of concepts would not be complete 
unless it examined the scope of the subject for this is the 
only way in which a decision can be made as to what are the 
appropriate concepts for an understanding of the subject. 
If religious education is to be concerned with the religion of 
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the believer then a definition of the believer is necessary. 
Wittgenstein gave a definition of a religious believer as one 
who makes use of a picture. Hudson provides a commentary on 
this point and describes a believer as one who makes use of a 
picture 
a) as explanatory of life set in the dimension of God 
b) in a commissive way in that he takes risks for them 
c) in an affective way in that awe, pity etc. are part of 
the substance of his belief. 
This definition is acceptable as far as it goes but it does 
exclude certain groups who would normally be considered as 
religious believers, for example some Buddhists do not have a 
belief in God. It also excludes some groups that are not 
normally considered as religious believers but whose beliefs 
offer an alternative to conventional religions, for example 
Humanists. Both of these groups fulfil the second and third 
criteria. They both act upon their beliefs and take risks for 
them. Equally, they both use their pictures in an affective 
way, for example, Bertrand Russell, (1966, 107) in describing 
his humanistic beliefs, wrote that the soul's habitation 
should be on the firm foundation of unyielding despair. The 
precise emotions that are evoked will depend upon the picture 
that is being used but it seems clear that it is not only 
those beliefs that are generally considered to be religious 
that can fulfil the second and third criteria. 
However, it is not acceptable simply to remove the words 
"set in the dimension of God" from the first criteria. The 
121 
Wittgensteinian criteria cannot be applied to any belief, they 
describe a particular kind of belief. Equally, not every 
belief comes within the scope of religious education. 
Stopes-Rowe was making this distinction when he wrote 
"The basic criterion which determines whether a definite 
system can be accepted as a "religion" or (more generally) a 
"life stance" is its sufficiency in relation to ultimate 
questions of fact, value, meaning and concern." 
(Stopes-Rowe, 1976, 26) 
He also offers a test that can be applied to beliefs to see 
whether they satisfy this criteria. The test is whether the 
system under consideration can be combined 
"consistently, and without oddness, with two genuine life 
stances which take contrary views on ultimate questions". 
(Stopes-Rowe, 1976, 27) 
As an example of the way in which the test works a 
consideration of "communism" is helpful. If "communism" is 
considered as a political system which may be held by Marxists 
and Christians alike then it fails the test, it is not a life 
stance. If, however, by "communism" is meant a system that is 
synonymous with all of the teachings of Marx then it would 
pass the test. This type of "communism", Marxism, is clearly 
an alternative belief system to Christianity and is 
inconsistent with it. The test is not above criticism, for 
example what is to count as a life stance in the first place, 
but does give a good illustration of belief systems that are 
compatible with the first criterion of Wittgenstein if the 
words "in the dimension of God" are removed. There are, of 
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course, the other two criteria that the belief system must 
also satisfy, the commissive and affective aspects of the use 
of a picture. What is really necessary is a new form of words 
to replace "set in the dimension of God". This form of words 
must limit the beliefs that conform the criteria to those that 
are religious or that take the place of a religion. 
Miller and Pound (1969) suggest that there are five 
characteristics of any belief system worthy of the name 
religion and these are 
1) Give a total world view 
2) Consider fundamental questions 
3) Show a practical expression or way of life 
4) Demand a serious concern from its adherents 
5) Show a corporate or social aspect 
(Miller and Pound, 1969, 100) 
The fifth criterion gives a description of religion rather 
than a definition of religious belief, but apart from that the 
characteristics are similar to Wittgenstein's definition of 
religious belief. The first two can be likened to the idea of 
using a picture as explanatory of life set in the dimension of 
God, without mentioning God. They offer an alternative form of 
words that does not exclude certain belief systems that have 
already been mentioned as possibly within the field of 
religious education. The third and fourth characteristics 
compare with the commissive 
Wittgenstein's analysis. 
and 
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affective elements of 
There are some conclusions that can be drawn from the above 
analysis of concepts and the way that they define the subject 
area. The first is that there appears to be a number of life 
stances, or belief systems, that are outside the analysis of 
religious belief offered by Wittgenstein, that operate upon 
the believer in the same way as those within the terms of the 
analysis. These life stances conform to the commissive and 
affective aspects of the analysis but do not use a picture as 
explanatory of life set in the dimension of God. What they do 
however is to use a picture, in all the ways that Wittgenstein 
sees religious belief as using a picture, without the 
reference to God. To expand Wittgenstein's analysis to include 
these other life stances the definition could be changed to 
describe the believer as one who "uses a picture as 
explanatory of life in its ultimacy". By this is meant that 
the life stance gives consideration to questions about the 
final cause as opposed to the efficient, to fundamental 
questions of meaning and value, and provides answers of some 
kind to these questions. This does resrict the areas of 
inquiry that could be pursued. There are some areas of inquiry 
which will be excluded because they are not capable of answers 
at any more than an immediate level, they are not capable of 
answers of any great depth. For example, questions about 
prefernces for one food rather than another, or questions that 
relate to purely mechanical situations such as about the way 
that an engine works. 
The concern for ultimacy also has a great effect on the way 
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in which the inquiry is approached and conducted. Questions 
must be pursued to the point where no further questions are 
possible. For example, the question of abortion must go beyond 
an answer such as "It is murder", beyond "It is wrong to take 
life", beyond "everyone has a right to life", to the question 
of why everyone has a right to life. Even answers to this 
question may require further answers, for example, what does 
it mean that all men are God's creatures. Eventually the 
answer may come that "That is my belief", there are no further 
answers. This is what is meant by a concern with ultimacy, the 
asking of fundamental questions of meaning and value. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn is with regard to the 
type of concepts involved in religious education. That the use 
of picture is explanatory of life in its ultimacy means that 
specifically religious concepts will be involved, as will 
other concepts not specifically religious but dealing with the 
beliefs of groups such as Marxists and Humanists, groups who 
have their own specific concepts. Of the concepts within each 
belief system more will be said in the next section. Whilst 
these specific concepts can be dealt with in an explicit 
manner there are other concepts, such as depth, meaning and 
value that cannot so easily be dealt with explicitly. The 
commissive and affective aspects concern the understanding of 
concepts such as faith, commitment and belief. These two 
groups of concepts are those that were found as represented by 
the first two aims that are commonly stated as aims in the 
objectives model of religious education. The third aim, that 
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of the pupils' developing their own beliefs, will also appear 
in a process model, both explicitly and implicitly. This 
concern will be expressed in some way in the principles of 
procedure, but it also figures in the whole philosophy of the 
process model. The pupil engaged in inquiry and organising the 
direction of this inquiry will inevitably develop his own 
understanding and beliefs, will develop his own picture. 
A classification of concepts in religious education 
Goldman investigated the area of the development of religious 
concepts in young people. His work was primarily concerned 
with Biblical concepts but pointed a way forward for religious 
education in general. Attfield has done some more recent work 
based on the claim that 
"religious education best begins from and should be built 
up around a particular core of subject matter" 
(Attfield, 1973, 13) 
He followed this statement with an assessment of the work 
needed to follow up Goldman's lead. Attfield claimed that 
Goldman's technical validity had not been seriously questioned 
and that what was needed was research into how it should be 
applied. It is the form that this research should take, and 
some progress in it, that he described in a series of 
articles. 
Attfield pointed out (in 1974) that whilst concepts build 
upon each other this should not be seen as a series of steps. 
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By this he meant that if concept A relies upon a pupil having 
concept B it does not mean that the pupil must have a fully 
developed concept of B before concept A can be learnt. The 
notion of a fully developed concept is debateable in itself 
but the point that Attfield was making is that concept A and 
concept B will develop together in a complex relationship. A 
knowledge of this relationship is necessary, he claims, in the 
planning of learning. Bruner made a similar point when he 
claimed that knowledge of the structure of a subject enables 
the gap between elementary and advanced understanding to be 
bridged and the inter-relationship of concepts is clearly an 
important part of the structure of a subject. The importance 
of this point to religious education can be seen when teaching 
the concept of God as father is considered. This concept 
relies on the pupil's concept of father, a concept that is 
developing as the pupil grows older. 
Attfield identifies conceptual research as a main area of 
research to be undertaken in education and he describes it 
thus 
"The main claim being made for conceptual research simply 
amounts to saying that the central concepts involved in a 
school subject should receive attention on the part of 
educators, that what is implicit in having or gaining a key 
notion should be analysed and clarified logically and 
philosophically before we can turn to the empirical and 
practical questions of teaching, its method and content." 
(Attfield, 1976a, 91) 
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He sees the task of conceptual research with regard to 
religious education as a series of systematically ordered 
steps, of which he identifies six. These steps are 
1) the identification of the categorial concepts. 
2) the alternative interpretations of these central 
concepts need specification and the relationship of these 
alternatives investigated. It does not seem clear exactly what 
is meant by this but it seems to require the specification of 
the ways in which each of the categorial concepts can be 
qualified, described and interpreted. This would seem to 
require an investigation of, at least, religious language as 
it relates to the categorial concepts. For example, the 
specification of those ways in which man can express his 
concept of God and the variety of interpretations open to 
these expressions. 
3) the essential religious concepts need to be specified 
and alternatives considered. For each group within a religion 
the emphasis will be different, even if only slightly. This 
difference may well be revealed by each groups specification 
of what they consider to be the essential religious concepts 
and the emphasis that is put on each of them. For example, a 
Roman Catholic may include a reference to the Virgin Mary as 
the Mother of God as an essential religious concept whereas a 
Protestant is unlikely to do so. 
4) the main logical features of each important concept 
should be specified as preparatory to the teaching of them. 
This step seems to require an identification of the right 
connections to be made for each concept. 
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5) the pre requisites for acquisition of these important 
concepts and the other concepts they depend on should be 
exhibited 
6) some tentative move towards investigation of the way 
that concept acquisition can be prepared for in the minds of 
the students. 
The meaning of some of the terms used will become clearer 
when the next part of Attfield's work is considered. 
In an article later that same year he put forward the outline 
of a taxonomy of concepts in religious education. The concepts 
that he analysed are those of what he describes as kerygmatic 
language, this being the minimum of religious language needed 
by a believer to express his belief. The concepts are also 
confined to those that express belief in God rather than those 
concerned with moral or historical statements. Finally, he 
applied his taxonomy to those terms that can be found in "A 
theological word book of the Bible". Thus the taxonomy is 
concerned only with a small area of the scope of religious 
education, what may be regarded as the most traditional area. 
In the taxonomy he identifies the following categories of 
concepts 
a) Categorial (C) These are the concepts that 
"demarcate the foundation of an entire way of thinking, 
thay denote what underpins a distinct form of knowledge" 
(Attfield, 1976b, 70) 
These are the categorial concepts of Hirst's forms of 
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knowledge. It is not necessary to accept Hirst's theory to 
recognise that certain concepts are fundamental to a way of 
thought, that they are the logical subject, or presupposition, 
of other concepts in that subject area. Attfield identifies 
four categorial concepts and these are God, Lord, Holy Spirit 
and Word. 
b) Independent (I) These are concepts that are used 
outside religion and are made theological by their reference 
to categorial concepts. An example of this is love, as it is 
used in the love of God. 
c) Religious (R) These are concepts that are distinctive 
of religion but are not categorial. They are divided into two 
groups, Essential Religious (Ra) and Inessential Religious 
(Rb). Ra concepts are those that are 
"indispensable to a minimum articulation of the rel,igious 
perspective of the simple believer" (Attfield, 1976b, 71) 
Rb concepts are required for a fuller explanation of a 
religius belief but are not essential to a basic explanation 
of it. Examples of Ra concepts are Church and sin, of Rb 
concepts are covenant and prophet. 
d) Theological (T) These are devised for theological 
language, to express precise positions in discussions. They 
can be seen as a second order level, where independent and 
religious concepts are insufficient. They represent the 
technical language of the subject. Examples are Sabbath and 
Spirit. 
The taxonomy may be criticised in terms of the placing of the 
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concepts within the particular categories. These are a matter 
of personal judgement, there is no objective criterion for 
their placement. However, much more important is the question 
of what value the taxonomy has. It is a pattern that is placed 
upon the concepts, it has no existence in reality, that is 
the concepts do not belong in these groups except in this 
particular classification of them. If it has any value it must 
be because of the help that it provides to teachers, and 
researchers, in the pursuit of their work. Ultimately it will 
only have value if it facilitates improvement in the process 
of education. This also applies to the tasks that Attfield set 
out for conceptual research, their value is not intrinsic but 
dependent upon the results that they produce for the process 
of education. 
Inasmuch as the analysis of concepts may reveal the structure 
of knowledge within a particular religion, or a particular 
group within that religion, it may be seen to be useful. 
However, this would seem to imply the production of something 
along the lines of Barth's "Church Dogmatics", that is an 
attempt to work out a complete system of belief. Theologians 
seem to have moved away from this kind of undertaking and it 
would not seem relevant to the pupil in a secondary school. 
Certainly it is necessary for the teacher to be able to 
present the views of a religious group accurately but this 
presentation would seem to be a reaction to the pupil's 
inquiry rather than as a planned, systematic study of a 
religion. Just as the believer reacts without ever working out 
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fully his position with regard to his beliefs, so the teacher 
may present beliefs as a reaction to questions and without a 
conscious awareness of all the possible connections and 
implications. There must also be the question of how far it is 
possible to work out and present all of Attfield's steps. The 
taxonomy he presents may be useful for the planning of a 
course and for consideration when reacting to the pupil's 
inquiries, but it is not clear that the greater detail that 
may result from a full working out of a taxonomy along the 
lines that Attfield suggests would be of much greater help to 
the teacher. It would seem to be an undertaking thatwould 
occupy a great deal of time which could perhaps be more 
profitably spent on other areas, certainly with regard to 
teaching. The taxonomy that Attfield (1976b) presents may be 
all that the teacher requires for the planning of a course or 
as a guideline when reacting to the inquiries of pupils. 
From Attfield's taxonomy there are three categories of 
concepts that are important for religious education. These are 
the categorial (C), the essential religious (Ra) and the 
independent (I). The inessential religious and the theological 
would only be examined specifically by the more advanced 
student or believer. Their use in schools is more likely to 
arise from some inquiry by the pupils rather than being 
intentionally planned as part of the lesson. The categorial 
concepts are obviously important if they are, as claimed, the 
presuppositions on which all of the other concepts rely and to 
which they all refer. Through the essential religious concepts 
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it is possible to elaborate on the beliefs that are held, to 
expand the meaning of the categorial concepts into a more 
complete belief system. It is through the use of the 
independent concepts that the categorial and religious 
concepts become comprehensible, it is through these concepts 
that the appropriate connections can be made. Without 
reference to things outside of the religious it would remain 
an inpenetrable code that had no meaning for anyone other than 
the individual believer. Even with the independent concepts 
the question of how far one man's beliefs can be understood by 
another man is open to question and has already been 
considered. 
Attfield's list of tasks for conceptual research require a 
very detailed specification of the concepts and their inter 
relationships. However, the more detailed this specification 
becomes the more the religion specified becomes the religion 
of the individual and not the group. Every religion could be 
said to contain a large variety of quite similar, but not 
identical beliefs. This is because no two men will have the 
same experience or place the same interpretation on a specific 
event, they will not use exactly the same picture. 
Consequently the more closely a particular picture is 
specified, the more people 
use that picture. This 
are excluded from the group that 
is illustrated by the numbers of 
different groups within each religion divided by theological 
dissensions. This is acknowledged by Attfield in the second of 
his tasks for conceptual research, the specification of 
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alternative interpretations of the central concepts. This 
specification could become a very extensive task if each 
believers picture is to be considered. Also, the more detailed 
the specification of the inter-relationships of concepts and 
the prerequisites for the acquisition of them, the greater the 
difficulty in applying an objectives model to the task of 
teaching them. This may seem paradoxical but the more precise 
the specification, and the greater the number of connections 
that will result from this process of specification, the more 
onerous the task of teaching each one of them becomes. 
Attfield makes no mention of how detailed this specification 
should be but there are clear problems for the objectives 
model if the work is completed in a thorough manner. It would 
seem that the research and classification are not entirely 
appropriate for religious education in a process model. The 
contribution of concepts to the planning and teaching of 
religious education and the work that needs to be done with 
them must now be considered. 
Categories of concepts in religious education. 
Before the value of concepts in religious education is 
considered there is something to be noted about the nature of 
religion. Attfield's taxonomy was concerned with only one 
religion, and if the taxonomy is of value the same work would 
have to be carried out for all of the religions that were to 
be included in religious education. Many of the concepts in 
Attfield's taxonomy for Christianity would also appear in the 
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analyses of other religions. When it came to specifying the 
appropriate connections to be made for each concept there 
would be many differences but there would also be many 
similarities. This would tend to reinforce the point made by 
Hardy that religions are not "eggs in a basket" but are inter 
related systems of belief. However, it would seem likely that 
the differences within, for example, Christianity would 
outnumber the similarities, even if they are not of equal 
weight. Between different religions it seems reasonable to 
suggest that the differences will grow and the similarities 
diminish. As life stances, other than those that are usually 
considered as religions, are included by this thesis as part 
of religious education this may well serve to reduce the 
similarities to a concern for ultimacy. This is not a concept 
that would be explicitly stated by many, if any, life stances 
but it may be the only concern that all of the life stances 
have in common. 
Concepts and their inter-relationships form, in their 
intensional and extensional aspects, the structure of the 
subject. They also provide the basis on which religious 
education could be planned within a process model of the 
curriculum. A process model would not require such a detailed 
analysis of concepts as that suggested by Attfield because, by 
its nature, it is an exploration of concepts and not the 
learning of a predetermined pattern. It is necessary to 
identify those concepts with which religious education should 
be concerned and which can be used as a basis for the planning 
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of lessons. 
There appear to be four categories of concepts that are 
involved 
1) Concepts that descibe a life stance. The 
analysis of concepts within Christianity that was produced by 
Attfield provides an illustration of this category. Each life 
stance can be seen as being based on the believer's 
understanding of certain categorial concepts, these are 
fundamental to his belief, to the picture that he uses. 
These, together with the specific concepts that Attfield 
termed "essential religious" and the other concepts that 
Attfield termed "independent" can be usd to provide a 
reasonably accurate picture of the beliefs held by the 
believer. If these concepts and their inter-relations are 
identified then the structure of that religion or life stance 
can be accurately presented. They do not define the stucture 
of religion but only of a religion. This identification of 
concepts is best done by the believer as only the believer can 
describe properly the connections that he makes with each of 
the concepts. 
The three other categories of concepts describe the structure 
of religion. Two of them describe the extensional use of 
concepts within the structure of religion and these follow to 
some extent the ideas of Phenix. They can be said to describe 
the quantitative and qualitative nature of the subject 
respectively. The third describes the intensional use of 
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concepts within the structure of religion. 
2) Concepts which are the subject of religious discourse. 
This category does not necessarily have any limits. It is 
possible that anything may become the subject of religious 
discourse. There are certainly some concepts that are more 
often considered by religions and upon which religions are 
expected to offer the opinions that reflect their beliefs. 
Examples of these concepts are authority, creation, truth, the 
nature of death etc. That is not to say that all discourse 
even on these concepts is religious. 
3) The concept that differentiates between 
religious and non religious discourse is the concept that may 
be said to define the quality of the nature of religion. This 
concept has already been identified as the concept of ultimacy 
and which is related to the concepts of meaning and value. 
Without this element the discourse is not religious. Opinions 
offered that do not refer to the ultimate are not founded on a 
religious basis. The second and third categories describe the 
scope and quality of a religion, they refer to the first of 
Wittgenstein's criteria for religious belief. 
4) The fourth category of concepts relates to the 
second and third of Wittgenstein's criteria and is concerned 
with the intensional use of religious concepts. The category 
includes such concepts as belief, faith and commitment. These 
are concepts of religious experience without which all other 
religious concepts make no sense. 
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Concepts in a process model of religious education. 
Having identified the categories of concepts that are the 
concern of religious edcation it is now necessary to show how 
these relate to religious education in a process model. It may 
also be useful to indicate the work that needs to be done with 
regard to concepts in this context. 
A definition of the structure of a belief is necessary, and 
must be understood by the teacher, if the pupil is to explore 
the faith of the believer rather than an impression that the 
teacher has of a believer's belief. Hence it is important that 
the concepts, and their inter-relations, are specifie~ and 
specified by the believer. Further work is also required to 
compare the concepts are used by different life stances. In 
this way the principal concerns of religion, the areas that 
are considered most important by religions, can be identified. 
For each of the concepts involved in these central concerns 
the different interpretations put on them by the different 
life stances need to be indicated, once again so that the 
beliefs of the believer are not misrepresented. 
The work that has been suggested above lies within the realm 
of religious studies and could be used to form the basis of a 
syllabus for such a course. It is not necessarily what is 
intended by religious education nor does it readily lend 
itself to be the content of a process based syllabus. The work 
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tends to imply that the course based on it would require the 
pupils to recognise the accuracy of the representations of the 
believer's life stances and possibly to attempt to understand 
and empathise with them. The work does not take any account of 
the development of the pupil's own beliefs. The above work is 
necessary, however, so that the teacher can act properly as a 
guide to the learning experience. 
Whilst it is important that teachers are able to present the 
beliefs of other people accurately this aspect will not 
necessarily form the greater part of the syllabus of religious 
education. It is important to engage the pupils in inquiry 
into areas that the pupils can see as relevant to themselves. 
In this way the pupils are more likely to be motivated 
particularly as they will be able to see a justification for 
the subject for themselves. There are many concepts that are 
relevant to the pupils and which are the subject of religious 
discourse but that would not come within the group of concepts 
that would generally be used to describe and define the 
structure of a religion. For example, the concept of family is 
one on which most, if not all, life stances would offer an 
opinion based on the beliefs of that life stance. However as 
the concept of family is not essential for the definition of 
the beliefs of a life stance the concept would not be included 
in those that are examined in the first category of concepts. 
The identification of these other relevant concepts and the 
development of learning experiences based on them is also part 
of religious education. That these concepts will be treated in 
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a religious way will be ensured by conforming to the 
principles 
and the 
of procedure that reflect the nature of religion 
subject of religious education. The particular 
principles are those that relate to the concept of ultimacy 
and the concepts related to religious experience. 
The concept of religious experience, and the concepts within 
the category of religious experience, are worthy of some 
further consideration. Smart's phenomenological approach to 
the study of religion is often characterised as the "explicit" 
approach to religious education. It is seen as the other side 
of a coin to the "implicit" approach. The differences in 
the two approaches have been emphasised and Smart's approach 
has been seen more in terms of the study of religious 
phenomena rather than the faith of believers. Smart himself 
emphasised that an empathetic approach is essential. He placed 
the experiential dimension at the centre of his study of 
religion (Smart, 1971) and emphasised its central importance 
to the believer. This emphasis is echoed by Hardy (1976) when 
he made the point that the believer concentrates on the 
practices of religion rather than ideology. By this he does 
not mean that the believer is most concerned with the external 
practices of religion but on the inner practice, the believer 
is most concerned with the heart rather than the head. This 
leads to the conclusion that to conduct religious education 
properly it would seem necessary to involve the pupils not 
only in the study of religion and its practices but also in 
the experience of religion. 
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To experience religion does not mean that the pupil must be 
converted to a particular set of religious beliefs, even if it 
were possible it would not generally be considered desirable. 
It means that pupils must be involved not only in experiencing 
religious discourse at an academic level but also involved in 
the emotions that come from realisation. Realisation can be 
seen as a new insight which demands affective and commissive 
responses. Realisation may be interpreted as revelation by 
some religions but the term is used here to describe only the 
experience of the believer and not the source of the 
experience. The term "believer" is appropriate, applied as 
it is here to the pupil, because each pupil is a believer of 
their own realisations. In the terms of Wittgenstein's 
criteria as they have been adapted earlier in the thesis, 
each pupil uses a picture to interpret their experiences no 
matter how unconscious that use or how undeveloped the 
picture. Realisation also carries the implication that the 
insight is the truth and this is also appropriate because to 
the pupil as believer it is the truth. 
Weightman (1982) considers the nature of realisation further. 
He compares the actual with the real, the actual being that 
which is fact and the real being that which is value. For 
example, the child who wishes to avoid a test at school may 
complain of a stomach ache. His complaint "I have a stomach 
ache" is fact, they are the words that he actually uses. The 
value of his statement is that he wishes to avoid a test at 
141 
school, that is what he really means. Weightman further 
compares the actual and the real with the notions of existence 
and essence. He suggests that existence has a poverty of value 
and purpose but the certainty of facticity. Essence has a 
richness of purpose and value but an uncertainty of facticity, 
essence carries only the possibility of being, of actually 
existing. For a full understanding both knowledge of fact and 
a realisation of the value of the fact is necessary. Clearly, 
in religious education, where the concern is with fundamental 
questions of meaning and value, realisation is important as 
the intention of the pupil's learning. This means that 
realisation is the intended outcome of the pupil's learning 
experiences. This does not mean that realisation is a 
behavioural objective, or any sort of objective, in the way 
that they are used in the objectives model. Realisation is the 
essence of what religious education is about. 
If the development of the pupil's experience is the intention 
of education, and this is seen as a worthwh'ile area of 
experience, then it can be argued that realisation forms the 
substance of a true education in religion. It also reflects 
most accurately the concern of the believer. If this is so 
then the only possible curriculum model for religious 
education is a process model. It is inconceivable that 
behavioural objectives could be stated that would then be 
achieved through the commissive aspect of the realisations 
that are somehow induced. The work following from acceptance 
of the above argument seems quite clear and it is not 
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primarily of an academic nature. The work is practical in that 
it requires teachers to develop ways in which they might set 
up situations and provide experiences in which the pupil may 
come to these insights that have been called realisations. 
There is one further aspect of concepts that needs to be 
emphasised and that is the need for pupils to become familiar 
with the connections that are made to religious concepts. This 
involves the pupil in the use of what is usually called 
religious language and includes not only words but symbols as 
well. Whilst it may not be necessary to include this element 
specifically in the principles of procedure, the teacher 
should always be looking for ways in which to develop the 
pupil's ability to recognise and use religious language. In 
this way the pupil is more able to recognise, understand and 
share other people's religious experience. In this way they 
will be able to develop better their own realisations and be 
able to communicate these to others. 
Realisation and the non-rational 
Otto (1931) refers to the claim of Fries that there are three 
forms of understanding. The first of these, knowledge, 
involves the building up of concepts to order one's 
sensations. This description of knowledge as a structure in 
which experiences are conceptualised and ordered has been 
referred to before in this thesis. The other two forms of 
understanding are faith and presentiment. Whilst knowledge 
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involves both concepts and sensations, faith and presentiment 
only have one of these charateristics each. Faith involves 
concepts without sensations, that is while the faith may be 
certain it cannot appeal to sense data for proof. Presentiment 
involves sensations for which there are no adequate concepts, 
the sensations are definite but not able to be articulated. 
In his book "The idea of the holy" Otto (1923) argues that the 
basic category in religion is the holy. This category includes 
both the rational and the non-rational. The rational is 
obviously open to consideration, reason and discussion, it is 
accessible to normal teaching methods. The rational and 
non-rational are bound together and thus both elements must be 
considered in the teaching of religious education. In order to 
distinguish the non-rational element of religion Otto coined 
the term "the numinous". This non-rational element is the form 
of understanding identified as presentiment. 
Realisation involves both rational and non-rational elements. 
Clearly much of a pupil's realisation will involve reason, 
realisation includes the appreciation of the conclusion of an 
argument, the perception of an illustration. For example, the 
-\-o 
term realisation can be appliedAthe understanding that in the 
r-p~able of the Good Samaritan, Jesus is showing that by 
neighbour he means all men, and the implications of this 
realisation for the behaviour of the followers of Jesus is 
also realised through reason. To give an example in words of a 
realisation on a non-rational level is, by its very nature, 
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impossible. It is possible to give an example in general 
terms. For example, realisation on a non-rational level could 
be involved in the appreciation of some aspect of God in a way 
that causes an emotional response of awe. There have been many 
attempts to describe this, essentially indescribable, 
experience. These include the writings of Christian mystics, 
the writings of nature mystics such as Jefferies "The story of 
my heart", and essentially secular writings such as the 
description of an experience at the end of Huxley's "Eyeless 
in Gaza .. Thus the numinous, whilst intended by Otto as, . 
perhaps, relating only to the religious, has parallels in 
Humanistic life stances. 
It is hard to see how any exploration of the numinous could be 
planned within the framework of behavioural objectives. Even 
within a process model it is an area which has not been 
explored at any great depth. Potter, in Minney and Potter 
(1984), has attempted a variety of teaching strategies to 
develop a sense of awe and wonder in pupils and concludes 
"there are teaching methods which prompt a receptivity to 
awe" (Minney and Potter, 1984, 27) 
The work was based on the Durham Agreed Syllabus but was not 
developed within a behavioural objectives framework. Clearly, 
any teaching which prompts in a direction, rather than setting 
out to achieve a particular result in terms of change in the 
pupil, cannot be planned within a behavioural objectives 
model. That it prompts in the direction of receptivity may be 
seen as an emphasis on the process, there is no indication of 
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how the pupil should react on experiencing awe, if any 
experience of awe should take place as the result of the 
teaching at all. 
The non-rational element of realisation is important in 
religious edu~ion, 
~ 
it is not properly seperable from the 
rational element. It is therefore possible to argue that if 
this element, the numinous, is so important in religious 
education then the objectives model is shown as an unsuitable 
model for the planning of religious education. In this case 
the model is shown as unsuitable specifically for religious 
education. It~must therefore be considered when it comes to 
develop a framework for religious education in a process 
model. 
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Summary 
It is concepts that define the subject area. It is possible to 
define the subject area of religious education in a 
satisfactory manner by adapting Wittgenstein's view of a 
religious believer. To include beliefs that are not 
considered religious, a believer is one who "uses a picture as 
explanatory of life set in its ultimacy". 
Attfield's taxonomy of concepts is too complex to have much 
use for the classroom teacher beyond being a reference source 
during planning. It does help to be able to identify the 
categorial and essential religious concepts of a belief 
system. The independent concepts may be necessary in an 
understanding of religious language. 
Four categories of concepts in religious education are 
indentifiable. These are 1) the concepts that describe a life 
stance, 2) concepts that are the subject of religious 
discourse, 3) the concept of ultimacy, 4) concepts of 
religious experience such as belief and faith. 
Religious education in a process model should plan for the 
pupils to experience moments of realisation. 
Realisation should be planned for at the non-rational level, 
the level of the numinous, as well as the rational level. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SKILLS IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
Definition 
Much has been written about skills and the word "skills" can 
be used in different ways. 
Borger and Seabourne (1966, 127) point out that the word 
"skill" is used in two different ways. Firstly it is used to 
denote the ability to do something, the emphasis is on the 
activity. For example it might be said that someone has the 
skill to drive a car. The second use relates to the level of 
ability, for example a skilled wood carver suggests a man 
with a high degree of ability in that area. The term will be 
used in this thesis in the first sense, the interest is 
primarily in the ability to perform the activity and not in 
the level of performance. 
Transfer of learning 
Transfer of learning is also referred to as transfer of 
training and has been mentioned earlier in the thesis in the 
section on psychology as an influence in the development of 
the objectives model. In that passage the faculty theory, that 
assumes almost complete transfer of learning, was dismissed as 
outmoded. In fact, Stones (1966, 87) points out that transfer 
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of training is less than was commonly thought. This means that 
it is no use teaching, for example, Latin because it trains a 
person to think logically either generally or in other subject 
areas. 
There is both positive and negative transfer of training. 
Positive transfer is where a previous experience enables a 
person to complete the task in an easier or a better manner. 
Negative transfer, interference, means that previous learning 
inhibits or prevents the completion of the present task. 
Thomson (1959, 56-8, 144-5) points to a conclusion that can be 
drawn from the results of Maier's "hat trick" and "pendulum" 
experiments. This is that 
"Positive transfer of relevant past training to a present 
task only takes place if the subject can make use of a 
mediating factor: this may come from uses within the task 
situation or as a result of the activity of the thinker." 
(Thomson, 1959, 144-5) 
The first case in which transfer can be expected, uses within 
the task situation, is the most obvious case. If the current 
task has elements in it that are similar to some aspect of 
previous learning then transfer would be expected. For 
example, if a man is good at tennis then it would be 
reasonable to expect him to be able to hit a squash ball 
competently in the type of strokes where the motion is the 
same as, or similar to, the motion of hitting the ball in 
tennis. This takes the point into the realm of degree of skill 
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rather than just competence. Whilst the good tennis player may 
have a basic competence in certain squash strokes he will only 
become a good squash player by practising and mastering the 
specific strokes needed for squash. 
The second element that enables past learning to be applied 
to a present task, as a result of the activity of the thinker, 
requires a separate note because of its importance to 
education and teaching. Klausmeier (1961, 425) explains this 
point more fully when he deals with generalisation and 
transposition theory. He quotes Judd's darts experiment to 
show that knowledge of principles can be a major factor in 
transfer of learning, ie. transfer by generalisation. In 
transposition theory Klausmeier refers to the work of Johnson 
and Zara (1960) and concludes that 
"The more extensive the knowledge of relationships gained 
during initial learning, the greater the transfer." 
(Klausmeier, 1961, 425) 
Klausmeier lists the following principles of retention and 
transfer 
1) Setting and starting to attain a goal initiates and 
focuses activities. 
2) Perceiving the relatedness of components of a task 
facilitates the initial learning and retention of all types of 
learning outcomes. 
3) Experiencing feelings of success in connection with 
initial learning promotes retention. 
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4) Attaining concepts and principles and developing 
abilities facilitate vertical and lateral transfer. 
5) Applying newly acquired concepts, principles and 
abilities increases their permanence. 
6) Learning over a period of time is essential for 
developing stable abilities and comprehensive knowledge." 
(Klausmeier, 1961, 425) 
These points should clearly be the concern of, and be 
considered by, all teachers. 
Transfer of learning in religious education 
It is certainly true that such general skills as 
"interpretation of evidence" are used in many subject areas 
but a skill such as "interpretation of a theological 
statement" will be considered solely or principally within the 
realm of religious studies, although the specific skill may 
also be required in history in some cases. Whether it is 
necessary to think of the specific skill as separate from the 
general skill depends upon the degree of transfer of learning 
from one area to another. 
It seems that with both positive and neg~tive transfer from 
within the whole range of the pupil's experience it is 
virtually impossible to conduct any experiments on transfer of 
general skills such as "interpretation of evidence". There 
will be far too many factors in the background of the pupil's 
experience to allow the test results to be reliable. All 
151 
conclusions in this area must therefore be tentative. 
It can certainly be shown that there are elements to a skill 
such as "interpretation of evidence" that are common to all 
uses of the skill, for example the appreciation of authorship. 
If these elements are learnt as principles then some transfer 
of learning from one area to another could be expected. 
Similarly, when dealing with rather more specific skills such 
as "ability to interpret the teaching of Moses" and "ability 
to interpret the teaching of Paul", as long as the additional 
information was available some transfer of learning would be 
expected because the skills have a great deal in common. 
It would also seem reasonable to say that "interpretation of 
evidence in history" and "interpretation of evidence in the 
Bible" contain significant elements of similarity and so some 
transfer is to be expected. However they each contain 
significantly different elements and so some new learning is 
essential. It would seem reasonable to say that within the 
subject area of religious education the careful teacher would 
make sure that they had identified those skills which are 
necessary to a study of religions, to the interpretation of 
other men's beliefs and to an appreciation of their own 
exeriences. The teacher would also look for, but not assume, 
some transfer of learning of skills from other similar areas 
in the curriculum and use these to the pupil's best advantage. 
Other points to note about the teachers use and development of 
skills can be read from the previous section on the definition 
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of skills. 
Skills exclusive to religious education 
Bloom's (1954) distinction between skills and abilities, 
abilities being skills allied to specific content, has already 
been noted. Bloom however treated skills and abilities as one 
in his taxonomy, or at least he made no further distinction 
between them. Obviously no skill can be exercised in the 
absence of content. Thus if skills are to be listed that a 
teacher would be concerned to foster in a religious education 
course then the examples of skills will describe the skill as 
applied to some content that is considered as appropriate to 
religious education. That is not to say that the skill is 
exclusive to religious education. 
Before it is possible to say that there are no skills that 
are exclusive to religious education two criteria need to be 
satisfied 
a) that any skill that is claimed as exclusive to 
religious education can be applied to some content outside the 
subject area 
b) that transfer of training is such that a pupil who has 
mastered the skill as applied to some area outside religious 
education would be able to apply that skill within the field 
of religious education with no further learning. 
Of these criterion (a) is the most crucial. With the previous 
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comments on transfer of learning in mind, criterion (b) can be 
satisfied if the two situations are similar in that the 
content on which the skill is now to operate is similar to the 
content on which the skill was learnt. A qualification should 
be made to this that the learning of the skill should take 
place in such a way that the pupil understands the 
principles on which the skill is based and is not merely able 
to perform the skill. This may seem a rather vague basis on 
which to claim that criterion (b) can be satisfied but it has 
already been noted that the area of transfer of learning is 
complicated, particularly by the pupil's previous learning 
that he brings with him to any new learning situation, and the 
possibility of a definite demonstration that criterion (b) can 
be satisfied in each case seems remote if not impossible. 
To further consider criterion (a) it is useful to examine what 
would have to be demonstrated to show that religious education 
could have exclusive skills that are not duplicated by some 
other subject area. To demonstrate this it would be necessary 
to show that the subject is of a different order from other 
subjects, that it involves a different form of knowledge, 
requiring different skills for understanding of the form. 
Whilst there have been noted some important and telling 
criticisms of the forms of knowledge of Hirst, they do provide 
an analysis of religion as a different order from other 
subjects and so the analysis is useful to the present quetion. 
Hirst suggested that there are four logical distinctions that 
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distinguish each form of knowledge and these are 
1) each form involves certain central concepts that are 
peculiar in character to the form. 
2) a distinctive logical structure; in a given 
form concepts, denoting certain aspects of experience, form a 
network of possible relationships by which experience can be 
understood. 
3) statements made in each form are testable by 
experience in accordance with the criteria that are peculiar 
to that form. 
4) particular techniques and skills for exploring 
experience and testing their distinctive expressions resulting 
in a mass of symbolically expressed knowledge. 
The first of Hirst's criteria deals solely with content, it 
makes no comment about skills. The second criterion deals with 
a distinctive logical structure and this structure is the way 
that the concepts relate to one another. Within a form the 
concepts link in a rational manner, it is not skill that makes 
the proper links but having a proper understanding of the 
concepts. In this way the rational connections between the 
concepts are made and thus the distinctive logical structure 
is understood. Thus the skills involved are general skills 
applied to a specific structure and not exclusive skills. To 
give an example of this, in the list of objectives that are 
produced by Avon to help teachers to prepare their own 
religious education syllabuses, there is a list of general, 
rather than particular, skills. They include 
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"To organise information through concepts and 
generalisations." (Lealman, 1981b, 37) 
Also from the Schools Council, in a list of key skills offered 
by most subjects 
"Ability to pursue a line of enquiry by making 
connections, thinking logically, recognising what is of chief 
importance......... (Schools Council, 1977a, 17) 
The third criterion deals with distinctive tests for truth and 
the ability to apply these, if they exist, and is important to 
religious education. The educated man would be one who could 
apply the tests for himself on new perceptions, not merely a 
man who knew of the tests. However, Barrow (1976) fails to 
identify any distinctive tests for truth within religion and 
so concludes that religion is not a distinctive form. Hirst 
(1970b) seems to accept this in his reply to Phillips (1970). 
The fourth criterion suggests that each form has particular 
skills and techniques for exploring experience. Whilst the 
position of religion as a form of knowledge has been called 
into question this is the criterion that offers most help in 
identifying skills specific 
considering further. 
to religion and is worth 
The nature of religious belief as the "use of a picture" 
means that belief is a personal thing in that no two people 
use exactly the same 
pictures are grounded 
picture. This is true even though the 
in a form of life which is largely 
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shaped by the community of faith. Each person's picture is 
influenced by his personal experience, which is unique to him. 
They will therefore react in different ways to new perceptions 
that need exploration. The degree of accommodation or 
rejection of the pereption wi.ll only be entirely relevant to 
the person that explores that experience. The truth will be 
subjective in that 
truth for the person who 
the precise truth is only the precise 
explores the experience although 
a very similar perception may be shared by many people. It is 
this similarity of perception that allows meaningful 
communication to take place. The similarities can be seen in 
agreements such as creeds, to which many believers may 
subscribe, and which state the salient features of the 
picture. 
It is this personal perception of truth that was being 
considered in the previous chapter in the examination of the 
notion of realisation. Realisation refers to insights that are 
set in the realm of ultimacy. Whether this realisation can be 
seen as a skill is another matter. To be a skill it must be 
possible to acquire, develop and refine the ability to gain 
insights of this nature. Certainly the steps on a mystical 
path may be seen as developing a skill but this view would not 
necessarily be shared by those who take this path. The process 
of self denial and openness to some Other may be a skill 
developed by self or some gift of grace and revelation by a 
Deity. It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine 
the nature of religious experience in this way and progress 
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along a mystical path is not the usual intention of religious 
education in a state school. It is however one road that is a 
logical extension of the development of realisation in the 
pupils. This raises the important question of the distinction 
between religious understanding and understanding religion. 
This distinction will be dealt with in the next section. 
If realisation is to be developed then there may be 
particular skills that enable the pupil to gain more frequent 
and deeper insights. Realisation has parallels with what 
Ramsey (1957) called disclosure; religious insights he 
referred to as cosmic disclosure. However, Ramsey also 
identified five other types of disclosure situation and there 
is no reason to suggest that, if there are any particular 
skills associated with disclosure situations, that these are 
not general to all disclosures, there are none that have been 
identified as specific to cosmic disclosure. It can be also 
be argued that these skills, if they exist, are similar to 
those that would be developed by a person going through 
certain forms of self analysis within the realm of psychiatry, 
or developed by training in De Bono's lateral thinking. The 
difference lies in the content, or rather, in this, case in 
the context. For it to be religious it would need to be in the 
context of ultimacy. 
To conclude, it seems that if there are any skills that are 
exclusive to religion that they lie in the area of realisation 
in the context of ultimacy, that these skills may also exist 
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in some other form of realisation not in the context of 
ultimacy is open to question. There may also be some skills 
associated with prayer, similar to those of meditation. Both 
of these come within the definition of religion that has been 
developed from Wittgenstein to include life stances and they 
are also open to the same question as above as they both seem 
to be ways of realisation. 
There is a further point to be made that in the "use of 
picture" there are no particular rules about the way in which 
a new perception must be accomodated or rejected. There is no 
reason to suggest that the "use of picture" follows rules of 
logic or consistency, these are not skills that are 
necessarily relevant to the believer. Religious beliefs may be 
held that appear to be contadictory but that are perfectly 
valid to the believer. They may be seen by the believer in 
terms of mystery, for example Jesus as God and man, or God as 
One and a Trinity. 
Religious understanding and understanding religion 
The distinction between these two forms of understanding was 
raised in the last section and needs to be clarified. The 
understanding of religion, with which the Schools Council 
(1977b) groundplan was concerned, would be seen as the the 
usual concern of religious education. It is concerned with the 
study of religion and the skills involved are those associated 
with study. It is this understanding that religious education 
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will explicitly develop. 
Religious understanding is an outlook on life, it is the 
experiences of life interpreted through religious belief. The 
skills involved are those of being religious, the skills that 
Wittgenstein described as being required by the believer. This 
understanding may be developed implicity in religious 
education as the pupil explores and develops his own 
experiences and beliefs. 
Cox (1983) considered the distinction carefully and set out 
the questions that need to be answered with regard to 
religious education. The first question that he asked is 
whether there is a unique form of understanding that can be 
called religious understanding. This question has already been 
considered in some detail and there are different answers 
according to what is meant by a unique form. If Hirst's 
criteria are to be used then Barrow would claim that religious 
understanding is not a unique form. However, if Wittgenstein's 
notion of what may constitute evidence for religious belief is 
taken into consideration then religious belief, and hence 
religious understanding, may claim to be different from other 
forms of understanding. Wittgenstein's notion of "use of 
picture" also gives a uniqueness to religious understanding in 
that it is an overarching understanding, it is the determinant 
of the way that the person approaches life. It may also be 
claimed that religius belief, in the way that this thesis has 
defined it, is unique in that it seeks understanding in the 
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context of ultimacy. Whilst these arguments are not conclusive 
they do indicate a way in which religious understanding may be 
considered to be a unique form of understanding. 
To the question of whether this religious understanding 
requires commitment or whether objective study is sufficient, 
the answer must be that, according to the definition of 
religious understanding that has been taken, religious 
understanding implies commitment. According to the view of 
religious understanding taken, it is also necessary to say 
that it is not confined to those of a conscious religious 
stance. All men make use of a picture to interpret experience 
and just as it is not unreasonable to suggest that a fully 
conscious picture is rare, if possible, then some people's 
pictures will be barely, if at all, conscious. 
Cox's final question is whether religious understanding is 
appropriate for religious education in schools. The answer 
that is suggested by Cox is that religious education should 
start with observation and ask the pupils to put themselves 
into other people's shoes. This places an emphasis on empathy, 
to develop religious understanding through other people's 
beliefs and experiences. The approach that has been taken by 
this thesis is not dissimilar, except that the emphasis has 
been placed on the pupil developing their own experiences and 
beliefs through inquiry into issues of fundamental meaning and 
value. 
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Skills in the objectives model. 
Whilst it is difficult to identify any skills that are 
exclusive to religious education except where skills are 
identified by content, there are skills which are of 
particular concern to religious education. These are skills 
that are necessary to religious education and are emphasised 
in religious education. There is also a group of general study 
skills that are used in religious education. 
General study skills are specified in conjunction with the 
more particular skills of religious education in two 
documents, Schools Council (1977a) and the material offered by 
Avon to help teachers prepare their own religious education 
syllabus (Lealman, 1981a). A combination of these two give the 
following general study skills 
1) To research and collect information from a wide variety 
of sources and ascertain its validity in terms of relevance 
and reliability. 
2) To understand and organise information through 
appropriate concepts and generalisations into a coherent 
pattern. 
3) To test and evaluate information objectively. 
4) To present findings in an intelligible, complete and 
attractive manner. 
The second group, skills particular to religious education, 
is more complicated. The skills are one aspect of the 
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objectives that attempt to specify the aims of a course in 
religious education, thus the skills specified will depend on 
the view taken of a man educated in religion. The skills are 
also specified in a variety of ways. Avon and Hampshire 
produce lists of objectives that combine concepts, skills and 
attitudes in descriptive statements and are therefore not 
particularly useful when the interest is solely in skills. The 
Schools Council (1977a), Durham and Manchester specify skills 
related to content that is particularly religious. The problem 
with these is that the skills specified are in terms of 
mediate goals, they are broadly descriptive of the aims rather 
than definitive. Obviously, the more precisely the skills 
are specified in relation to content the greater the list 
becomes, and the less manageable, one of the criticisms of the 
objectives model. Berkshire specifies a broad skill and then 
relates the skill to religious education in a descriptive 
statement of its relevance, once again ref~ing to content. 
The skills thus specified overlap greatly, as is to be 
expected. Any comparison would be difficult due to the variety 
of forms in which the skills are presented and would not seem 
to offer much help in the development of the process model of 
religious education which is the current concern. 
Skills in the understanding of religion 
Johns (1983) adopts a somewhat different approach when he 
suggests that there are at least six major skills involved in 
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religious understanding and these he describes thus 
1) Classification - which he describes as 
"the ability to judge correctly which conceptual schema 
applies to an object, act ion or statement." 
(Johns, 1983, 70) 
In this one skill he combines the first four skills that are 
identified by Bloom in his taxonomy. The remaining skill in 
Bloom's taxonomy is evaluation. 
2) Evaluation - which is 
"the skill of knowing how an object is used, or 
the rules which give an action meaning •••• , or the logic and 
truth criteria of a statement" (Johns, 1983, 71) 
Evaluation is for the most part inseparable from 
classification, if it is known how to classify an object, the 
reason for that classification is usually known and that is 
the skill of evaluation. Johns continues 
"The skill of evaluation implies •••• at some level, the 
ability to apply the correct truth criteria" 
(Johns, 1983, 71) 
3) Explanation which builds upon evaluation and 
requires that an explanation of religious activities can be 
given in terms that the believer would accept. This is the 
last of the objective skills in that the skills of 
classification, evaluation and explanation could equally apply 
to any scientific study as they do to religious study. The 
addition of the words "that the believer would accept" leads 
on to a different group of skills, those used in inter 
personal relationships. 
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4) Self examination relates the basic requirement of 
being able to express one's own beliefs and therefore knowing 
what are one's beliefs. Whilst self awareness is obviously 
important in religious education this does not appear to be a 
separate skill but rather a combination of the above three 
skills, particularly explanation, applied to a particular area 
of content ie. the self. Self awareness would seem to be 
essential if the next skills are to be developed. 
5) Empathy - which is the ability to understand the 
importance of another man's beliefs to him. This is the 
appreciation of the subjective nature of beliefs that have 
been given an objective explanation, it relates to an 
understanding of the commissive and affective aspects of the 
use of a picture. It would seem reasonable to suggest that 
the more a pupil becomes aware of his own beliefs and the 
importance of them to him the more ready he is to develop an 
empathetic approach to other people's beliefs. It is hard to 
see how a pupil who does not attach, or perceive, any 
importance to his own beliefs could appreciate empathetically 
the importance of beliefs to other people. The development of 
empathy, and its exercise, is made problematic by the degree 
to which it is ever possible to appreciate the feelings of 
another person whose experience and outlook on life is not 
shared. However, empathy is possible to the extent that 
emotion and experience are common to man. 
6) Epoche - which is the ability to suspend judgement, to 
bracket out ones own preconceptions to see the essence of 
religious phenomena. The essence of religious phenomena can be 
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said to lie, for the teacher of religious education, in their 
meaning to the believer, not only in how they contribute to 
his view of life but also how he reacts to them affectively 
and commissively. To suggest that the essence of religious 
phenomena lies elsewhere, for example in a Deity, as the 
believer might do, is the meaning of the religious phenomenon 
for the believer; it is the way the phenomenon is interpreted 
by his use of picture. Thus to see the essence of a religious 
phenomenon is to share in the beliefs of the believer. In this 
respect epoche may be seen as a similar skill to that used by 
method actors when they assume a part. Epoche can be said 
to be distinct from empathy in that empathy asks the pupils to 
appreciate the emotions of others by relating the other 
person's experience to their own experience. Epoche asks the 
pupils to enter the experience of others and share their 
emotions. It would seem that empathy requires that the pupils 
have sufficient relevant experience to which to refer before 
empathy is possible. Epoche can be seen as a more advanced 
skill in that pupils are asked to enter into an experience 
which may be new, and then appreciate the emotions that come 
from this new experience. Even when the pupil has relevant 
experience he is asked to bracket out his own experience. 
There are several points to note about these skills of 
religious understanding and the first is that they are related 
to the study of religion, of other people's beliefs, rather 
than the development of the pupils own beliefs. Of the six 
skills only self examination refers directly to the pupil and 
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his own experience. They may well be said, however, to 
contribute to the development of the pupil's own beliefs in 
that they develop his understanding of his own experience. 
Whilst the first three skills may be approached in an 
objective manner the second group of three are bound up with 
the pupil's feelings, they involve certain attitudes. For 
example it is not possible to develop empathy unless there is 
an attitude of respect for others, an intention to treat other 
people as equals. These attitudes are prerequisites for the 
application of empathy. 
The skills are complementary and rely on each other for their 
full development within the individual. Also, Johns would 
argue, these skills are not only necessary to the study of 
religion but they are also essential in a liberal democracy. 
Particularly important, with regard to a liberal democracy, is 
empathy. A liberal democracy relies to a great extent on each 
member of the community having respect for the other members 
of the community. It may be suggested that in the ideal of 
such a society the freedom of the individual would be 
guaranteed by the respect shown to him by the other members of 
the society. It would seem reasonable to suggest that empathy 
plays a great part in the development of this respect. Respect 
can be built up by fear but this would not seem to be the type 
of respect required in the society that is being described. 
Appreciating the emotions of others requires care and concern 
for the other person's situation and the ability to recognise 
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in that situation elements of one's own experience. Hence 
respect for self leads, via empathy, to respect for others, by 
virtue of common experience. The care and concern is shown by 
the willingness to empathise, the recognition that the effort 
is worthwhile also shows respect for others. 
This list of skills is more useful for the current purpose of 
setting out the framework for a process model of religious 
education than are the other skills that have appeared in 
relation to the objectives model. This is because they are 
free from content and do not need to be seen as objectives, 
they can be seen simply as those skills that will be used. 
Epoche can be seen as useful to the development of realisation 
as it is concerned with insight into the essence of religion, 
that is the beliefs of the believer as experienced in all its 
aspects. 
It has already been noted that these skills relate to the 
study of religion rather than the development of the beliefs 
of the pupil. Religious education is concerned with both of 
these aspects although they are by no means separate. In 
studying the beliefs of the other people the pupils are 
enlarging their own experience 
their own beliefs, if the study 
and may be thus developing 
is approached in the right 
way. Before skills in a process model are considered a look at 
the skills of the believer may be useful. 
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Skills for the believer 
Wittgenstein suggests that there are four ways in which the 
believer must learn the techniques of using a picture and 
these are 
1) learning psychological techniques of concentration so 
that the picture will stay in the foreground of ones own mind. 
2) of persuasion, so that one can hold it tellingly before 
the mind of others. 
3) learning certain arbitrary logical connections in 
accordance with which the picture is used. 
4) recognising which of the ordinary logical implications 
of the term employed to express the picture must be drawn out 
and which not. (Hudson, 1975, 188,9) 
These will be considered in reverse order. 
The fourth of these skills refers to the use of language, 
which also includes symbols. This use of language is the way 
in which beliefs are communicated by relating them to everyday 
language and thus to everyday experience. The language is 
used in an odd way, according to Ramsey, and these specific 
uses need to be understood in order to make communication 
effective. The believer needs this expertise in using language 
to articulate and rationalise his own beliefs to himself, to 
communicate with those believers who use a similar picture so 
that he may learn more, and to justify his actions to others. 
This may be considered as a proper understanding of the 
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concepts involved rather than as a skill but there seems to be 
an element of skill in the interpretation of connections that 
are new to the believer. 
The third technique seems to deal with the internal structure 
of belief, the inter-relationships between concepts. This, it 
has already been suggested, is a correct understanding of the 
concepts rather than a skill, considering Peter's second 
criterion for a form of knowledge. This is important to the 
believer for the same reasons as the fourth 
technique, that is in the articulation and rationalisation of 
his beliefs. These two techniques relate to the extensional 
use of a concept. 
The second technique relates to the intellectual 
understanding of one's belief and therefore includes the use 
of the two techniques already considered. The technique has 
two areas of use, as a defence in the face of criticism, and 
in the propagation of ones own viewpoint. In the first sense 
it must include the ability to preserve one's faith in the 
face of attack but not necessarily in open expression of one's 
belief. It need not be involved in open contradiction of the 
opposing viewpoint but may consist of some psychological 
practice that preserves the faith, for example a Christian may 
remind himself, particularly in an affective manner, of part 
of the Sermon on the Mount that promises blessings for those 
that are persecuted for the sake of their beliefs. In the 
second sense it would require some skill in debate and oratory 
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as well as a thorough understanding of one's own beliefs. It 
is not necessarily the intention of religious education to 
produce orators but it is to be hoped that pupils would have 
the confidence to express their beliefs and it would then be 
the duty of the teacher to see that these beliefs were given 
the respect that they deserve. There is another implication 
for education in that whilst a pupil that is able to defend 
his/her own point of view may be desirable, the pupil should 
also be willing to listen to other peoples points of view and, 
if necessary, to adjust his/her own views accordingly. Thus 
this technique may involve the teacher in a consideration of 
the importance of such skills as those relating to the 
interpretation of evidence and of discernment. 
The first technique shows the importance of belief to the 
believer, that belief is intended to dominate the life of the 
believer, that it is a faith by which to live. This comes from 
the intensional use of a concept, it carries the compulsion to 
act. It relates to the intention of attitudinal change and 
development in that the life stance adopted, the picture used, 
requires certain standards of behaviour and attitude, in most 
life stances at least, and the believer will wish to conform 
to these. Thus there will be certain reactions to experience 
that are considered the correct reactions according to the 
life stance and the believer will aim to react in these 
particular ways. 
From an educational point of view these techniques may seem to 
171 
be related to an education for mental health in that they 
relate to the understanding of a particular position, the 
understanding of the way that the picture reflects the 
experience of the believer, and its relation to life in the 
sense of living according to ones use of picture consistently. 
Skills in a process model of religious education 
First of all it must be said that there do not appear to be 
any skills that are specific to religious education. There are 
some that would appear to be specific to religious education 
but on closer examination these turn out to be a non-specific 
skill that is attached to some content that is religious in 
nature. These skills that are not exclusive to but are, 
rather, of particular concern to religious education are 
important to the process model as they will be required by the 
pupil in his educational activities and inquiry. These 
particular skills can also be developed, to the extent that a 
pupil can use the appropriate skill in dealing with new 
material, or with old material in a new situation. There also 
appears to some sort of hierarchy of skills which are 
dependent upon each other. 
The implications of these points for the process model are 
straightforward. The teacher should be aware of the skills 
that may be required in any activity and should plan 
activities on the basis of the ability of the pupils to 
complete the activities in some sort of satisfactory manner. 
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This does not mean that each activity should result in success 
for the pupil because the pupil may be able to learn more from 
failure on some occasions. It would seem reasonable to expect 
the teacher to plan activities that will build upon skills 
that the pupil already possesses and also to develop other 
skills that are seen as further up in the hierarchy. Thus the 
activities should be chosen to challenge and develop skills as 
well as to keep the pupils interest. 
The skills that seem most important to religious education 
are those of empathy and epoche. The contribution of the 
skill involved in appreciating another person's feelings with 
regard to respect, that is empathy, has already been noted. It 
is however the skill involved in sharing another person's 
experience and feelings, that is epoche, that seems to be most 
likely to lead to moments of realisation in the context of 
ultimacy, with reference to other people. The area of inquiry 
which is likely to lead to realisation in the context of 
ultimacy outside of interpersonal relationships will involve 
the pupils in some kind of contemplation in depth about their 
experience. 
It is possible to distinguish between two categories of 
realisation, and these may be referred to as primary and 
secondary realisation. Secondary realisation comes as a result 
of empathy or epoche. It is the appreciation of what is true 
to another person. It does not mean acceptance of the beliefs 
of the other person as the truth but rather an acceptance, and 
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appreciation, of those beliefs as true for the other person, 
what these beliefs mean to the other person both on a rational 
and an emotional level. There is, of course, the problem of 
whether it is ever possible to fully appreciate the beliefs of 
another person, what is true to them, without accepting those 
beliefs as true oneself. The truth of the belief is an 
essential element of that belief to the other person. This is 
the area in which the skill of epoche is essential, allowing 
as far as possible a realisation of what is true to another 
0 
person, what their realisation of the truth is, without 
accepting their realisation as true. This would only seem to 
be possible on the basis of common experience. 
Primary realisation does not involve the appreciation of the 
truth claims of another person but is a realisation that 
originates from an appreciation of the value and meaning of 
one's own experience. This would involve such reactions to 
phenomena as awe and wonder and the understanding and 
commitment that comes from these reactions. It would include 
any other realisation of a rational or non-rational nature 
that comes from one's own experience. This is what is meant by 
a realisation that comes from a contemplation in depth about 
one's own experience. 
The techniques and skills that may be developed as liable to 
lead to realisation are not fundamentally objectionable to the 
curriculum in a state school, or to the model of the 
curriculum that has been proposed, that is a process model. 
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They must be directed, however, to the development of the 
pupil's own insights, rather than to the accepance of some 
insight that the teacher may wish the pupil s to accept, if 
they are to remain neutral and acceptable in the curriculum. 
Within the process model they must obviously remain as tools 
that are available to the pupil in his inquiry rather than 
directed towards any end. For them to remain neutral it is 
also necessary that they are not based on any presuppositions 
with regard to an end. For example, prayer as a technique 
liable to lead to a realisation may be acceptable within a 
relig~s community but not within a school. The reason is that 
prayer presupposes a something to which it is worthwhile 
praying. Meditation, which does not presuppose any particular 
object to which the meditation is directed, would be 
acceptable. 
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Summary 
It does not seem possible to identify any skills that are 
exclusive to religious education unless they lie in the area 
of realisation in the context of ultimacy. That is, in the 
development of a religious understanding of life. 
Religious education 
understanding 
understanding. 
of 
should 
religion 
be concerned with both an 
and the pupil's religious 
Of six skills identified by Johns as necessary for an 
understanding of religion, the most important are empathy and 
epoche. Of these two, it would seem that epoche will be the 
one most likely to lead to moments of realisation by the 
pupils. 
Empathy is important with regard to the basis of the 
process model of the curriculum. Empathy should lead to 
respect and a liberal democracy, upon which the process model 
is to an extent based, relies to a large extent on the mutual 
respect of the members of the community. 
Wittgenstein identifies four skills that are necessary for the 
believer and these will be the skills that are developed in 
religious education with respect to the pupil's own beliefs. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ATTITUDES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
Attitudes are most important to, some say would the essence 
of, the learning process and it has been suggested that 
"Among the various tendencies and predispositions which 
are acquired and modified by learning, none is more important 
to individuals and social welfare than attitudes and ideals." 
(Kingsley and Garry, 1957, 471) 
Definition 
The above quotation emphasises the importance of attitudes 
and gives some clue as to what they are, namely 
predispositions or tendencies. Allport defined an attitude as 
"a state of readiness organised through experience 
exerting a directive and/or dynamic influence upon the 
individual's response toward all objects or situations with 
which it is related" (Allport, 1935, 45) 
Mouly describes attitudes as emotionally toned ideas and 
suggests that they can be considered as having three basic 
components 
"a) An affective component ie. a certain feeling tone, 
sometimes quite irrational, which influences the acceptance or 
rejection of the attitude - object. 
b) A cognitive component consisting 
regarding the attitude - object. 
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of ones views 
c) An action component, predisposing the individual toward 
specific overt behaviour." (Mouly, 1968, 452) 
These components may exist at various levels of intensity and 
in varying degrees of interdependence to each other. 
Klausmeier takes the same approach as Mouly in that rather 
than define attitudes he describes five defining attributes 
(Klausmeier, 1961, 357). These are 
1) Learnability. All attitudes are learnt and they vary 
according to their level of awareness of learning. Some 
attitudes are acquired almost unconsciously whilst others, 
for example best buys in consumer tests, are carefully 
learnt. 
2) Stability. There can be considered three terms that are 
relevant here: taste, attitude and value. For example, in 
music one may have a taste for a particular piece of music and 
this may change frequently; one may also have an attitude to 
categories of music which change rarely; one's value of the 
role of music in society may never change. These are not hard 
and fast divisions but are indicative of the stability of 
attitudes. 
3) Personal Societal significance. Attitudes are 
involved in, and affect, relationships between people and 
other people, and between people and society. 
4) Affective - cognitive element. Cognitive refers to the 
informational content of the attitude whilst affective 
relates to the degree of emotion that is associated with the 
attitude. For example, a fear of spiders is high in affective 
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content but low in cognitive content. 
5) Approach - avoidance directionality. This describes how 
the attitude will affect ones behaviour, for example a 
favourable attitude to church will make one approach it, an 
unfavourable attitude to sport makes one avoid it. 
Klausmeier puts these attributes into a diagrammatic form. 
without awareness 
-- Learnability --------- intentionally 
temporary 
---------- Stability ------------ permanent 
low 
---------------- Personal/Societal 
significance 
high affective ------ Affective/Cognitive 
element 
high approach ------- Approach/avoidance 
directionality 
high 
high cognitive 
high avoidance 
Klausmeier also claims that attitudes are learnt in one of 
three ways 
a) observation and imitation 
b) classical and operant conditioning 
c) intentional securing, thinking about and evaluating 
information. 
There are several further points to be made about attitudes in 
relation to concepts, beliefs and ideals. Klausmeier claims 
that 
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"The main difference between an attitude and a concept is 
that the former directly influences the individuals 
acceptance or rejection of attitude objects, persons, events 
and things. 
(Klausmeier, 1961, 382) 
This active, directional element in attitudes is not only 
concerned with the acceptance - avoidance attribute but also 
gives them their personal - societal significance. 
It is clear from the point above, and that attitudes have an 
affective component, that attitudes are closely related to the 
intensional aspect of concepts. This can be seen clearly when 
the concept of a dog is considered. In this example the 
intensional aspect of one's concept of a dog will also govern 
one's attitude to, and one's action towards, dogs. 
More complex attitudes are built up from several concepts that 
are synthesised into a particular view. For example, ones 
attitude towards immigration would be built up from concepts 
of coloured people, overpopulation, unemployment, equality of 
man etc. It may well be the case that the attitude is built up 
partly of attitudes, for example one's attitude to coloured 
people, and partly from concepts, for example the concept of 
equality of man. 
Attitude, in some cases, is closely related to belief. Where 
ones attitudes are in the realm where Klausmeier uses the term 
value then the terms value and belief may be interchangable. 
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For example, to value all men as equal could be stated as a 
belief in the equality of man. Attitudes tend to be specific 
and definite with respect to the object to which they refer, 
and it is in this that they differ from ideals. One's 
tolerance of a minority group would be described as an 
attitude to that group whereas tolerance as an abstraction 
would be an ideal. 
Attitude development and change 
Attitudes clearly permeate man's existence and, as part of the 
learning process, schools must be concerned with the learning 
of attitudes in an organised way. However, attitudes are 
difficult to change because they are so closely related to the 
total personality, that is they are the basis of the self 
concept. 
Teaching of attitudes is not something that can be ignored 
and thought beyond the sphere of education. Teachers cannot 
help but teach attitudes because they will be used as a model 
in the formation of attitudes. It is therefore important that 
the teacher, in his behaviour, does not contradict the values 
that he wishes the pupils to adopt. It is often claimed that 
attitudes are "caught and not taught". This means that 
attitudes are learnt more by non-rational methods than by 
information and evidence. As an example of what is meant, it 
seems that the fostering of desirable attitudes is much more 
likely to result from the personality and approach of the 
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teacher than it is from the subject matter. For example, 
teaching about democracy in an autocratic manner is not likely 
to be very effective. Mouly suggests that 
"Some attitudes are learned as the result of conditioning 
through emotionally toned experiences." 
(Mouly, 1968, 455) 
This means, quite simply, that a pupil may come to dislike a 
subject not because of the subject itself but because of the 
way that the subject is taught, for example by a teacher who 
constantly ridicules the pupil. The attitude to the subject is 
also likely to last a good deal longer than the memory of the 
content of the subject, particularly where there has been such 
negative reinforcement of the learning. This is a particularly 
important point if education is seen in terms of getting 
pupils committed to areas of knowledge as Peters does. Mouly 
goes on to suggest that 
"Desirable attitudes are probably best developed through 
meaningful participation in worthwhile activities designed to 
influence attitudes." (Mouly, 1968, 455) 
It has already been suggested that religious education in a 
process model would be planned on the basis of the pupil being 
involved in activities that are considered worthwhile. That 
they should be designed to influence attitudes would seem to 
be part of the definition of education and will be a primary 
concern of this chapter. 
Stenhouse and Verma produced an hypothesis from their 
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research, from 1972 to 1977, that suggested how difficult 
attitude change may be for the teacher to bring about. In a 
project called "Problems and effects of teaching about race 
relations" they produced statistics that led them to suggest 
that 
"When teaching about race relations meets the educational 
criteria of appeal to the judgement of those that are taught, 
as opposed to the procedural principles of indoctrination or 
brainwashing, a fairly substantial minority will, during 
teaching, shift attitude in the direction judged undesirable 
by the teacher." (Stenhouse and Verma, 1981, 336) 
This would seem to confirm that for teaching to be effective 
in the changing of attitudes it is essential to consider 
non-rational as well as rational influences. The following 
section gives an example of this. 
Cognitive dissonance 
The problem of developing and changing attitudes is 
complicated by the wide variety of attitudes that the pupils 
will bring into the classroom with them that have been formed 
independently of the teacher's influence, attitudes that have 
been formed by their parents, their peers etc. These attitudes 
may show a strong resistance to change, a point which is 
developed in Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance. This 
suggests that 
"the amount of dissonance that exists after a decision has 
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been made is a direct function of the number of things the 
person knows that are inconsistent with that particular 
decision." (Festinger, 1964, 5) 
What this means is that the greater the difficulty in making 
the decision the more the person will attempt to justify it 
afterwards, the chosen will be made as attractive as possible 
whilst the rejected will be made less attractive, thus 
attempting to reduce dissonance. This theory has important 
implications for religious education when the nature of 
religious belief is considered. In a previous chapter it was 
noted that a belief may be based on the most minimal of 
evidence in favour of that belief but will then be adopted 
with a commitment out of all proportion to the evidence. 
These are precisely the conditions in which Festinger suggests 
the greatest dissonance, and hence resistance to change, 
occurs. 
In general terms, dissonance will be created in the pupil's 
mind whenever the cognitions offered by the teacher to the 
pupil are not in accord with the pupils own cognitions. This 
is one way of looking at what happens in education all of the 
time, the pupils are required constantly to adjust their view 
of their environment, of themselves or their view of the 
world. Where a specific decision has been made to which the 
new information (cognition) provided is relevant, the new 
cognition will be either consonant or dissonant with the 
pupil's decision. This will affect the reception of the new 
cognition. 
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Where no decision that is relevant exists the cognitfon may 
be treated in an impartial and objective manner. Where a 
relevant decision does exist, that is, one of two or more 
options has been rejected, the process of dissonance 
reduction may affect the reception of the cognition. Where a 
cognition is dissonant with a decision already made defensive 
processes may prevent the 
established. 
new cognition from becoming 
Within religious education the teacher may deal with two 
separate groups of pupils in the same class, those who have 
committed themselves to one of the alternatives relevant, that 
is a religious belief, and those who have made no such 
commitment. These two groups will react differently to 
cognitions that are relevant to the decision made by the 
committed pupils, as will pupils who have made different 
decisions about the relevant alternatives. These different 
reactions are to be expected if religious belief is a matter 
of using a picture, Festinger's theory suggests a resistance 
to change that is particularly relevant to the teaching 
situation. 
There are further implications of the theory in that if the 
subject is disliked by the pupil, or perceived to be 
unimportant, for whatever reason, there may be a rejection of 
all attempts to interest the pupil, and a rejection of all 
interesting material and presentations. Even if the subject is 
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not rejected, pupils will not seek out material that is liable 
to be dissonance-increasing unless there is a particular 
reason; for example if it is seen to be useful to them, 
perhaps in another context. This point is important for any 
teaching strategy that allows, and requires, pupils to select 
their own material, for example in inquiry and project work. 
The pupils will tend to seek out information that reinforces 
their own point of view rather than material that will 
challenge their view and thus broaden their experience. 
Attitudes in an affective taxonomy 
Krathwohl (1964) gives a description of what is meant by 
"attitude" in his "Taxonomy of educational objectives in the 
affective domain". This was an extension of Bloom's work in 
the cognitive domain but was less successful than the earlier 
work primarily because, in the affective domain, the terms are 
less precise in that the meaning of each term has less common 
agreement. The taxonomy does, however, have a useful 
contribution to make to the discussion on attitudes. 
Krathwohl produced a table showing the meaning of certain 
terms measured against his taxonomy continuum. In this 
continuum he suggests that the term "attitude" has the same 
range of meaning as the term "value". The range of meaning for 
these two terms is given as including a willingness to respond 
and a satisfaction in response; the acceptance of, a 
preference for and commitment to a value; and the 
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conceptualisation of a value. Attitudes, according to 
Krathwohl, do not go beyond a single event, they are the 
reactions to specific circumstances. He suggests that the 
organisation of a value system, where values are brought into 
an ordered and consistent relationship with each other, is 
beyond the term attitude. He also makes no distinction between 
attitude as a means and as an end, he is concerned with an 
affective reaction. Whilst he is concerned with the affective 
domain he also brings in the cognitive function of an attitude 
in the examples that he gives. The taxonomy is concerned with 
the internalisation of cognitive perceptions such that they 
form the tendency to react in certain ways. 
The highest level of affective reaction is that of 
characterisation, this being described as 
"the integration of these beliefs, ideas, and attitudes 
into a total philosophy or world view." 
(Krathwohl, 1964, 184) 
One of the examples given of this is "to develop a consistent 
philosophy of life". Characterisation can thus be identified 
with Wittgenstein's use of picture to the extent that the 
philosophy of life is religious. With the adaptation of the 
use of picture to the dimension of ultimacy rather than of God 
it seems reasonable to suggest that characterisation is the 
province in which religious education should operate. This 
refers to the notion of the "use of picture" as the one 
comprehensive determinant of a person's view of life, and the 
stimulus for his behaviour. Characterisation involves the 
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development of a total philosophy of life by interpretation of 
the relevant aspects of a person's life. 
Thus characterisation involves the development of a world view 
that could be seen as the same in function as the believers 
"use of picture". If religious education is to be concerned 
with the pupil as believer then it is concerned with 
characterisation, that takes account of the coherent nature of 
his belief. 
Whilst considering the affective nature of an attitude it is 
useful to look at Wilson (1971) who was paricularly concerned 
with the education of the emotions. He claimed that 
"any concept of religion as a sui generis activity ought 
to rest primarily on the central emotion of awe •••• " 
(Wilson, 1971, 33) 
He thus identifies emotion as central to religious education. 
If the teacher is to be concerned with the mental health of 
the pupil then it seems necessary that the education provided 
takes account of the education of their emotions. Wilson 
(1971) emphasised the importance of emotions in religious 
education. He provides a basic framework in which the 
education of the emotions can be planned in a rational way. 
Whilst the framework, Wilson calls it a taxonomy, is so basic 
as to provide little help for teachers it does serve to 
emphasise one point. If there is an intention to change a 
persons attitudes, or promote in them certain attitudes at the 
expense of others, then success is more likely if the 
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emotional element is catered for as well as the cognitive 
element of the attitude. 
Limitations on the teaching of attitudes 
Attitudes relate to teaching in two ways, as means and as 
ends. The difference between these two uses is important and 
it is necessary that it is made clear. Attitudes that are the 
end of education can be seen as two groups, attitudes that 
are specific to a religious belief and more general attitudes. 
This second group of attitudes will be further considered in 
the section on attitudes in an objectives model. These 
attitudes are those to which education is generally directed. 
The first group of attitudes includes the pupil's attitude 
to man, life etc. and are the components of the pupil's life 
stance. Attitudes as means are those attitudes that the pupil 
must bring to the learning process itself, attitudes such as 
interest and concern for truth. Attitudes as means and 
attitudes as ends of the second type are not always separated 
in lists of objectives and a clear separation is not, in many 
cases, possible because many attitudes will appear in both 
groups, for example a tolerance of another person's point of 
view. The reason for indicating a distinction between means 
and end is that in a process model only attitudes that are 
means will be stated explicitly. 
However, that is not the whole picture. The lists of 
attitudes as objectives that have been produced have been 
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careful to exclude certain attitudes. These excluded 
attitudes are those that, seen as objectives, would lead to a 
charge that the syllabus required the teacher to engage in 
some form of indoctrination. That is, attitudes that are ends 
of the first type. Thus the attitudes in the lists are those 
that define an approach to the study of other people's beliefs 
and to one's own experience. In this they can be seen as 
acceptable to most people. Almost any attitude that is 
presented as an aim may be challenged by some group or 
individual but there are certain attitudes about which a large 
measure of agreement could be found that would endorse them as 
suitable as objectives in education, for example respect for 
other human beings as equals. These attitudes that would find 
a large measure of agreement include those that are implicit 
in the view of education in a liberal democracy. 
The attitudes that may be specified as objectives of the 
process of education are justified by one's view of the nature 
of education and society. One could give many reasons as to 
why one should respect one's fellow man, depending upon the 
life stance adopted. One could say that it is because we are 
all God's creatures, or because it is commanded by God or 
simply because one wishes reciprocal respect. These further 
explanations are a reflection of the picture that is used and 
are not the concern of religious education as objectives but 
only as content. The attitudes that one may be concerned to 
promote are those that reflect the nature of the society, they 
are those attitudes upon which society depends for its 
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existence. Without the people having the attitudes appropriate 
to a liberal democracy that liberal democracy could not exist. 
As well as society the particular attitudes that the 
teacher would hope that the pupils would adopt are those 
relevant to the view of the nature of education that is taken. 
If a process model of the curriculum is to be adopted then it 
would be required that the pupils have an interest in their 
work. A process model requires that the motivation for the 
inquiry comes from the pupil and this obviously requires the 
pupil's interest for it to be successful. Equally, the pupils 
cannot have their inquiry and horizons limited to one set of 
beliefs or values. It is necessary that the pupils direct 
their own inquiry within this model. The teacher must be 
prepared to accept that the pupil may see truth as different 
from that of the view of the teacher. 
The process model is clearly opposed to the imposition of any 
particular views, values or beliefs. Inasmuch as the model 
reflects a view of society it reflects a belief in a liberal 
democratic society and by this is meant a belief in a form of 
society rather than any political intentions. This view of 
society and the model of education it implies provides an 
interesting anomaly. To offer a process model of the 
curriculum as the only proper model for a particular view of 
education reflects a particular view of society. It also 
commits its advocates to a particular approach and to the 
encouragement of particular attitudes in the pupils. These 
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attitudes may be directly opposed to those of other people who 
take a different view of society and of education. For 
example, the religious man who believes that wisdom is an 
increasing knowledge of God through the reading of the Bible 
and prayer would not necessarily accept that all religions are 
equally worthy of study, or equally worthy of respect. A 
fascist view of society may not take the view that all men are 
equally worthy of respect, the Marxist may also take a 
different stance with regard to desirable attitudes. 
It is reasonable to say that a process model of education is 
linked to a liberal democratic view of society. The model 
requires that pupils decide upon their own beliefs and that no 
undue pressure should be put on them to accept any particular 
life stance. This could mean that a pupil may reject the very 
attitudes with which he has been encouraged to approach his 
learning. If the pupil does reject the values inherent in the 
model then the tacher is not at liberty to use any other means 
to convince the pupil other than to present to him this view 
as an alternative to his own. As has already been noted from 
Stenhouse and Verma and from Festinger, the rejection of the 
values of the model is quite possible and may be very 
difficult to change, or even gain consideration for any 
alternative views. There is no other way in which the case for 
the attitudes inherent in the process model may be presented 
to the pupils other than as a possible alternative, within the 
model the end is the means. 
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There is the further point that a pupil may become 
interested in the arguments of a fascist group and wish to 
pursue them as part of his inquiry into the beliefs of others. 
According to the principles of the process model the teacher 
would be obliged to provide the information and the forum for 
discussion of beliefs that contradict the principles on which 
the learning experience is based. Unless certain conditions 
are laid down as to the extent of the pupils inquiry there can 
be no argument with the pupil embracing fascism and also 
trying to persuade other pupils to accept it. It would be the 
bold teacher who would claim that the principles inherent in 
the process model will always be more attractive to pupils 
than any other life stance with less tolerance of other people 
and their attitudes. 
The case for some limitations on the inquiry of pupils will 
come in the principles of procedure, those that limit the 
inquiry to the area of religious education. This still leaves 
a large area that can legitimately be covered and beliefs 
involving, for example, racial intolerance will still come 
within the, scope of the subject. Obviously the teacher has the 
advantage of choosing the methodology for presentation of what 
they might consider as undesirable views but this may be seen 
as a masked form of indoctrination and hence would not be 
acceptable. 
It is possible that there is some moral limit to the teacher's 
acceptance of the pupil's inquiry. For example, the teacher 
193 
may not accept from the pupils any inquiry that led to the 
breaking of the law, or inquiry into groups that preach the 
breaking of the law. This would limit inquiry in that openly 
racist groups, or those that endorse terrorism as a legitimate 
weapon of protest, would not be studied. It is possible to 
argue however that certain laws have been changed because 
people have disobeyed them as part of a protest that has led 
to an improvement in the law. For example, the law that 
required the wearing of a motor cycle crash helmet compulsory 
for riders of motor cycles even though their beliefs about 
religious dress made this impossible. It could also be argued 
that a group such as some of the peace campaigners, whose 
protests include illegal acts such as criminal damage to 
fences, are a legitimate area of study as part of an inquiry 
into peace and war. Equally, it would 
religious conflict in Northern 
consideration of the I.R.A •• 
be unbalanced to study 
Ireland without some 
The answer may have to be pragmatic. It is hard to find any 
viewpoint that is not supported by at least a small group of 
people but that does not mean that all viewpoints should be 
equally worthy of consideration, nor that all viewpoints are 
suitable subjects for study in school. It could be said 
that all viewpoints are legitimate as areas of inquiry unless 
the study involves the pupil in activities that would be 
condemned by a large majority of the people in the country. 
Thus a study of the policies of the I.R.A. may be valid, a 
study of the methods that they use and why they use these 
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methods may be valid, but a study of the various techniques 
that they use would not be valid. Even a study of their 
methods and the reasons for these methods would obviously need 
careful thought and preparation. The views and practices of 
certain sexual deviants may be considered as completely 
unsuitable under any circumstances. 
If questions are asked by the pupils about these viewpoints 
that are opposed by a large majority of people then it may be 
seen as the teacher's duty to forcefully dissuade the pupil 
from the inquiry in such a 
viewpoint are made clear 
way that the objections to the 
without 
consideration of the viewpoint. 
spending too 
It is obvious 
long 
that 
on a 
the 
viewpoints and pratices that are not acceptable may change as 
society itself changes, and that teachers may well make what 
can be seen later, or on further reflection, as mistakes. This 
may be the price that has to paid for the type of education 
that has been put forward, it can also be argued that 
education inevitably involves the possibility of mistakes. 
The problem needs careful consideration before a process model 
is put into operation. The conclusion may well be that any 
dangers that may arise, and these may also exist in an 
objectives model to a lesser extent, are such that they must 
be coped with when the situation arises, and that certain 
techniques can be developed that enable the teacher to 
overcome such difficulties. It may be felt that education 
involves risks, and that they are worth taking. 
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Attitudes in the objectives model 
Attitudes have been compiled into lists as suitable 
objectives for religious education and it is these lists of 
attitudes that will now be considered. There are six lists 
of attitudes where the attitudes have been listed separately 
from other objectives and these have been compared in the 
chart in appendix c. Two of these are almost the same, the 
Schools Council (1977a) and the notes that were presented as 
guidance for teachers who were preparing a syllabus according 
to the Avon agreed syllabus (Lealman, 198la). The Schools 
Council also offered another list in a different form (1977b). 
The other three lists all come from agreed syllabuses, those 
of Berkshire (1982), Durham (1983) and Manchester (1985). 
The comparison in the table is by no means definitive and 
there are arguments for it to be changed to some extent. It is 
rather an example of the way that the lists could be compared. 
What can be seen, however, is that the lists are largely 
similar in content. Each has a different emphasis and because 
they are descriptive statements they should not be expected to 
agree exactly. 
The lists given by the Schools Council (1977a) and Avon 
differ principally in the headings given to the attitudes, 
although the wording does vary slightly at times. The only 
time a difference in wording changes the sense of the attitude 
to any great extent is in the last one and in this case the 
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alternative wording is also included. Elsewhere the wording is 
that of the Schools Council as they were the earlier to 
publish and hence the most likely compiler of the list. The 
difference in headings shows a difference in emphasis. Avon 
relates the attitudes to the areas of content within religious 
education to which they will apply whereas the Schools Council 
relates them to the subject areas that might make use of them. 
The Schools Council are thus able to identify two attitudes 
that relate primarily to religious education and hence to some 
extent reveal what religious education is thought to be about. 
The second of these relates to a need for commitment in the 
search for a life stance by which to live. The first of these 
raises some interesting points. 
Many of the attitudes are not simply attitudes but are 
attitudes linked to content. It is only the content, in many 
cases, that makes them specifically religious. There would 
appear to be three groups of attitudes listed 
a) non-religious attitudes, for example, Curiosity: the 
desire to know more and understand better. This has no 
specific religious connection. 
b) attitudes made specifically religious by the 
specification of content, for example, Critical mind: pupils 
should be developing an interest in religious beliefs and 
practices, and in the main questions and issues with which 
religions are concerned. A critical mind is not specifically a 
religious attitude, the attitude as it is stated is 
specifically religious linked as it is with religious content. 
197 
c) religious attitudes, for example, Wonder and awe in the 
presence of true mystery. Despite the specification of 
content, in the form "in the presence of true mystery", it can 
be argued that any experience of awe is a fundamental 
religious reaction. This implies that all reactions of awe are 
reactions that are fundamentally religious in their nature. 
This uses the term "religious" to include reactions that 
recognise in phenomena something beyond the empirically 
explicable. Not all such reactions would qualify as religious, 
but a reaction such as awe would be included. The reason that 
awe would be included is because it seems that awe involvesthe 
recognition of some element in the phenomenon that is of the 
nature of ultimacy, it goes beyond everyday experience to an 
experience of the numinous • 
The attitude of .. awe and wonder in the presence of true 
mystery" echoes to some degree the view of religion given by 
Wilson (1971) which is quoted above. There is no real 
corresponding attitude to this mentioned in any of the other 
lists of attitudes although it is mentioned in some of the 
other documents, for example Durham refers to something 
similar in its list of concepts. This particular attitude, as 
it is stated, may well be contentious in that some people 
would deny the existence of such thing as true mystery in any 
sense that it may be used in a religious context. If Barrow's 
(1976) theory of two interpretative attitudes is accepted then 
those that would consider any mystery of life interpreted in 
religious terms as unnecessary and meaningless would also 
198 
reject this attitude on the same grounds. Thus if 
consideration is to be given to all interpretations of the 
meaning of existence on the same basis, an approach without 
presuppositions as to a final truth, then this attitude would 
have to be rejected as it already implies a particular view of 
life. 
It has already been noted that whilst awe and wonder might be 
a reaction to phenomena at a fundamental level, they do not 
have to be religious in the "usual" sense of the word 
religious. That is they do not have to be attached to a belief 
in God. Poets, for example, attempt to express awe and wonder 
without reference to God. Thus, if the words "in the presence 
of true mystery" are removed, the attitude of awe and wonder 
may still be an appropriate attitude for religious education, 
if not a key attitude. 
Of the other two groups of attitudes that are included in the 
lists of attitudes, it is possible to consider them as one 
group if those of group (b) are read without including the 
references to content that is specifically religious. Both 
group (a) and (b) can then be seen as attitudes not exclusive 
to religious education. The attitudes are intended to describe 
an end state, this is what would be expected of attitudes 
stated as objectives. It is reasonable to suggest that the 
attitudes, when devoid of references to religious content, 
would each be included in a list of the attitudes that most 
people would consider to be the attributes of an educated man. 
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This also includes the attitude of awe and wonder to some 
extent. It is an attitude that may appear in a list of the 
general attitudes required by a man in order to be considered 
as educated. This is because it is an attitude which gives a 
depth to the view of a particular situation or phenomenon, the 
depth that might be expected of an educated man. This would 
tend to suggest that in an objectives model some kind of 
religious education would be necessary to give this depth, 
this consideration of ultimacy, that would be expected of the 
e<W a ted man. 
The attitudes, even with their religious content, may also be 
seen as attitudes that are required by the pupil in his study. 
They are attitudes that do not need to be seen as the end 
result of religious education, or of education in general when 
devoid of religious content, but as those attitudes that it is 
necessary for the pupil to adopt in order for his education to 
be successful. Even an attitude such as commitment is required 
if it is seen not as a commitment to a particular religious 
stance but to learning itself. This may seem to be a debatable 
point but commitment to a reigious stance, through the 
learning in religious education, is in one aspect the same as 
commitment to learning. No particular religious stance is put 
forward in the lists as the one to which the pupil should 
become committed. This is, of course, as it should be. The 
pupil's commitment is to that which he considers, or feels, is 
right. This is based on his interpretation of his learning 
experiences. In the respect that he becomes committed to the 
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end result of his learning he is committed to the learning. 
It is important that these attitudes can be seen as part of 
the process of learning rather than only as an end. They are 
then relevant to a process model of religious education. 
Having suggested that these attitudes, seen as means rather 
than as ends, are those that can be considered appropriate to 
the process of education, it is now desirable to examine the 
place of attitudes in a process model of religious education. 
Attitudes in a process model of religious education 
Whilst the process model of the curriculum has no desired end 
but rather concentrates on the process of education, it is 
useful to examine the concept of the educated man as it 
provides a useful illustration of the importance of attitudes. 
The educated man will certainly be knowledgable but it is not 
so easy to identify a particular piece of knowledge and be 
able to say that without that piece of knowledge a man could 
not be considered educated. The case is not so clear with 
regard to skills if they are seen in a general way. If, 
however, they are linked to a particular area of content, such 
as may have to be done if there is to be a reasonable degree 
of certainty that there will be transfer of training, then it 
might be possible to say the same for them as has been said 
about knowledge. These are tentative proposals and it is easy 
to exaggerate them. However, with attitudes the case is much 
clearer. Few would argue that a man is educated if he did not 
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possess certain attitudes, for example a respect for rational 
argument and intellectual integrity. Thus to the educated man 
certain attitudes are essential. 
The same can be said to apply to attitudes and the process 
model, for it to work successfully certain attitudes are 
essential, on the part of the pupil and the teacher. Certain 
attitudes are required of the teacher before the teacher would 
embrace the notion of education as process and before they 
could with integrity teach it in the way required by the 
nature of the model. Certain attitudes are also required from 
the pupils so that they will respond to the type of learning 
experience that will be offered within the model. The process 
model assumes and propagates the attitudes of a liberal 
democracy, as that is the view of society in which a view of 
education as process is possible and can flourish. 
Religious education does not require any special attitudes 
other than those that sustain a liberal democracy. The 
attitudes that are represented as particular to religious 
education seem to be general attitudes that are attached to a 
particular piece of content, that are represented in one 
aspect of the general attitude. For example, to respect the 
religious beliefs of other men is one aspect of respect for 
one's fellow man applied to the area of religious belief. The 
list of attitudes in appendix C, when devoid of content and 
seen as means rather than ends, are those required of the 
pupil by the process model. They are also those that the 
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teacher should exemplify. 
Religious ed uca t ion also deals with attitudes in another way, 
in that it deals with concepts towards which it asks the 
pupils to develop an attitude. It does not require them to 
develop any specific attitude although it would be hoped by 
the teacher that the attitude thus developed did not 
contradict any of the attitudes on which the model is based. 
The attitude that it is hoped the pupil will adopt then 
becomes part of the pupil's life stance. Such attitudes relate 
to concepts such as the nature of man. The subject also deals 
with the pupil's attitudes in a reflective way in that it will 
ask the pupils to examine their attitudes and develop them 
into a coherent life stance. 
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Summary 
The teaching of attitudes must be as much at a non-rational 
level as at a rational level. A purely rational approach may 
not have the desired effects and may be resisted by the pupils 
for a wide range of reasons relating to the pupil as an 
individual with his own interpretation of his experiences. 
Characterisation, the development of an overall, consistent 
attitude to life, is the provinmce 
education should operate. 
in which religious 
Within a process model the teaching, and therefore the 
teaching of attitudes, is limited by the nature of the model 
and the nature of society on which it is based. There are 
limited responses open to the teacher when a pupil wishes to 
follow a line of inquiry which the teacher, and society in 
general, find undesirable. 
Only attitudes relating to awe and wonder may be, possibly, 
the exclusive realm of religious education. 
The process model requires that the teacher and the pupil 
adopt certain attitudes towards the learning process. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
A FRAMEWORK FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN A PROCESS MODEL 
The task 
The task of this chapter is to provide a framework in which a 
syllabus for religious education could be planned within a 
process model of the curriculum. This can be seen in two 
stages, firstly a definition or description of the principles 
upon which a process model of the curriculum could operate, 
and secondly a definition or description of the area that is 
meant by the term religious education. Peter's principles of 
procedure, and the way that Stenhouse uses the notion to offer 
a way of describing a process model, have already been 
examined. It is this line of thought that will be developed in 
this chapter. 
The function of principles of procedure in describing a 
process model can be expressed quite simply. Basic to the 
process model is a view of education as of intrinsic value. If 
it is the process that is important then it can operate on an 
almost infinite range of content. Much of the content would 
not normally be included in a curriculum but, because of the 
nature of the model, it cannot be excluded and may become part 
of the pupil's inquiry. For example, the pupil may wish to 
pursue the topic of torture, either from some stimulus such as 
the work of Amnesty International or from a morbid interest in 
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the inflicting of pain. For whatever reason the pupil is 
interested in the subject it is a valid area of inquiry, 
particularly in religious education with its concern for the 
nature of man. Within the process model it is not possible for 
the teacher to state that the aim of his teaching is for the 
pupil to recognise the inherent evil in torture. What the 
teacher must do is proceed in such a way that the pupil is 
given the opportunity to realise the nature of torture and 
relate it to the rest of his experiences and his own view of 
life. Well adjusted pupils, given sufficient facilities to 
investigate the subject and enough experience of their own to 
which to relate the new learning, should be able to recognise 
the evil in torture for themselves. The principles of 
procedure set out the way in which the teacher should approach 
the task of teaching such that pupils may be able to form 
their own, informed opinion. They should also offer 
principles on which the selection of content can be based. 
The challenge in writing a set of principles of procedure is 
that they must be sufficient to ensure that it is education, 
of intrinsic value, that takes place in the classroom and not 
learning of any other kind. Thus it is by reference to the 
principles of procedure that, if a study of torture was to be 
included as a planned part of a course, it would be studied 
not as a useful practical lesson but to bring out its inherent 
evil nature and to illustrate some more fundamental question 
of values. 
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General principles of procedure 
For the general principles of procedure that describe the 
view of education as process there are two examples that give 
guidance. The first of these is Raths' "criteria for 
worthwhile activities" (see appendix B) and these offer a 
useful starting point. They are certainly not beyond 
challenge, for example the suggestion that areas of inquiry 
that are not normally explored provide more worthwhile 
activities than common areas of inquiry does not appear to 
particularly useful, or even valid. It is not easy to see why 
this was considered important by Raths, certainly it would not 
be desirable that pupils went over the same topic many times 
but this is not necessarily the point that Raths is making. 
However, it is possible to accept the general purpose and 
tone of Rath's criteria 
individually. 
without accepting each point 
Raths' criteria are very general, as they were apparently 
intended to be1 but they also seem to lack coherence. They are 
certainly all directed towards the same end but they appear as 
random statements rather than as a planned group of statements 
that cover all the relevant areas of concern for the planning 
of teaching. However, Raths' criteria will be used as the 
basis of the general principles of procedure which are to be 
proposed although they will be placed into a 
organisation. 
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form of 
The other example that can be drawn upon is the pedagogical 
aims that are connected to M.A.C.o.s. (Hanley, Whitla, Moo, 
Walter, 1970, 5). These are linked to a particular course and 
cannot be taken to apply to any other course as they stand. 
They are therefore less general than the criteria of Raths but 
they do offer some further ideas as to what could be included 
in a list of general principles of procedure for the 
description of a process model. 
The following principles of procedure are an amalgam of those 
points of Raths and Macos that seem to be most important and 
relevant. They seem to offer a general description of what is 
intended as teaching within a process model of the curriculum. 
A) With regard to the learning conforming to the view of 
education as a process, within a liberal democracy. 
Activities should conform to the criteria that they 
1) require students to engage in inquiry into ideas, 
theories, beliefs and explanations of phenomena. 
2) permit students to make informed choices in carrying 
out the activity and to reflect on the consequences of their 
choices. 
3) involve the students in the application and mastery of 
meaningful rules, standards and disciplines. 
B) With regard to the pupil as a person. 
Activities should be such that 
4) students can recognise the legitimacy of the search, 
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and appreciate and accept the risk of success or failure in 
the search for definitive answers. 
5) they involve the students in that which is relevant to 
them, and is recognised by them as relevant. 
C) With regard to pedagogy. 
Activities should be such that 
6) they involve the student with realia (i.e. real 
objects,materials, beliefs). 
7) they may be accomplished successfully by students at 
several different levels of ability. 
8) they require the students to re-examine in a new 
setting, and build upon, ideas, an application of an 
intellectual process or a current problem that has previously 
been studied. 
D) With regard to the role of the pupil. 
The students should take active roles in the learning 
situation and be required 
9) to rewrite, rehearse, and polish their initial efforts. 
10) to share in the planning, the carrying out of the plan 
or the results of an activity with others. 
11) to set realistic targets for themselves, and make 
an accurate assessment of their activities and results. 
E) With regard to the role of the teacher. 
12) the role of the teacher should be that of guide and 
resource. 
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These groupings and headings 
definitive. It is possible to 
should 
move some 
not be seen as 
of them around to 
other groups, for example, (6) could be in group B or group C, 
by placing the emphasis on a different word in the statement. 
The groupings and headings are rather an attempt to make the 
principles as coherent and as comprehensible as possible. 
Neither are the principles themselves definitive, they are 
only descriptive statements and are hence open to 
interpretation. For example, (7) requires the activity to be 
capable of being accomplished successfully by pupils of 
different abilities. What is meant by "successfully" may be 
different for pupils of different abilities, and may also have 
a variety of meanings for different teachers. The principles 
of procedure have deliberately been kept short in order to 
enable them give a manageable impression of a process model. 
Some of them may require further explanation in order to make 
their intention clear. 
The difficulty of the precise definition of educational 
objectives has been considered carefully. Principles of 
procedure are not intended to be definitive of the process of 
education, that would seem to be impossible. Neither is it 
necessarily desirable, the principles are principles upon 
which the educational experience will be planned. They are 
intended to be descriptive of the process of learning that is 
the essence of an understanding of the nature of education. 
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The principles are not rigid rules, all of which must be 
complied with at all times. They are rather the principles on 
which the teacher will act when a situation arises relevant to 
that particular principle. The first group are somewhat 
different from the others in that if the learning is not 
according to the spirit of these three criteria, which reflect 
the view of education as process in a liberal democracy, then 
the learning would not normally be within the definition of 
education that has been adopted. They can thus be seen to some 
extent as criteria rather than as principles. This applies not 
only if the content cannot be made to conform to the criteria, 
for example learning to type cannot meet criteria 1 or 2. It 
also applies if the content is presented in such a way that 
acceptance of a proposition is expected without the pupil 
being given an opportunity to consider possible alternatives. 
Principle 4 requires a certain attitude from the student 
towards his learning, one that must be fostered by the teacher 
and which is closely connected with the way in which the 
teacher plans the approach to the learning. It requires that 
the pupil adopts the same attitude to education that is held 
by the teacher, that the process of education is of intrinsic 
value. It is not easy to specify stategies that will bring 
about this attitude in the pupils but it may well be the case 
that the first steps would come through the interest of the 
pupil, that the pupil enjoys the learning. This in turn is 
recognised by principle 5, the pupil is more likely to respond 
positively to that which is perceived as relevant rather than 
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irrelevant. This can also be seen as justification for the 
inclusion of principle 6. It is reasonable to suggest that 
realia is more likely to be perceived as relevant by the pupil 
than secondary sources, although this may not always be so 
with regard to the interest of the pupil. It may be argued 
that principle 6 is not worthy of a place in the list, it may 
seem to be a minor consideration compared to many others. It 
is not necessary, however, that all of the principles should 
be of equal importance, just that they are all relevant to the 
pupil's learning and this principle is consistent with the 
impression of the type of education being described. 
Principle 7 reflects the need for all pupils in a learning 
experience to be able to respond at their own level, a 
particularly important consideration in classes that have 
pupils of different abilities. There is also a correlation 
with the previous group of principles in that it would seem 
unlikely that a pupil would perceive as relevant any situation 
that he found incomprehensible or trivial. It is also possible 
to refer this principle to the comment of Bruner that by 
teaching the structure of knowledge it is possible to teach 
anything in an intellectually respectable manner to different 
levels of ability. Principle 8 reflects some of the points in 
the list of commonly agreed points of understanding about 
learning. 
The principles in group D can be seen as referring, amongst 
other things, to the development of the pupil's learning how 
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to learn. Principle 9 relates to the development of self 
discipline, in not accepting the first results as an easy 
option, as well as learning. Principles 10 and 11 require the 
pupil to look at the process of learning and to make realistic 
judgements about it. 
Principles of procedure for religious education 
It could be argued that the general principles of procedure 
are quite adequate and that all that is needed is to specify 
the content that is appropriate to the subject area. The 
principles that will be put forward do specify, or rather 
indicate, the area that is religious education. They also go 
further in that they indicate the type of approach that is 
appropriate to the subject. They are thus able to offer more 
direction to the teacher of religious education than a list of 
content. It would be inaccurate to call them principles of 
procedure that are specific to religious education as some of 
them are clearly not specific. They are rather principles of 
procedure that are particularly appropriate to religious 
education. 
The activities that are particularly relevant to religious 
education are those that require the students 
1) to examine questions, aspects of life and their 
experience in the dimension of ultimacy. 
2) to become involved in experiences that are liable to 
open the students to realisation, in both its rational and 
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non-rational aspects. 
3) to consider other people's views of life alongside 
their own. 
4) to examine the ways that belief may affect and motivate 
the believer. 
5) to suspend their own beliefs and judgements and enter 
into a situation from another person's point of view. 
6) to use religious language and symbols. 
7) to become involved in inquiry into the fundamental, 
categorial, concepts of life stances. 
This list is not definitive, it consists of descriptive 
statements that can be phrased in other ways and does not 
contain all that could be included in the list. As with the 
previous list of general principles of procedure the list is 
descriptive not definitive. In this case it is descriptive of 
what is understood to be the essence of religious education. 
It offers the basis on which religious education could be 
introduced to pupils within a process model of the curriculum. 
Each of the statements requires some explantion as to its 
precise intention. 
Principle 1 sets out the adapted version of Wittgenstein's 
first characteristic of religious belief. It requires that 
pupils look beyond the immediate, beyond the initial reaction 
and the first impact of a perception. It involves the pupils 
in a search for value and meaning that relates to the depth of 
experience. To give a simple illustration, when a person runs 
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out of words and declares "that is what I believe" that is the 
province of religious education. Religious education should 
not be satisfied with the statement "that is what I believe" 
but then go on to look at the implications of the belief that 
is acknowledged thus. The concept of ultimacy has been 
referred to by many thinkers under many different titles, many 
of them specifically religious but others capable of a secular 
interpretation. In the final analysis ultimacy seems to be 
beyond description and is most closely experienced in the 
feelings of believers. This is the area that is referred to by 
some as the spiritual but without the presuppositions of that 
term. It even has meaning to those that deny any ultimacy, by 
reference to their denial their picture is set in the 
dimension of ultimacy in that to them the ultimate is also the 
temporal. 
Principle 2 requires that the pupils be given an opportunity 
to have what may be interpreted as a religious experience. To 
those that deny any such thing as religious experience, 
interpreting such experience in psychological terms, the term 
"insight" might be preferable. Either way the phenomenon under 
consideration is that type of perception that has an effect on 
the perceiver not only in terms of understanding but also in 
that it requires some change in the perceiver as a result of 
that perception. In fact the term believer can be substituted 
for perceiver because the type of perception that is being 
referred to will become part of the picture that is used by 
the perceiver, hence it is part of their belief. 
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The two principles above deal particularly with the pupil's 
own search for belief by requiring the pupil to look at 
content in a manner that may be seen as of the essence 
of religious inquiry. They also require the pupil to become 
open to experiences that will develop the picture that the 
pupil uses to interpret life. The next three principles are 
concerned primarily with the way that the pupil approaches 
other people's views of life. 
Principle 3 refers to the attitude that it is necessary for 
the pupil to adopt if the type of education that is envisaged 
is to be possible. Thus this requirement, to some extent, 
underpins the others. By "consider" is meant that the pupil 
makes an examination of the views of others that is both 
honest and respectful. By "honest" is meant those qualities of 
intellectual integrity and fairness, and by "respecting" is 
meant that the inquiry is based on an acceptance of the 
validity of the other person's belief to that other person. In 
this case "validity" refers particularly to the believers 
seeing his beliefs as true and being committed to them. It 
also includes his right to hold his beliefs. The willingness 
to consider other people's views on these terms is essential 
for religious education in 
attitude the pupil cannot look 
the process model. Without this 
at the beliefs of another 
person in any way they reflects the true nature of the belief 
to the believer. This principle refers primarily to the 
rational nature of the other person's belief. 
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Principle 4 requires the pupil to examine the effects of the 
belief on the believer. It reflects the importance of the 
other two characteristics of Wittgenstein's view of religious 
belief, the affective and commissive components. This 
principle will require the pupils to be engaged in the use of 
the skill of empathy in order to examine, to any extent, 
these aspects of belief. "Motivate" refers not only to the 
observable reactions of the believer but also to the 
requirement placed upon the believer to change, to live up to 
the life stance in which he places his faith. 
Principle 5 goes one stage further than principle 4 and 
requires that the pupils become involved in the reactions of 
believers to their belief. This will involve the pupil in the 
use of the skill of epoche if the pupil is to enter 
realistically into the feelings of other people. By use of 
this skill it is also possible that the pupil will be involved 
in situations that lead to a realisation on the part of the 
pupil. 
The last two principles relate primarily to the selection of 
content. Principle 6 needs more amplification than most of the 
other principles because it is much briefer than the 
implications that it carries. The use of religious language is 
not simply a matter of using terms such as God but, as has 
been shown earlier, making the appropriate connections to the 
qualifying terms such as father. These connections are 
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particularly important if there is to be any useful form of 
communication between believers about their beliefs. Thus the 
pupil needs to be able to make the appropriate connections 
when other people communicate their faith to him. The pupil 
also needs to be able to consider his own picture and express 
that picture to others and for this he needs to be able to use 
religious language. This may seem to be an objective rather 
than a principle. It could be worded, for example, as "the 
pupil will be able to understand the correct connections to 
make in religious language". It is a principle and not an 
objective because the choice of content that allows the pupil 
to practise the use of religious language does not specify 
what the pupil is to make of the language, what interpretation 
is to be put on it. Obviously the interpretation that is to be 
desired is that of the believer. However, it is not 
necessarily always true that the teacher understands the mind 
of the believer better than the pupil. Particularly where the 
pupil's own beliefs may be closer to those beliefs under 
inquiry than the teachers. Also it is necessary to bear in 
mind the point made by Wittgenstein that what the non-believer 
cannot accept is not what the believer claims to believe. This 
exposes the shortcomings of the comparison of the way that two 
people use a picture that is possible with any language, 
including religious language. Thus this intention is not meant 
as an objective but as an essential part of the process. The 
more able the pupil is in the use of "religious" language the 
better he can communicate with others and make himself 
understood. 
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Principle 7 reflects the importance of the presuppositions on 
which the picture of the believer is based. This principle is 
related to principle 4, the consideration of other people's 
views should take into account the fundamental concepts of 
that view. They are necessary to a proper understanding of the 
way that other people use a picture. 
The above two sets of principles of procedure provide the 
framework within which religious education in a process model 
can be planned. They are guidelines, principles by which to be 
guided, rather than laws that must be observed dogmatically. 
It is possible that, in certain circumstances, two principles 
may contradict one another. For example, the risk of success 
or failure does not fit in easily, in all circumstances, with 
the principle that requires the pupils to rehearse and polish 
their initial efforts. The first one seems to require 
spontaneity whilst the second requires a much more deliberate 
approach. It is not difficult to see that these two principles 
may clash. It is for the teacher to decide the emphasis to 
placed on particular principles in each area of inquiry. 
There are only hints in the principles of procedure as to the 
selection of content and this is another area in which the 
teacher must make decisions. There are many factors that must 
be taken into account before such decisions can be made. It 
would seem that only the teacher is in a position to take into 
account all of the relevant factors. Clearly the process model 
219 
places a great emphasis on the professionalism and the 
competence of the teacher. It would now seem appropriate to 
look at some of the other considerations that are relevant to 
the development of religious education in a process model. 
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Summary 
It is possible to propose two sets of principles of procedure 
on which the planning of religious education in a process 
could take place. 
General principles of procedure can be compiled from those 
offered by Raths and M.A.c.o.s .• These give general principles 
relating to the process model of the curriculum. 
Seven principles of procedure are proposed as relevant to, and 
descriptive of, the area of religious education. These were 
compiled from the discussion of concepts, skills and 
attitudes, and the nature of religious belief, in the previous 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter will look at some of the points that have been 
raised in previous chapters and that have been brought up by 
setting religious education in a process model. It is not 
intended to be an exhaustive inquiry into all of the 
considerations that need to be taken into account before 
religious education within a process model should be taught in 
school. For example, no mention is made of the facilities that 
would be desirable, or necessary. It is intended to outline 
some of the aspects of implementation that 
considered, and offer some comments on them. 
Integration 
should be 
The process model raises the question of subject boundaries 
and the problem of whether they present artificial barriers to 
learning. The process model emphasises the intrinsic value to 
the learner of being involved in the process of education, it 
emphasises the value of the inquiry. It also emphasises that 
the important thing is the learner understanding, making sense 
of experience, rather than the understanding of a subject. In 
this sense the process model sets out the value of an 
integrated approach to learning. Blenkin and Kelly make this 
point when they suggest that 
"This is the real and only point of a unified approach to 
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curriculum, namely that the basis of its coherence is the 
internal logic of the individual's organisation of his own 
experience rather than only the logic of the subject - matter 
itself." (Blenkin and Kelly, 1981, 134) 
This takes a view of subjects as of secondary importance to 
the understanding of the learner. There is a sense however in 
which the subjects do contribute to the understanding of the 
learner. It is clear that subjects can offer a pattern of 
understanding of some aspect of human experience. They offer a 
discipline by which to study some aspect of experience that 
has shown itself profitable in terms of understanding.The 
Keele Integrated Studies Project claimed that 
"The main thing at stake is to regard subjects as tools of 
enquiry and not just bodies of information." 
(Schools Council, 1972, 10) 
The subjects can be seen as tools of inquiry that have 
demonstrated their worth. This does not mean that the 
approaches of the various relevant disciplines cannot be 
combined into an integrated approach to the study, and 
understanding, of some aspect of experience. It seems however 
that in any integration of the various disciplines into a 
unified approach the characteristics of each approach should 
not be lost, as it is these characteristics that have made 
that approach to the understanding of experience successful. 
By setting out the 
are particularly 
particular principles of procedure that 
relevant to religious education, the 
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characteristics of the approach of religion to the 
understanding of experience have also been indicated. Thus, in 
an integrated study it is possible to identify the 
contribution that may be made by an approach that is 
"religious". The process model requires that no artificial 
restrictions on learning are placed on the learner, and this 
is a point that should be remembered in religious education in 
a process model, and thus the development of an integrated 
approach in this model may be inevitable. One of the first 
steps that it seems necessary to take, the identification of 
the particular contribution of each of the disciplines 
involved, is represented by the particular principles of 
procedure as stated for religious education, for the field of 
religious inquiry. 
Realisation and bias 
Religious education in a process model seems to offer a form 
for religious education that cannot be seen as objectionable 
by any rational parent because it does not require the pupils 
to adopt any particular point of view. This does not mean 
that it is an education into agnosticism but rather that no 
one viewpoint is taught as the truth, and all other viewpoints 
as in some way flawed. There is however one aspect in which 
agnosticism may be necessary. The teacher should not use their 
position to influence the pupils towards any particular 
viewpoint and so the teacher should not assert as true one 
viewpoint against a contrary opinion or belief. If questioned 
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by the pupil the teacher may have to revert to the statement 
that certain groups believe one thing and that other groups 
believe another. The teacher should adopt the position of 
fellow seeker, an agnostic position, with the pupil. 
The only area in which religious education in a process model 
might be seen as objectionable is if the content that is 
studied is considered objectionable. This situation might 
exist if such subjects as astrology were examined, some 
parents who are fundamentalist Christians, or Jews or Muslims, 
may see these subjects as outside the experiences that they 
wish their children to have. 
The other objection from some parents is that religious 
education is not directed enough towards the pupil's 
understanding of a particular life stance, a life stance that 
the parents endorse and/or an understanding of which is 
considered important for the pupil. One would assume that if 
the importance of this life stance were so great, the parents 
themselves would introduce it to the pupil, and in fact it 
represents the picture that is used by the parents. To some 
extent religious education in the process model may reinforce 
the teaching of the parents in the home. If realisation is an 
important part of the development of a life stance, as has 
been suggested it is, then this realisation is likely to have 
the content of that which is most familiar to the pupil. To 
suggest a parallel, if a Roman Catholic has a vision it is 
more likely to be of the Virgin Mary than it is to be of 
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Shiva, in the same way that a Hindu is more likely to have a 
vision of Shiva. Thus realisation is most likely to reflect 
the background of the pupil, the background supplied by the 
most influential elements in their life. Among this small 
group of influential elements must surely come the home. 
The content of religious education 
There has been no specification of the content of religious 
education within a process model as yet. Some of the 
principles of procedure indicate some of the elements of 
content that should be the subject of the pupil's activities, 
for example religious language and categorial concepts, but 
there has been no suggestion as to what religious language or 
from which religion the categorial concepts should be taken. 
Certainly it has been suggested that the content may be set by 
the interests of the pupil, if the pupil wishes to make an 
inquiry into any relevant area then it seems to be part of the 
nature of the process model that the pupil be permitted, and 
encouraged, to make that inquiry. This is far removed from the 
planning of the educational experience that is required of 
teachers, it seems quite obvious that the teacher cannot 
simply wait for the pupil to declare an interest in some 
relevant area. 
The teacher must therefore choose the content on which to 
base the pupil's learning experience. The principles of 
procedure give some help in this but not very much. In fact 
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the model is quite adaptable to a wide range of approaches 
with regard to content. For example, teachers may decide that 
their own experience and expertise lies primarily in the 
Judaeo/Christian tradition and that the content of the 
syllabus that will be presented to the pupils will be based on 
that tradition. Another teacher may feel that a much wider 
range of content is necessary reflecting a wider range of 
beliefs in the local community. As long as both teachers 
conform to the principles of procedure, and allow the pupil to 
question and develop his own lines of inquiry, then they can 
both use the process model as the basis of the planning of 
their teaching. What cannot be acceptable is for the 
Christian, or any other, faith to be presented as the only 
source of truth, this would be contrary to the principles of 
procedure. 
The process model may even be followed by those involved in 
the organisation of the Christian group that is often found in 
schools as an extra-curricular activity. That much more 
questioning of the faith may be the result of adopting the 
process model is quite possible but this will only reflect the 
current attitude of some in the Anglican Church, that faith is 
an exploration rather than a set of dogma. There seems to be 
a similarity between this idea of faith and the process model 
of education that may deserve some serious consideration by 
those within the Christian religion who are concerned with the 
education of the young in that faith. This would seem to be 
more relevant to Christian education than perhaps Islam, which 
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has a different attitude to God and to revelation. 
Constraints on implementation 
Edwards (1983) suggests that there are at least three 
constraints on the implementation of the process model in a 
secondary school and these are related to the attitudes of the 
pupils to education in school. Firstly, the pupils expect a 
secondary school to be highly structured and authoritarian. 
This is a constraint because a process model requires the 
pupil to develop their own inquiry, to propose and carry out 
activities on their own initiative. This aspect of the process 
model is expressed in the general principles of procedure that 
were proposed in the last chapter, specifically that they 
should share in the planning of activities. This would seem to 
be a particular problem if only some subjects were taught 
according to a process model and others were taught according 
to an objectives model, the pupil may find the necessary 
adjustment difficult. However, it is a problem that may well 
disappear when the pupils perceive what is required of them 
within a process model, and pupils do react differently to 
different subjects according to their different perceptions of 
them. 
The second constraint is that pupils expect education to be 
instrumental and utilitarian. This attitude is experienced 
frequently in religious education, the pupils will often 
question the point of doing religious education because they 
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do not want to be a vicar. Once again, this point is 
recognised in the general principles of procedure, requiring 
the pupils to recognise the legitimacy of the search. It is a 
valid point that has no simple solution. It requires the 
pupils to change their attitude towards learning. 
The third constraint is that pupils perceive work that is not 
written as of less importance. This seems to be a minor 
consideration, the pupils may well be required to produce some 
written work as part of their inquiry. They will also be 
required, according to the general principles of procedure, to 
rewrite and rehearse their initial efforts and this is liable 
to produce in the pupils a perception of their work as of 
value. 
Assessment 
The methods of assessment that are used within an objectives 
model of the curriculum are not necessarily of value within a 
process model. Within the objectives model there are 
prespecified targets for the pupil to reach and it is thus 
possible to use criteria based referencing, although the 
general methods of assessment that are used are norm based. 
Within the process model, criteria based referencing is not 
possible, by the nature of the model it is not possible to set 
certain standards of skill and knowledge that must be attained 
by the pupil to gain a certain grade. Equally, with regard 
to norm based referencing, the process model is concerned less 
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with results than with the activity, the assessment of the 
pupils should reflect this concern by assessing the way that 
the pupil performed in the activity rather than just by the 
end result. This does not mean that the end result will not be 
assessed, it is an important part of the assessment because it 
is the culmination of the activity. Its importance is by 
reference to its part in the activity rather than as an end. 
The general principles of procedure require the pupils to 
assess their own activities and results and this is an 
essential part of the learning within the process model. By 
self assessment it is possible for the pupils to learn more 
about themselves and also to improve their performance in the 
next activities. This is a reflection of the comment by 
Stenhouse (1975, 83) with regard to teachers and the 
objectives model. Improvement of practice does not come from 
raising standards higher but 
current performance. Detailed 
by examination and criticism of 
discussion of the possible 
methods by which this assessment can be made is not practical 
in the limited space available but it is an area that requires 
and deserves careful consideration. 
The role of the teacher 
It may be argued that the best of teacher models in an 
objectives based view of the curriculum, such as care and 
concern for the pupil as an individual person, are part of the 
requirements of the teacher operating within the process 
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model. This is part of the challenge of the process model to 
teachers that it demands of the teachers the highest 
professional practices for it to be successful, it requires 
the teachers to examine and improve their practice. It is 
possible to suggest that as a result the education of the 
pupils will improve, which is the intention of all committed 
teachers. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMMON AGREEMENT IN LEARNING THEORIES. 
) 
1) Behaviour is a function of the learners perception. 
2) A motivated learner will learn more quickly than 
one who is not motivated. 
3) Motivation that is too intense may be 
accompanied by distracting emotional states. 
4) Learning under the control of reward is usually 
preferable to learning under the control of punishment. 
5) Learning under intrinsic motivation is better 
than under extrinsic motivation. 
6) Tolerance for failure is best taught through 
providing a backlog of success that compensates for 
experienced failure. 
7) Individuals need practice in setting realistic 
goals for themselves which will lead to more satisfactory 
improvement. 
8) Individual differences affect learning. Such 
differences may be biogenic or socio/cultural. 
9) Similar situations may elicit different reactions from 
different learners. 
10) Active participation by a learner is preferable 
to passive reception. 
11) Meaningful material and tasks are more readily 
learnt than nonsense. 
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12) There is no substitute for repetitive practice for 
memorization of unrelated facts or the overlearning of skills; 
particularly with spaced or distributive recalls. 
13) Information about the nature of a performance aids 
learning, particularly if it is immediate. 
14) Transfer is much less than is usually expected but can 
be increased if the learner discovers relationships and if 
experience is wide, particularly of applying principles. 
15) Group atmosphere affects both learning product and 
accrued satisfaction. 
16) All learnings are multiple. Though focus may be on one 
particular (desired) outcome other learnings take place 
simultaneously. 
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APPENDIX B 
RATHS "CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING WORTHWHILE ACTIVITIES" 
All other things being equal, one activity is more 
worthwhile than another if:-
1) it permits children to make informed choices in 
carrying out the activity and to reflect on the consequences 
of their choices. 
2) it assigns to students active roles in the learning 
situation rather than passive ones. 
3) it asks students to engage in inquiry into ideas, 
applications of intellectual processes, or current problems, 
either personal or social. 
4) it involves children with realia (i.e. real objects, 
materials and artefacts). 
5) completion of the activity may be accomplished 
successfully by children at several different levels of 
ability. 
6) it asks students to examine in a new setting an idea, 
an application of an intellectual process, or a current 
problem which has been previously studied. 
7) it requires students to examine topics or issues that 
citizens in our society do not normally examine - and that are 
typically ignored by the major communication media in the 
nation. 
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8) it involves students and faculty members in "risk" 
taking - not a risk of life and limb, but of success or 
failure. 
9) it requires students to rewrite, rehearse, and polish 
their initial efforts. 
10) it involves students in the application and mastery of 
meaningful rules, standards, or disciplines. 
11) it gives students the chance to share the planning, 
the carrying out of a plan, or the results of an activity with 
others. 
12) it is relevant to the expressed purposes of the 
students. 
(Raths, 1971, 716) 
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